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Abstract
The increasing scale and distribution of modern pervasive computing and service-based plat-
forms makes manual maintenance and evolution difficult and too slow. Systems should therefore
be designed to self-adapt in response to environment changes, which requires the use of on-line
models and analysis. Although there has been a considerable amount of work on architectural
modelling and behavioural analysis of component-based systems, there is a need for approaches
that integrate the architectural, behavioural and management aspects of a system. In partic-
ular, the lack of support for composability in probabilisitic behavioural models prevents their
systematic use for adapting systems based on changes in their non-functional properties. Of
these non-functional properties, this thesis focuses on reliability.
We introduce Probabilistic Component Automata (PCA) for describing the probabilistic be-
haviour of those systems. Our formalism simultaneously overcomes three of the main limitations
of existing work: it preserves a close correspondence between the behavioural and architectural
views of a system in both abstractions and semantics; it is composable as behavioural models
of composite components are automatically obtained by combining the models of their con-
stituent parts; and lastly it is probabilistic thereby enabling analysis of non-functional properties.
PCA also provide constructs for representing failure, failure propagation and failure handling
in component-based systems in a manner that closely corresponds to the use of exceptions in
programming languages. Although PCA is used throughout this thesis for reliability analysis,
the model can also be seen as an abstract process algebra that may be applicable for analysis
of other system properties.
We further show how reliability analysis based on PCA models can be used to perform ar-
chitectural adaptation on distributed component-based systems and evaluate the computational
cost of decentralised adaptation decisions. To mitigate the state-explosion problem associated
with composite models, we further introduce an algorithm to reduce a component’s PCA model
to one that only represents its interface behaviour. We formally show that such model preserves
the properties of the original representation. By experiment, we show that the reduced models
are significantly smaller than the original, achieving a reduction of more than 80% on both the
number of states and transitions. A further benefit of the approach is that it allows component
profiling and probabilistic interface behaviour to be extracted independently for each component,
thereby enabling its exchange between different organisations without revealing commercially
sensitive aspects of the components’ implementations.
5
The contributions and results of this work are evaluated both through a series of small scale
examples and through a larger case study of an e-Banking application derived from Java EE
training materials. Our work shows how probabilistic non-functional properties can be integrated
with the architectural and behavioural models of a system in an intuitive and scalable way that
enables automated architecture reconfiguration based on reliability properties using composable
models.
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1. Introduction
Due to their increasing complexity, modern distributed applications need to be permanently
maintained and frequently changed to ensure their robustness in the face of a changing envi-
ronment [ST09, OMT08, CLG+09]. Making such changes manually is too difficult, slow and
error prone. Systems are therefore required to adapt autonomously in face of changes in their
environment or in their operational conditions. On top of that, the rapid pace of change in
the execution environment makes it infeasible to anticipate all the possible changes at design-
time. To cope with unforeseen situations at runtime, systems should avoid depending only on
assumptions made at design w.r.t. the execution environment.
To achieve self-management, systems can resort to different mechanisms to adapt their be-
haviour and/or structure. These changes can be realised by changing parameters or by intro-
ducing proxy components that encapsulate and mediate interactions with other components
[SMCS04, MG05]. Transparent methods that do not require changing the source code of the ap-
plication can also be applied using middleware mechanisms that intercept messags/invocations
between components in order to adapt the system’s behaviour [SM04, OB99, RC02].
Although these approaches allow to manipulate the behaviour of an application, they tend to
be too low-level and specific to a particular programming language and/or application domains.
Architectural adaptation, where the system can be reconfigured by changing the bindings be-
tween components, provides a suitable level of abstraction for self-managed systems [SHMK08].
In the context of software architectures, a component provides a separation between structure
and implementation, and supports encapsulation of behaviour. It can equally well represent soft-
ware libraries, hardware devices or (web) services. Following component-based design, systems
are then built by composing loosely coupled components that provide higher-level functionality
by combining the capabilities of a set of (sub-)components.
When the system is being assembled or when reconfiguration is required, the set of possible
configurations for a system can be constructed from a description of functional requirements
and a list of available components. If multiple components offer the same functionality, non
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functional properties/Quality-of-Service (QoS) parameters, such as reliability and performance,
are often used to choose between alternative configurations.
Monitoring QoS metrics has been extensively studied in Network Management Systems [ACH98].
However, the QoS monitoring in existing management frameworks is usually deployed externally
to a running software system [LDS+08] and is not aware of the system model, e.g. its internal
structure. Monitoring non-functional parameters is thus performed for the system as a whole.
However, changes in non-functional parameters may be associated with a particular part (com-
ponent) of the system, or even a particular aspect of the implementation of a single component.
On top of that, non-functional properties that a component provides are also dependent on the
context in which the component is deployed. Although the reliability/performance of the in-
structions executed by a component plays an important role in determining the reliability/per-
formance provided by a component, the interactions with other components can also have a
significant impact. For example, a component may have some functionality that is unreliable
or slow, but if it is seldom used then its impact on the overall system reliability/performance is
minimal.
Model-based reliability analysis of a particular configuration typically analysed by modelling
the control flow between components and representing the failure of each component using a
Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) [Che80]. Reliability requirements are defined using Prob-
abilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) [BK08]. The performance of the system can be anal-
ogously analysed using a Continuous-Time Markov Chain model [FGT12], while performance
requirements are specified using Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [BK08]. Automatic verifi-
cation of reliability and performance requirements for DTMC and CTMC models, respectively,
is enabled through Model-checking tools such as PRISM [KNP].
Although this approach has been successfully applied to early reliability assessment of alterna-
tive architectural assemblies at design-time [IN08], when the system needs to adapt to changes
in requirements and in operational conditions at run-time, because new components become
available, or others may face degradation of their service or fail all together, only architectural
configurations defined at design-time can be considered if DTMC and CTMC models are used.
While DTMC and CTMC models support automatic analysis, the DTMC/CTMC model of a
system is not automatically constructed from the models of each component. Consequently,
a separate DTMC/CTMC model has to be manually defined for each architectural configura-
tion. When new components become available, human intervention is required to define the
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DTMC/CTMC model corresponding to each alternative configuration that involves the new
components. In fact, automating architecture reconfiguration at run-time presents significant
challenges.
An essential aspect to achieve automation is the composability of models, i.e. the ability to
derive the composite representation of a system configuration, using the model of each (sub-)
component. This has been successfully explored for software architectures [GMW00, MDEK95,
MT10], where a system can be structured as a composition of components. Such structure
is independent from the distributor/developer of each component as well as the programming
language used. As a result, the complexity of designing medium to large-scale systems is reduced
by supporting incremental elaboration. To this end, composite components provide higher-level
functionality whilst hiding their internal structure to other components. Software architectures
also enable reuse of previous successful designs, while the same component can be used in
different configurations.
Composable behaviour models using representations based on Labelled Transition Systems
(LTS) have also been widely used for analysis of the functional behaviour of distributed systems
[MK06, CES86, TK93, YY91, LSW95]. Similarly to software architectures models, behaviour
models provide generic high-level structures that are not specific to a particular programming
language. When used to model component-based systems, the behaviour of each component
is depicted as a separate LTS representation, thereby facilitating incremental modelling. The
behaviour model of a composite component (application) is then automatically constructed
by composing the individual LTS representation of each component. In most cases, the same
representation of a component’s behaviour can be used in any architecture configuration that
includes that component. LTS representations also support encapsulation of internal behaviour
by hiding internal actions. Additional operators enable representation of multiple bindings as
shared resources [MK06]. However, LTS models do not include probabilistic information and
therefore can only be used for behavioural analysis, e.g. deadlock and liveness properties.
Composability is less well supported for non-functional properties which require extending
behaviour models with stochastic information on the frequency of execution and/or duration
of actions. However, composing stochastic information is a challenging task which involves de-
termining a reasonable interpretation of probabilities in an automaton, which is then preserved
when composing with other models [SV04]. In the context of performance analysis, the Perfor-
mance Evaluation Process Algebra (PEPA) [Hil96] provides support for incremental definition
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and composition by exploring the properties of exponential distributions. However, these models
impose a different semantics based on the duration of actions, thus presenting limited support for
compositional analysis, where the internal behaviour of components is deleted before composing
with other components, and the associated stochastic information propagated to remaining ac-
tions. In addition, these models also have limited representations for failures, their propagation
and handling. They support analysis of non-functional requirements associated with questions
such as “what is the probability that the system fails within s units of time?” or “what is the av-
erage time until the system fails?”. In contrast, we focus in this thesis on reliability requirements
based on the reachability of failure states through discrete-time steps, which correspond to the
following questions: “what is the probability that the system fails?” or “what is the probability
of failure after action a?”.
Self-management thus requires addressing architectural, behavioural and non-functional as-
pects along with adaptation as first-class concerns. These aspects are interdependent and should
be considered together as part of the design process. However, traditional Software Engineering
and Systems Management techniques are not well equipped to achieve this, and tend to consider
them separately. The goal of this thesis is to define an extended component-based multi-view
modelling approach that makes provisions for these aspects thereby leveraging their complemen-
taries. We aim to preserve composability and compositionality as key aspects across all views
and elements of the framework to enable distributed adaptation based on local and distributed
control, thereby providing better scalability. Non-functional aspects, such as reliability or other
quality-of-service parameters usually drive the selection of new architectural configurations. An
additional goal of this thesis is to define automatic re-configuration methods which preserve the
system’s reliability using composable models for the representation and analysis of probabilistic
behaviour.
1.1. Requirements
Having discussed the motivation for self-management and the key problems associated with
existing approaches, we briefly discuss the main requirements related to self-managed architec-
tures.
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1.1.1. R1 - Autonomy
Self-management requires a system to be able to adapt autonomously, without requiring user
input at run-time. When applied to architectural reconfiguration, it implies determining the
possible alternative configurations based on the available components, calculating their non-
functional properties and choosing the most suitable configuration that satisfies functional and
non-functional requirements. To avoid limiting the alternatives for re-configuration, the system
designer should follow a declarative approach, i.e. by defining the conditions that adaptation
processes need to achieve, instead of specifying the steps for adaptation. The next Sections
enumerate the requirements for automated analysis that enable self-management for component-
based architectures.
1.1.2. R2 - Integrated System Models
Separation of concerns is a principle widely applied in the development of complex systems,
whereby the system functionality is decomposed into smaller units in order to reduce the imple-
mentation complexity and/or to focus on a particular concern. The same principle is applied to
system models to enable incremental modelling and to focus on a particular aspect of a system.
However, self-management requires combining the architectural, behavioural, non-functional
properties and management concerns. For instance, the reliability of a component depends not
only on its behaviour, but also on how it is used and on the reliability of the components it
requires. As a result, if models are considered in insolation, they may require user input at run-
time when the system changes or to avoid inconsistencies [FKN+92]. To facilitate coordinated
and synchronised analysis across models, these should have semantic aspects in common and
also closely integrate with the system’s code.
1.1.3. R3 - Composability
Composable models are needed to enable automatic construction and analysis of models from
representations of each component. If architectural reconfiguration is conducted using non-
composable models, configurations involving components only discovered at run-time cannot be
considered as the models associated with the new configuration cannot be created without addi-
tional user input. Composability is also necessary to reduce the specification burden for complex
systems by enabling individual modelling of each component, thereby facilitating incremental
elaboration and the definition of more fine grained representations.
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1.1.4. R4 - Scalability
When selecting a new architectural configuration, the corresponding analysis needs to scale well
in order for the benefits of choosing the configuration that maximises non-functional properties
to overcome the cost of analysis and adaptation. In some application domains the environment or
operational conditions may vary significantly, thereby requiring adaptation to be applied in few
seconds. Other domains may not have enough resources to support analysis of non-functional
properties using composable models. Therefore, composable representations may need to be
minimised before composing in order to mitigate state-explosion associated with concurrent
models. But reducing probabilistic models can be challenging. For example, when deleting a
probabilistic transition what should happen to the remaining transitions?
1.1.5. R5 - Adaptation Safety
When a given valid architectural configuration, i.e. based on compatible bindings between pro-
vided and required interfaces, is selected for reconfiguration, it may lead the system to incon-
sistent states due to behaviour mismatch related to component’s interactions. For example,
functionally equivalent components can implement different versions of the same functionality,
which may be based on different assumptions w.r.t. interaction with other components. In
addition, the system configuration cannot be changed whilst the components to be replaced are
being used by others. Consequently, reconfiguration mechanisms need to ensure that the new
configuration does not contain behaviour mismatch and also that the system is led to a state
where it can be adapted.
1.1.6. R6 - Decentralisation
Architectural reconfiguration may be required to be based on distributed or even on fully decen-
tralised processes to avoid relying on a single physical host. A centralised solution may not be
feasible for other reasons, e.g. commercial, to avoid that a single node possesses knowledge about
all components of the system. Therefore, models of architectural, behavioural, non-functional
properties need be compositional in order to support analysis without requiring the computation
of the full model of a system configuration.
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1.2. Contributions
The objective of this thesis is to define a framework that supports automated architectural re-
configuration by integrating compositional models of architectural, behavioural, non-functional
properties of component-based systems. Therewith, this thesis makes the following contribu-
tions:
Probabilistic Component Automata The primary contribution of this thesis is the defini-
tion of a composable modelling formalism, Probabilistic Component Automata, to rep-
resent the probabilistic behaviour of component-based systems. We define mechanisms
to combine architectural, behavioural and non-functional aspects to support automated
analysis of reliability requirements. Our model establishes a close link with Architectural
Description Languages, such as Darwin [MDEK95], to describe the system behaviour. The
representation for a composite component is automatically constructed by combining the
architectural model of a given configuration and the PCA model of each component. PCA
also provide suitable semantics to accurately represent the behaviour of software compo-
nents by establishing a close link with architectural aspects and object-oriented languages.
Compositional Reliability Analysis Our second contribution consists in a novel algorithm
to remove internal behaviour of a PCA model, thereby mitigating the state-explosion
problem associated with composite models. This algorithm extends the concepts of Com-
positional Reachability Analysis to probabilistic models to define how internal actions
are removed and, more importantly, how their probabilistic information is propagated to
remaining transitions. The scalability of reliability analysis using composable models is
greatly improved by reducing the PCA representation of each component before compo-
sition. We have further demonstrated both empirically, and formally using the notion of
weak bisimulation, that the reduced models produced by the algorithm preserve the reach-
ability properties of the original representation. As a result, the analysis of reliability and
operational requirements that do not involve internal actions is equivalent for the original
and reduced models. Properties that involve specific internal actions can still be analysed
as the algorithm takes as input a generic set of internal actions to be removed.
Multi-view Framework The third contribution of this thesis is a multi-view modelling frame-
work that leverages the integration that we establish for architectural, behavioural and
management models. The framework includes two algorithms for architectural reconfigu-
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ration driven by reliability requirements, which enable systems made of autonomous com-
ponents to re-configure themselves to preserve global non-functional requirements. The
required representations for selecting a new architectural configuration are first reduced
according to the bindings between components in order to remove internal actions as well
as behaviour associated with unused functionality. As a result, the selection process can
involve different entities as the internal behaviour of each component is not disclosed, but
only the choices that a component makes over its bindings.
Tool Support Finally, both the PCA formalism, associated operators and the aforementioned
reduction algorithm have been implement in an extended version of LTSA [MK06], a well-
known modelling and analysis tool for LTS representations.
1.3. Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 we review the different
approaches that underpin adaptive software architectures. We first describe adaptation mecha-
nisms to support changes in the behaviour and structure of components. We then discuss for-
malisms to model the structure and behaviour of component-based systems, the self-managed
frameworks that use these models and the adaptation mechanisms to perform adaptation at
run-time. While automating adaptation driven by non-functional properties requires combining
structural, behaviour and non-functional aspects of a system, existing approaches are either
based on textual annotations of non-functional properties or rely upon non-composable models
which do not consider structural aspects.
To this end, in Chapter 3 we present Probabilistic Component Automata (PCA), the associ-
ated operators and their corresponding semantics to model the behaviour of basic and composite
components, including explicit mechanisms for failure modelling, handling and propagation. The
last part of the Chapter covers the semantics of the parallel composition operator and how it is
combined with the architectural model to automatically construct the composite models.
As composite representations may suffer from state-explosion due to modelling of concurrent
execution, in Chapter 4 we propose an algorithm as an extension to Compositional Reachability
Analysis for reducing a PCA model by eliminating transitions associated with internal actions
and propagating their probabilistic information to the remaining transitions, when possible. We
illustrate using a set of simple examples the gains produced by the algorithm in computational
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complexity for composite model construction and analysis of reliability requirements. The re-
ductions in model sizes obtained for those models are in excess of 80% which leads to a reduction
in excess of 90% in the time to analyse reliability properties.
While we have empirically verified that the reduction algorithm preserves the reliability prop-
erties of the original models of the examples in Chapter 4, in Appendix A we review standard
notions of behaviour equivalences and extend them to formally show that the minimised model
produced by the reduction algorithmic preserves the properties of the original model. Specifi-
cally, we show that the reduced model is weakly bisimilar to the original one.
In Chapter 5 we describe architectural reconfiguration processes underpinned by the architec-
tural, behavioural and probabilistic models discussed in the previous chapters. Building upon a
multi-view framework that integrates these models, we first discuss a centralised version of the
reconfiguration process based on a central point that possesses knowledge about the available
components for reconfiguration and their associated models. The reduction algorithm presented
in Chapter 4 along with the operators discussed in Chapter 3 are used to automatically construct
and analyse the composite representation for each possible architectural configuration. We then
propose a distributed version which enables each component to make local choices regarding its
required functionality and/or internal configuration. The reduction algorithm is used to com-
pute the information exchanged by components that underpins local choices, without disclosing
information about internal configuration encapsulated in the architectural model.
Finally, we illustrate the work presented in this thesis using an e-banking system from Java
EE examples. This example system provides a simple but realistic application, of a reasonable
size and with several sources of failure. We discuss how the behaviour of each component/class
implemented in Java is modelled using PCA and how probabilities of internal, output and failure
actions can be automatically extracted from execution traces. We then construct the composite
representation and show how it is used to analyse relevant operational and reliability properties.
In Chapter 7 we summarise of the work presented in this thesis, review the contributions in
light of the defined requirements for self-managed component-based systems and discuss possible
further work.
Finally, we present in Appendix B our extension to the LTSA which supports specification,
construction and analysis of PCA models.
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2. Background
After introducing in the previous Chapter the general motivation and main requirements for
adaptive software architectures, we review in this Chapter the relevant literature on self-managed
software systems. We start by reviewing programming language support and other low-level
techniques to adapt the system behaviour and/or structure in Section 2.1. We then discuss in
Section 2.2.1 architectural models that cater for modular representations of the system structure
which enable architecture adaptation based on adding and replacing components. Although some
models associate textual notations of non-functional properties with components, automating
architectural reconfiguration requires reasoning over formal representations of non-functional
properties to accurately distinguish between components with equivalent functionality. These
are discussed in the next Chapter in more detail. In Section 2.2.2 we discuss behavioural
formalisms that enable analysis of the soundness of each configuration based on representations
for each component that model internal behaviour and interactions between components. We
then present in Section 2.3 different methods to specify when and how the system should adapt
as well as management frameworks that provide re-usable services, such as monitoring and
execution, to support adaptation. In Section 2.4 we describe methods that determine when the
system, or parts of the system, can be stopped and adaptation can be applied whilst ensuring
the system correct functioning. We conclude this Chapter by evaluating the limitations of the
presented approaches w.r.t. to the requirements discussed in the previous Chapter.
2.1. Adaptation Techniques
Systems need to adapt in order to cope with changes in the environment and operational con-
ditions, but the extent to which the system adapts can vary. The simplest technique to adapt
a system is by changing the value of its configuration parameters. For instance, a video appli-
cation can accommodate different traffic conditions by changing the parameters of TCP, e.g.
window size, or by adjusting the video quality. Other examples exist for adaptation of specific
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applications. However, these techniques are usually too low-level and specific to a particular
application or domain. In the next Sections we cover higher-level techniques to change the
behaviour/structure of an application/system.
2.1.1. Programming Languages Support
Programming languages comprise means to control dynamic objects at runtime that can be used
to support adaptation techniques. For instance, Erlang includes the hot code upgrade feature
that allows to change a program code at runtime. Erlang code is loaded as module units and
the runtime system supports the simultaneous existence of two versions of a module in memory.
The versions are referred as old and new and running processes can concurrently execute both
versions. A process switches from the old to the new version by making an external call, when
it conducts possible state transformations to use the new version. This allows a system to adapt
with no interference. Furthermore, an Erlang application is structured as a supervision tree,
where processes are hierarchically organised and divided in two groups: workers that perform
computations and supervisors that monitor and manage workers. Each worker is structured into
two parts: a behaviour that represents the provided functionality, and a callback that consists
in a specific implementation of such functionality. ContextErlang [GPS10] is a context-oriented
extension to Erlang in which applications consist of a set of components, each one having a
single behaviour module and various callback modules that can be dynamically activated and
deactivated based on context changes. More than one callback module can be active at the same
time in a given component, as the set of implemented functions are not necessarily identical.
When active callback modules have overlapping functionality, the order of activation determines
which callback module is used.
Dynamic class loading supported by modern Object Oriented languages, such as C# and
Java, in conjunction with reflection mechanisms can also be used to enable late bindings of
classes not known or available at design and compile time. At design time, dependency injection
mechanisms allow the client part of an application to delegate to an external configuration
module the choice over the specific library or object that an instantiation of the client program
uses.
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2.1.2. Interception as a Means to Implement Adaptation
Middleware layers allow to introduce mechanisms to transparently intercept messages/invo-
cations between components in order to perform adaptation, filtering or forwarding to other
components without the original ones being aware of such actions. In the next paragraphs we
review some examples of these mechanisms for CORBA and Java platforms.
Adaptive CORBA Templates (ACT) [SM04] rely upon the concept of a generic interceptor,
which is a particular type of a CORBA portable request interceptor that adds adaptation ca-
pabilities to an existing application without having to change and recompile its code. A generic
interceptor is registered in the ORB during its instantiation, intercepts all incoming and outgo-
ing requests and sends them to the ACT core. The ACT core comprises one or more rule-based
interceptors that perform a given action when a condition is verified. Examples of possible
actions are: send new requests; record statistics; raise a ForwardRequest exception in order to
forward the request to another CORBA object. This object is a surrogate for a CORBA object
that provides the same set of methods, using a different implementation.
Another form of realising dynamically activated and transparent adaptation is by extending
virtual machines with means to intercept and redirect interactions wit the application code.
Guarana´ [OB99] achieves this by extending the JVM code, whereas Iguana/J [RC02] employs
aspect-oriented techniques to extend the JVM without modifying its source code. Although
these approaches perform adaptation in a transparent way in respect to the application code,
the required modifications of JVM reduce their portability.
TRAP/J [SMCS04] applies similar (aspect-oriented programming) techniques to transparently
generate adaptable Java programs at compile time. By using Aspect/J, an aspect-oriented
extension to Java, TRAP/J does not require the JVM and the application source code to be
changed in order to dynamically adapt an application. Wrapper- and meta-level classes are
produced by an Aspect Generator and a Reflective Class Generator for each of the classes that
need to be adapted. These are then weaved together with the application source code by the
AspectJ compiler to construct an adapt-ready application. New functionality can be introduced
at runtime by using delegate classes which contain a set of the methods of the application base
code. Meta-level objects dynamically redirect messages originally sent to a wrapper-class to the
corresponding delegate class.
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2.1.3. Proxies to Implement Adaptation
Explicit proxy components can be placed to encapsulate functionality and intercept the inter-
actions from other components to perform behaviour adaptation. This techniques requires the
application source code to be adapted to support indirect interactions through proxy compo-
nents.
Cavallaro et al. proposed using proxy services to find a substitute a web-service when the
previously used becomes unavailable. For each functionality required by the system, a proxy
service receives clients requests to the faulty service and forwards them to an alternative service
that performs the same operation. Similarly, Contract-based Adaptive Software Architecture
(CASA) [MG05] uses Handle classes, which implement the same interface as the specific compo-
nent class, to support adaptive selection of different implementations of the same functionality.
The operations invoked on the Handle class are forwarded to the currently used implementation
through structural reflection. When a class instance is replaced, its internal state is exported
using a common representation and transferred to the new instance. In addition, each class
needs to define safe points where its execution can be suspended when it needs to be replaced,
and where the new instance can be started. Where the definition of such points is infeasible, the
Handle class waits for the conclusion of the current invocations and buffers the incoming ones
until the replacement takes place.
2.2. Software Models
While the previous mechanisms provide the means to enact adaptation at lower levels, they do
not cater for the representation or analysis of the architectural and behavioural aspects of a
system which are required for automating adaptation processes.
2.2.1. Architectural models
Architecture Description Languages (ADLs) are declarative languages to describe the structure
of a system based on functionality provided and required by components and their connections.
Existing approaches can divided in two groups: those that consider connectors, which comprise
a specification of behaviour interaction between components, as first-class entities equivalent to
components, and those that leave such specification to the component’s implementation. Archi-
tecture models can include descriptions of architecture styles for a group of systems that denote
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reusable architectural specifications and determine the allowable structural modifications that
can be conducted at runtime. Component-based architectural descriptions are composable as
the structure of complex systems can be defined based on bindings between basic and composite
components, which can themselves be composed of basic and composite sub-components and
respective bindings between them.
UniCon [SDK+95] and Wright [AG94] are examples of ADLs that require interaction between
components to be specified using connectors. A connector specification consists in roles that
define the behaviour of participant components in an interaction. The interaction is mediated
by glue code that constrains the interactions between roles. A component is described as a set of
ports and a specification of its functionality. C2 [Med96], another ADL example, was originally
defined as an architectural style for Graphical systems. It then evolved to an ADL where
components and connectors have only a top and a bottom ports, resulting in strict hierarchical
architecture designs. Communication between components is only achieve via connectors as
components are not allowed to interact directly, while connectors can be connected to each other.
Both components and connectors are permitted to be bound as follows: the top of a component
can be attached to the bottom of a single connector; the top of a single connector can be attached
to the bottom of a component; two connectors can be attached to each other from the top of one
to the bottom of the other. There is no limit on the number of connectors and components that
are attached to a single connector. Moreover, a component is only aware of other components
that are above it in the architecture hierarchy, having no knowledge of components beneath it. An
interface definition language is used to express the public functionality and data of a component,
based on the following elements: a) top and bottom notification handling and request sender
interfaces; b) initialisation parameters; c) publicly available methods; d) component semantics
using behaviour specification; e) description of component context. An example architecture of
a video game described using C2 ADL is shown in Figure 2.1.
While the previous ADLs comprehend explicit specifications of components interactions through
connectors, the following ADLs delegate such specification to the component’s implementation.
Rapide [LKA+95] focuses on providing constructs to express architectures in an executable form
for behavioural analysis through simulation at design stage. An architecture in Rapide consists
of components having modules and an interface to specify required and provided functions from
other components modules. Connection rules determine the communication between interfaces
and formal constraints dictate legal and illegal communication patterns. Architectural con-
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Figure 2.1.: Example Architecture of Video Game using C2 ADL [Med96]
straints are defined using conformance rules that state which components can be connected to a
given component interface. Rapide separates the representation of the above constructs in five
languages: 1) a type language to characterise components interfaces; 2) an architecture lan-
guage to denote the communication between components; 3) a specification language to describe
components behaviour; 4) an executable language to define executable modules in components;
5) and a pattern language to express allowed patterns of communication events.
Darwin [MDEK95] is another declarative language to specify the architecture of distributed
component-based systems which does not distinguish components from connectors. Each com-
ponent specifies the set of services it provides to others and the set of services it requires from
other components, each one having a certain type. Components interactions are defined by
one-to-many mappings between provided and required interfaces, i.e. a provided port may have
many required ones bound to it whereas a required port can only be bound to one provided
port. Furthermore, a composite component defines composition by establishing bindings among
internal components ports as well as binding from its ports to the ones of internal components.
Darwin also comprises the definition of dynamic architectures that change at runtime through
dynamic instantiation. This construct enables the specification of components that can evolve
arbitrarily or in response to a change in the environment. For instance, a composite server
component can create new message handler sub-components in response to a request from the
system manager. Since dynamically created sub-components instances are anonymous at de-
sign time, the type of the sub-component is used to specify internal bindings instead of the
component instance name.
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Acme [GMW00] is as a second-generation ADL which can also be used as an interchange
language [GMW97], i.e. a common representation for software architectures specification that
provides support for the use of various existing analysis tools of different ADLs, such as Wright
and Rapide [GMW97]. The foundation concepts used for architectural description are based on
the ones shared among previously defined ADLs. Components represent computational and data
elements of a system having one or more interfaces, designated as ports. Each port defines a point
of interaction and may be represented by a method signature. Connectors manage interactions
between system elements and have interfaces designated as roles. A role establishes a participant
of the interaction mediated by the connector. A system is defined as a graph in which nodes
designate components and edges denote connectors and represent connections between pairs of
a component’s port and a connector’s role. Acme introduces low-level internal descriptions of
a component or a connector, denoted as representations. Each component or connector may
have different representations to express its multiple views. Representation maps specify the
correspondence between an internal representation and the external interface. For instance,
defining the association between internal and external ports. Each of the previous architectural
entities can be annotated with a list of properties, each one characterised by a name, an optional
type and a value. However, the semantics of these properties is specific to external analysis tools
and has no interpretation in Acme.
While the previous ADLs are independent from implementation languages which may lead to
the violation of architectural structure and other inconsistencies, ArchJava [ACN02] is a Java
extension to define a software architecture and seamlessly integrate it with implementation code
in Java. The implementation has to comply with the communication integrity property, i.e.
implementation code of components only interacts directly with components to which there are
bindings in the architecture specification. The architecture is specified in terms of components
with provided, required and broadcast ports as well as connections between ports. While require
ports only support single bindings, broadcast ports may be connected to various provided ports,
though these must return void. This is because when a broadcast is invoked it results in simulta-
neous calls to multiple provided interfaces. In addition, components can be dynamically created
at runtime using the operator new, triggered by the invocation of a given method. These compo-
nents can be bound at runtime using the connect operator. The connection pattern expression
can be used to explicitly express the allowable bindings for dynamically created components.
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Architectural models enable the representation of the system’s structure as a composition of
basic and composite components, instead of having a monolithic design. This modular structure
supports easy replacement of independent sub-parts (components), which can also be reused
in different systems. Although some models support reasoning on the interactions between
components through connectors, the architectural models described in this Section do not cater
for analysis of the system behaviour based on a composite representation constructed from a
representation of each component.
2.2.2. Behaviour Models
Reconfiguring the system architecture at run-time may involve considering configurations which
include components not known at design-time or from third-party providers. However, these
components may lead the system to inconsistent states which can result in serious incidents,
e.g. caused by a deadlock. In this Section we present behaviour models that support analysis
of safety and liveness properties of each architectural configuration using the corresponding
composite model. Such analysis can be used to detect inconsistencies before adapting the system
configuration.
Labelled Transition Systems (LTS) [MK06] support modelling, construction and analysis of
distributed component-based systems1. Aspects related to data representation, resource alloca-
tion and user interaction are abstracted by LTS models in order to focus on concurrency details.
Consider the execution of a concurrent program which consists of multiple sub-processes. When
a (concurrent) program is executing, its state can be characterised by the values of explicit
variables. The execution of a single statement transforms the program from one state to an-
other. The sequential execution of each sub-process is modelled as a Finite State Machine in
the form of LTS representations, whereby each transition between states is labelled with actions
that represent atomic statements, though variables of the system do not need to be explicitly
encoded. Formally, an LTS is defined by the following tuple 〈S, q, E ,∆〉, where
• S is a finite set of states, q is the initial state,
• E is a set of action labels, and
1Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS) and Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) are examples of
formal languages that enable the specification of the behaviour of concurrent systems. Although both CSP
and CCS explicitly distinguish between the receiving and sending ends for synchronisation between processes,
the existing operational semantics [CS99] are equivalent to the ones specified for LTS models.
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• ∆ ⊆ S ×E ×S is the set of transitions, each defined by a source state in S, an action label
in E and a destination state in S.
As LTS are graphical representations, Finite State Processes (FSP) are used as a textual
notation for describing behaviour. For every expression E in FSP, there is a corresponding
LTS model A as defined by function lts : E → A. The basic operators supported by FSP to
specify the execution of sequential processes are prefix and choice. Analogously to other process
algebras, FSP has algebraic properties as expressed by operational semantics of its operators.
The prefix operator defined in Rule 1 describes a process that initially executes action a and
the subsequent behaviour is described by expression E.
(a→ E) a−→ E
(Rule 1)
The corresponding LTS is given by lts(a→ E) = 〈S ∪ {p}, p, E ∪ {(p, a, q)}〉.
(a1 −> E1 | . . . | an −> En) ai−→ Ei
(Rule 2)
The choice operator enables the specification of different possible outcomes from a given
state, as defined by Rule 2. The expression (a1 −> E1 | . . . | an −> En) describes a process that
initially engages in any of the actions ai, and then behaves as described by the corresponding
FSP expression Ei. The corresponding LTS model is formally defined as follows. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and lts(Ei) = 〈Si, qi, Ei,∆i〉, then lts((a1 −> E1 | . . . | an −> En) ai−→ Ei) = 〈(
⋃
i Si) ∪
{p}, p, (⋃i Ei)∪{a1, . . . , an}, (⋃i ∆i) ∪ {(p, ai, qi) }〉. Additional operators are supported by FSP
to specify more complex behaviours of sequential processes, e.g. conditional behaviour [MK06].
On the other hand, the representation of the execution of a concurrent program is automatically
constructed by composing the representations of its sub-processes. The same principle can be
used to model a composition of components from their individual LTS representations. Given two
LTS models A and B, their concurrent execution is denoted by the parallel composition between
them: A ‖B. Interaction between two processes A and B is modelled through synchronisation
of their shared actions. Rule 3 determines that processes A and B only interact when they are
both ready to execute the shared actions.
A
a−→ A′ , B a−→ B′
A||B a−→ A′||B′
, a ∈ EA ∪ EB (Rule 3)
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On the other hand, non-shared actions are executed concurrently and all their possible inter-
leavings are included in the composite model, as defined by Rule 4.
A
a−→ A′
A||B a−→ A′||B
, a /∈ EB B
b−→ B′
A||B b−→ A||B′
, b /∈ EA (Rule 4)
Other operators such as re-labelling enable the specification of scenarios with shared resources,
while hiding replaces action labels with the silent action τ to denote internal actions and avoid
synchronisation with other components when constructing composite representations. LTS mod-
els with internal actions can be minimised using Compositional Reachability Analysis [CK96]
in order to mitigate state-explosion associated with interleaving of non-shared actions. We will
discuss this in more detail in Chapter 4.
All the previous operators for behaviour modelling and construction of LTS models are sup-
ported by the tool Labelled Transition System Analyser (LTSA) [MK06]. Safety and liveness
properties can be expressed using Fluent Linear Temporal Logic [MK06] and automatically
analysed using the model-checking mechanisms supported by LTSA.
While LTS models do not distinguish between input, output and internal actions, Input/Out-
put (I/O) Automata [LT89] in contrast do but introduce a different operational semantics. An
automaton can determine when it executes output or internal actions, but it is not able to
block the execution of any input action. As a result, output actions do not block as in CCS (or
shared actions in LTS) as they can be synchronised with the corresponding input action at any
time. Consider enable(s) ⊆ E as the set of actions that can be executed from state s ∈ S. The
semantics of I/O Automata requires processes to be input-enabled, i.e. for each state s ∈ S the
process needs to be able to executed all the input actions E in: E in ⊆ enable(s). Consequently,
even when a sequential process is executing internal statements it cannot block interaction with
other processes until both are ready to synchronise. This does not always represent a suitable
semantic for a software system. Note that multi-threaded reactive programs, which resemble
the semantics of I/O, can also be modelled using the previous formalisms by means of different
processes, each one denoting a specific thread.
Interface Automata (IA) [dAH01] is a modelling formalism based on I/O automata, though
it does not require input-enabledness. Apart from the distinction between input and output
actions, IA models have similar semantics to LTS models. One important distinction lies in the
synchronisation of input/output actions which is only allowed between two components, whereas
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LTS models support synchronisation on shared actions amongst more than two components.
Although this restriction may limit the ability to model publish-subscribe type of interactions
using IA, it is suitable for representing synchronous interactions such as method invocations.
Furthermore, the algorithm that implements the parallel composition operator for IA models
computes first the product automata and then prunes invalid transitions. In contrast, the
parallel composition algorithm for LTS models does not need to construct the full product
automata, which can be significantly large. It The composite model is constructed using an
iterative method whereby its states and transitions are defined by the operational semantics
rules previously defined in this Section. In other words, starting from the initial composite
state which denotes the initial state of the models involved in the composition, the operational
semantic rules determine the valid transitions from each composite state.
Given two components with bound interfaces and the associated IA models, the corresponding
composite model can be used to verify if the components are compatible w.r.t to their interaction
through input/output actions. On this account, IA include a notion of refinement that enables
valid replacement of components. An interface automaton Q refines an interface automaton P ,
denoted by P  Q, if all the input steps of Q can be simulated by P and all the output steps
performed by P can be simulated by Q, while the internal steps of P and Q are independent. A
component whose behaviour is represented by IA P can be replaced by another component whose
behaviour is denoted by IA Q if Q refines P (P  Q) and Q is compatible with the environment
that previously interacted with P . While the first condition resembles sub-class polymorphism
and implies that any component can be replaced by another as long as it provides the same
functionality, and possible more, the second condition is needed to prevent any incompatibilities
arising from the environment using the additional functionality of the new component.
Although the previous formalisms support automated construction of models of composite
components, along with automated analysis of safety and liveness properties, they do not sup-
port the representation of non-functional properties such as reliability and performance which
require modelling the duration of actions and/or their frequency of execution. Discrete-Time
Markov Chains (DTMCs) have been proposed by Cheung [Che80] to model the system execu-
tion profile and calculate its reliability based on the reliability of its components. However, this
approach faces several limitations. Firstly, the model assumes that components execute sequen-
tially and thus cannot represent concurrent execution. Secondly, the DTMC model of a com-
posite component cannot be automatically constructed from the models of its sub-components.
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Thirdly, this approach assumes that failures occur independently in components bound to each
other and cannot represent failure dependencies and failure propagation across component bind-
ings. In Chapter 3 we discuss in more detail these limitations and other models for reliability
analysis.
2.3. Management
While software models enable modelling and analysis of the system structure and behaviour,
management services and frameworks determine when and how the system adapts. In this
Section we first review the main decision-making mechanisms which are responsible for choosing
the most suitable adaptation action to be executed in face of an internal or external phenomenon:
the violation of a given goal or poor performance. We then discuss existing frameworks that
implement the MAPE-K loop [IBM].
2.3.1. Decision-Making
Policies have been successfully applied to express automated management on distributed systems
as well as dynamic changes in the system behaviour at runtime [Slo]. They can be characterised
by the main three types: Action, Goal and Utility-Function policies [KW04]. Action policies
specify the action(s) to be taken on the occurrence of an event, based on the current system state,
and if a condition verifies (Event-Condition-Action), while Goal and Utility-Function policies
specify a desired system state without defining how to achieve it. Goal policies denote desirable
states that are either satisfiable or not, while utility functions assign a scalar value to a system
state, with the most suitable state being the one with the highest value. These policies are more
flexible than Action policies since the responsibility for determining the actions to achieve the
desired states is left to the managing system.
Although a combination of these policies allows to express different concerns, it may create
conflicts between policies. Generally, Goal and Utility-Function policies are less liable to conflicts
since they are both expressed in terms of desired states. However, a set of Goal policies may
not be mutually satisfiable. Similarly, various Action policies may be simultaneously activated
and perform operations that change a common part of the system in a conflicting way. Utility-
Function policies may introduce problems when combined with Action policies by operating
upon the variables which appear in the Action clause. Nonetheless, Utility-Functions do not
have a propensity to conflicts since the desired state is easily determined by the one with the
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highest value. The drawback of these policies is the additional burden of exactly defining numeric
values for the system state space. A common mixing pattern of different policies is using Goal
policies as a constraint for Utility-Function policies [KW04]. In addition, Utility-Functions can
be used to determine the choice among simultaneously activated Action Policies and are the
basis for self-tuning mechanisms.
The next Section presents languages to express Action policies. Thereafter procedures that
use Utility-Function policies are described. Finally, methods that deal with Goal Policies are
discussed in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.2. Languages for Action Policies
SAFRAN [DL06] is an extension to FRACTAL components, described later in Section 2.5,
to define adaptive applications based on Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) concepts and
techniques that focus on a clear separation between business code and adaptation logic code.
In AOP systems an aspect is a module that can alter the behaviour of a base program (business
code). Each aspect combines (pointcut, advice) pairs, where a pointcut designates a set of
points of interest in the execution of a base program (join-points) and an advice represents
a code segment which realisation is triggered when the execution of a base program reaches a
joint-point of the pointcut set. Due to the event-based style of adaptation procedures, SAFRAN
adopts the notion of point-cuts as sequences of runtime events, including internal and external
ones. Based on AOP concepts, the following are the main elements of SAFRAN:
• the base program corresponds to a FRACTAL component;
• point-cuts are denoted by internal and external events;
• advices represent behavioural reconfigurations;
• aspects specify adaptation policies that link joint-points to advices that can be dynamically
weaved, i.e. dynamically loaded.
The FScript language [DL06] is used as the advice language to define adaptation actions, includ-
ing a special notation based on the XPath language to easily navigate through the configuration
of FRACTAL components, encoded as FPath. It relies upon a directed graph representation
of FRACTAL components, where nodes designate components, their interfaces and attributes,
and arcs correspond to relations between components including a type annotation. Adaptation
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policies in SAFRAN follow the ECA pattern: when an internal or external event occurs, if a
boolean FPath expression matches, then an action specified by an FScript reconfiguration is
executed. External events supported in SAFRAN include:
• changed(expression): perceives any change of the value of the expression, which can
designate an attribute or a resource;
• realised(condition): a specific case of changed construction that only discerns boolean
changes.
• appears(path) and disappears(path): detects the appearance or disappearance of a
resource or an attribute; the path expression can be a generic one, i.e. not referring to a
specific attribute/resource but rather a type, by putting the ’∗’ character at the end.
Alternatively, the Stitch language [CG12] is based on a slight modification to ECA policies
based on two constructions: tactics and strategies. Tactics implement the Condition-Action
part of ECA policies where the condition can be composed by exists and forall conditions,
and introduce an additional construct to indicate the expected behaviour of adaptation actions.
Strategies are defined as a tree of Condition-Tactics nodes. Firstly, each strategy comprises
boolean conditions activation, which can also include exists and forall conditions. Secondly,
each node defines a condition for the tactic to be applied as well as an estimation of the time
it needs to adapt the system. A list of conditional branches define the next steps in the tree,
which can be one of the following: terminate in the current node if the tactic is successful, raise
a failure exception or initiate another navigation from a given start node. The last construction
also defines the number of allowed tree navigation loops. In addition, a tactic is associated
with an impact vector which consists in a cost-benefit specification on system properties. A
utility-function and weight is associated with each system property, which is then used to select
the most suitable tactic.
In order to prevent long strategies from taking over the adaptation system, hence causing the
delay of other adaptation decisions, a preemption mechanism was added to the Stitch language
[RCGS10]. Each strategy is associated with a time utility curve (TUC) that expresses the
expected utility of concluding a strategy depending on the time in which it is conducted. When
there is a need for adaptation, i.e. a new strategy is triggered, and another strategy is currently
executing, the decision-making service checks whether is better to let the latter strategy finish
or preempt it and allow the former to execute. If multiple strategies are triggered, the decision-
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making service selects the scheduling order that maximises a Predicted System Utility based on
the TUC of each strategy.
2.3.3. Using Utility-functions
Utility-functions are high-level specifications for self-optimisation of software systems. They
express the level of preference for a given system state according to some metric(s). One ap-
plication of these specifications is to determine the most suitable adaptation action when more
than one rule is triggered, based on non-functional metrics annotations. The utility value of
an adaptation strategy can be computed using a weighted sum of several utility functions, each
one using a given metric. For example, in [SHMK10] each component is annotated with non-
functional metrics that correspond to its resource usage pattern, e.g. cpu=low, memory=high.
Utility-functions rely upon those annotations to select the most suitable component when the
previously used one fails or for optimisation purposes. As these annotations only correspond to
predictions of system designers/administrators, they should be dynamically updated using the
values collected by the monitoring service to reflect their real resource usage pattern [SHMK10].
Utility-functions are also used to express high-level business terms and service-level require-
ments that are used to dynamically allocate resources in a Data Centre management system
[TK04]. In this case, the management system is structured as a two-level architecture: a low-
level of logically separated Application Environments and a Resource Arbiter at higher-level. An
Application Manager encapsulates the management details of the resources assigned by the Re-
source Arbiter by only providing to it the predicted resource needs. Each Application Manager
controls the assigned local resources of the Application Environment and periodically optimises
their control parameters C using a service-level utility-function R, based on the measured service
level S and demand D aggregated by the Data Aggregator from its locally managed application
servers. A Modeler handles a model of system performance S(C,R,D) based on the current
control parameters, allocated resources and service demand. The Utility Calculator computes
the optimal resource-level utility considering an estimate of the predicted demand in conjunction
with the all possible resource allocations. This function is periodically passed to the Resource
Arbiter by all running Application Managers. The Resource Arbiter uses those functions to peri-
odically recompute the allocated resources to each Application Manager, however cost associated
with switching resources are not considered.
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2.3.4. Mechanisms Supporting Goal Policies
In filling the expressiveness gap of Action Policies, Utility-Functions provide the means to in-
dicate preference in terms of metric values. Goal Policies are based on boolean predicates that
establish the system correct functioning according to its requirements. Although they do not
specify actions for adaptation, these policies give the means to assess if a system is violating
its specification. Given one or several goals, planning algorithms are used for the generation
of action plans to fix the system relying upon a domain description as input, containing the
available actions and information about the evolving environment.
Sykes et al. [SHMK07] generate reactive plans using the Model-Based Planner tool (MBP)
[BCP+01], from a domain description defined in SMV, to perform architectural changes when
high-level goals policies specified by the system designer are violated. The domain description
includes state-predicates, pre- and post-condition constraints on the available actions, the initial
state and a goal. The generated plan consists in a set of condition-action rules that comply with
the following requirements: a condition refers to a state in the environment from which the goal
is achievable and it is viable to apply the associated action in that state. Moreover, the set of
condition-action rules can be represented as a graph of state transitions. During the execution
of the plan, the shortest path to the goal is selected from the available ones to reach it until
the goal state is achieved. Furthermore, the possible large size of state spaces in the definition
of the domain description may hinder the applicability of planning algorithms. To address
this issue, the domain model is structured as a hierarchy of partial descriptions and sub-plans
are generated for each one, using a bottom-up approach. Finally, the required changes in the
component configuration are automatically derived from the actions included in the plan. For
instance, if the plan contains an action performed by a non-active component, that component
is instantiated before plan execution.
2.3.5. Self-Managing Frameworks
Self-managing frameworks provide adaptation capabilities to software systems. The main func-
tions associated with self-management are characterised by MAPE-K loop: Monitoring, Analy-
sis, Planning and Execution, all underpinned by system Knowledge. Monitoring concerns with
the supervision of the system and its surrounding environment. Analysis deals with the rea-
soning over system state and the environment conditions to detect functional inconsistencies as
well as nonfulfillment of system goals and desired performance. On top of that, Planning builds
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adaptation plans based on the reasoning conducted by Analysis. The generated adaptation
plans vary from design-time plans for predicted scenarios and runtime plans for unpredicted
situations. Finally, Execution is responsible for conducting the realisation of the generated
adaptation plans and guaranteeing system consistency throughout plan execution. In the next
paragraphs we discuss how existing frameworks realise the MAPE-K loop using the concepts
and techniques presented in the previous Sections.
StartMX [AST09] is a centralised framework to create applications with self-managing prop-
erties for Java-based systems relying upon Java Management Extensions (JMX), as well as on
a policy engine. JMX technology is used to provide the generic means to cope with different
resources, to provide managing and monitoring interfaces for adaptation managers as well as a
notification mechanism. A centralised execution engine supports different external policy en-
gines or adaptation code written in Java. Policies can be dynamically loaded, unloaded and
redefined. An adaptation procedure is represented by an execution-chain sequence of processes,
each one representing a function of an autonomic manager (Monitor, Analysis, Plan or Execute).
A process can interact with the managed resources using the managing interfaces provided by
JMX.
Prism-MW is a framework supports dynamic software updates, decentralised service discov-
ery, transparent replication and logical mobility [ESP+07]. An active deployment and analysis
environment (DeSi) centralised point complements the Prism-MW with visualisation and man-
agement facilities for the software architecture. Each host that instantiates the Prism-MW has
an Admin component that consists in a local management unit which is responsible for instan-
tiation, addition, upgrade and removal of components residing on the host, by interacting with
DeSi. Additionally, a Service Discovery Engine (SDEngine) maintains a database with all the
services provided by components executing in a given host, together with an SDConnector to
route service discovery requests to the host where a proper service provider resides. On top of
that, a fault-tolerant connector is placed before the service provider and transparently applies
a synchronisation mechanism among service replicas, i.e. instances of the same service type.
However, the SDEngine of the service client is aware of the existence of the service replicas.
If it detects that the main service provider has failed, it upgrades one of the backup replicas
to the primary provider and informs all other SDEngines on the upgrade. Furthermore, the
monitoring services integrated in each host report the values of non-functional properties con-
cerning service execution to DeSi, which in turn applies optimisation algorithms to improve the
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system architecture. The generated modifications are transmitted to the Admin components
which coordinate the application of the corresponding adaptations. If these adaptations involve
the replacement of a component for a new version, the Admin component transfers the state of
the old version to the new one.
Rainbow is a centralised framework [GCH+04] that uses a generic dynamic architectural model
to represent and manage a given software system. The architectural model is based on the Acme
ADL [GMW00] annotated with non-functional properties, as well as architectural constraints.
Monitoring facilities are used to dynamically update non-functional properties and to verify if
the system is satisfying the specified architectural constraints. The framework is composed of
various reusable units in each of its layers:
• system-layer : monitoring probes (sensors), resource discovery service and effectors, i.e.
interfaces to adapt the system;
• architecture-layer : gauges aggregate info from probes and update the architectural model,
which is handled by the model manager; a constraint-evaluator analyses the architectural
model consistency and the adaptation engine verifies the need to adapt and decides the
most suitable actions, which are directly conducted on the managed software system;
• translation infrastructure: bridges the abstraction gap between the system and the archi-
tectural model by mapping reusable units to the concrete system structure;
• system-specific adaptation knowledge: system operation model that defines parameters
such as component types and properties, behavioural constraints and adaptation strategies
specified using the Stitch language [CG12], to add self-management capabilities to the
managed system using the adaptation infrastructure.
The system layer is responsible for keeping the runtime architectural model updated with the
managed system throughout its execution. Although the constraint-evaluator examines the
runtime architectural model to trigger Stitch strategies, once a strategy is activated it is directly
executed in the software system.
The GRAF centralised framework [DAO+11] also relies upon a runtime abstract model be-
tween the managed software system and the centralised adaptation manager. However, adapta-
tion actions in the GRAF framework are not directly applied to the managed software system
in order to reduce the risks of adaptation. To this end, the framework architecture is organised
into three layers:
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• the Adaptation Management Layer comprises a Rule Engine which evaluates the adapta-
tion policies in a repository and a Control Panel to add, edit and remove policies to/from
the repository;
• the Runtime Model Layer maintains a repository of model history and controls a Model
Manager that handles the Runtime Model representation and evaluates model invariants;
• the Adaptation Middleware Layer bridges the gap between the Adaptable Software and
the Runtime Model layer using state variables adapters and model interpreters.
The control loop in GRAF is realised as follows. The state of the running adaptable software is
disseminated to its runtime model, with such changes being realised by the adaptation manager
through sensing the runtime system. By analysing that information, the adaptation manager
chooses the most suitable adaptation policy and sends it to the Runtime Model Manager. The
Runtime Model Manager evaluates the pre-conditions of the adaptation policy before applying
adaptation actions on the runtime model. Thereafter, the effects of the conducted modifications
are validated using the post-conditions specified by the adaptation policy as well as the model
invariants. If they do not conform with such constraints the Runtime Model Manager roll-
backs the performed alterations. Moreover, the state variables are updated using State Variable
Adapters that are connected with the code of adaptable software. The modifications performed
on the Runtime Model are then effectuated on the Adaptable Software at predefined points in
the software control flow, designated as interpretation points, similar to pointcuts in AOP.
The previous frameworks rely upon a centralised representation of the system and a centralised
adaptation manager which may not scale for complex enterprise systems. iManage [KCES07]
is a policy-driven modelling framework that partitions a system state space into smaller units
to facilitate system management by reducing the complexity of building the system models
and specifying adaptation policies for each small unit. Firstly, the framework provides tools to
collect system parameters and metrics that are mapped into a single representation of the system
state-space, which is then partitioned into small state units. Each unit includes homogeneous
variables, i.e. variables which states are related to each other, while minimising the number of
knobs, i.e. variables that the external change of their values affects the state of other values,
which in turn affect the state of other variables. Another criterion used by the partitioning
algorithm is guaranteeing that knobs required by one partition are not needed by others, in
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order to have each partition orthogonal to the others. A partition establishes a micro-model
with particular monitoring specifications, adaptation policies and goal rules.
The system state-space model and the micro-model are then used to derive ECA policies from
a Goal policy. The framework registers a trigger for capturing a state where the goal is not
being met, which is registered as the Event part. When the trigger is activated, the current
small-unit state is recorded as the Condition part. A corrective action is then derived using
the current small-unit state and it is stored as the Action part [KCES07]. Furthermore, as the
state of micro-models evolve overtime the expected outcome of adaptation policies may not be
consistently the same. On that account, each policy is associated with a confidence attribute
that reflects the probability of the policy reaching its expected outcome. After executing a
policy the framework evaluates its outcome and updates the confidence attribute accordingly.
A threshold is specified to establish the minimum confidence level to allow the execution of a
policy.
The Self-Managed Cell (SMC) [SL10] is a distributed self-management framework which en-
capsulates an administrative domain composed of a set of components. It comprises an extensible
set of services which is managed by the service discovery. This service finds neighbouring com-
ponents that can be added to the SMC. The management of the administrative domain is based
on a policy engine using authorisation and obligation policies, i.e. ECA policies. A publish-
subscribe event bus is used as the form of communication between services as well as SMCs.
Obligation policies are triggered by events diffused by the bus.
2.4. Adaptation Correctness
Adaptation processes must not lead the system to an inconsistent state, an unstable situation
or one where its specification is not met, i.e. the system correct functioning must be preserved.
The formalisation of the adaptation process allows system designers to prove the correctness of
the adaptation actions at design time.
An adaptation process can be formalised as a set of safe adaptation sequences of safe tran-
sitions between safe configuration states [ZCYM]. Those states are generated from the speci-
fication of system invariants and dependency among components. Each safe transition can be
composed of several adaptation actions that are divided in three parts: a pre-action preparation
phase, an in-action phase that changes the system structure and final tasks in the post-action
phase. When the system detects a condition for triggering adaptation, a centralised adaptation
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manager obtains the target configuration and prepares for the adaptation in the following three
stages:
• using the source-target configuration and dependency relationships among components, a
set of safe configurations is constructed;
• from the constructed set of safe configurations a safe adaptation graph is produced, having
safe configurations as nodes and adaptation steps as edges;
• the solution with the minimum cost is found executing the Dijkstra’s shortest path algo-
rithm on the safe adaptation graph.
Alternatively, the concept of quiescence is used to define conditions to ensure that the adap-
tation process is properly conducted in a distributed system without violating its consistency
[KM90]. A system is modelled as a direct graph in which nodes are system entities where
communication is based on transactions and edges denote connections between these entities.
The state of an application is abstracted into a set of different configuration states, considering
active and passive ones as the two main states of each node. If a node is in the active state it
can initiate, accept and service transactions. Although in the passive state a node still has to
accept and service transactions, it cannot be involved in a transaction of which it is the initiator
and cannot also start new transactions. Notwithstanding that the passive state is considered a
necessary condition to ensure adaptation correctness, it is not sufficient since a node may still
be involved in transactions of which it is not the initiator. Accordingly, the quiescence state is
introduced as a stronger condition state for adaptation as follows: the node is in passive state,
it is not involved in other transactions and no transactions that involve this node have been or
will be initiated.
Furthermore, the quiescent state is proven to be achieved in bounded time [KM90]. Firstly, a
node N has to move from active to passive state in order to reach the quiescent state. It reaches
passive state in bounded time since it can finish in a certain limited interval the transactions it
has initiated. Other transactions also terminate in a tied period since a node in passive state can
accept and service transactions, provided that they do not lead it to start new ones. Secondly,
in order to reach quiescent state, not only the node N must be in passive state but also the
set of nodes TN that are directly involved in transactions with node N have to move to passive
state as well. This is to ensure that all transactions involving node N can be finished while new
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ones are not initiated. As all nodes in TN and N can reach a passive state in bounded time,
node N is able to reach quiescent state in bounded time.
However, Vandewoude et al. [VEBD07] argue that the quiescence criterion is highly disruptive
to the system execution. They have suggested using a low disruptive criterion underpinned by
the concept of tranquility as an alternative to quiescent [VEBD07]. This criterion for adaptation
correctness relies upon the following two considerations:
• If a node has finished its participation in a transaction, it can be adapted before the
transaction completes. Similarly, if a node is involved in a transaction in which it has not
yet participated, it can be adapted.
• As opposed to the underlying model of quiescence where the initiator of a transaction is
aware of its completions, this model nodes follow a black-box design, hence the initiator of a
transaction is only aware of its directly connected nodes. Although each participant in the
transaction can initiate new ones in response to messages concerned with the transaction,
the initiator of the original transaction is not aware of these sub-transactions.
The concept of tranquillity can be summarised as follows: a node is in tranquil state if 1) it is
not involved in a transaction that it has initiated, 2) it will not start new transactions, 3) it is
not handling a request and 4) its adjacent nodes are not involved in any transaction in which
the node has participated and may still participate in the future. The tranquillity criterion
for adaptation correctness is less disruptive than quiescence as only the node where adaptation
is taking place has to be in passive state. Although the third condition for a node to be in
tranquil state requires that some adjacent nodes finish transactions with that node before it can
be adapted, those adjacent nodes do not need to be fully passivated.
The previous conditions establish when adaptation can be correctly applied without compro-
mising system consistency. There is a trade-off between the level of assurance at design time
of adaptation processes, which may lead to poor performance, and following an optimistic ap-
proach whereby adaptation is performed when needed and additional techniques are used to
detect and fix instability situations related with the adaptation process. An important benefit
of the approaches presented in this Section is that they are independent from the adaptation
process.
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2.5. Integrated Models
Separation of concerns is a principle widely applied in the development of complex systems,
whereby the system functionality is decomposed into smaller units or different concerns in order
to reduce the implementation complexity and to allow focusing on a particular concern. The
same principle is applied to system models to enable models that focus on a particular aspect of
a system. On this account, the Viewpoints framework [FKN+92] supports the specification of
multiple-views to express different perspectives of a system. Although each view can seen as a
vehicle for separation of concerns, the different views need to be integrated to avoid inconsisten-
cies when analysing the system. To this end, the Viewpoints framework supports the following
relationships between viewpoints:
• independent views which are required by a project;
• non-overlapping views where there is some dependency on each other;
• partially or fully overlapping views.
The framework also includes mechanisms for interaction and cooperation between views that
have dependencies or overlap in order to transfer information between different views and to
check their consistency.
The same principle of divide to conquer and unite to rule [FKN+92] is also required for
self-management system where the architectural, behavioural, non-functional properties and
management concerns need to combined to support automated adaptation mechanisms. In this
Section we discuss approaches that combine models and techniques presented in the previous
Section for integrated analysis of the system structured, behaviour and management aspects.
2.5.1. Architecture and Behaviour models
Most existing Architectural Description Languages described in Section 2.2 include formalisa-
tions of architectural styles or of interactions between components. The C2 Architectural style
rules are defined using Z notation as a set of logical rules regarding architectural elements con-
figuration and connections [Med96]. Additionally, Acme comprises a constraint language based
on first order predicate logic to express design constraints regarding an architectural specifica-
tion. In addition to the standard set of constructs related to first order predicate logics, the
constraint language incorporates a set of boolean functions concerning specific aspects of archi-
tecture configurations, which include special predicates to verify if two components are directly
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connected through a connector or indirectly connected via intermediate connections, if an entity
comprises a given property or a given type, the set of connectors of a given system, the set of
ports and roles of a given component or connector, respectively, and all other aforementioned
elements. Two types of constraints are distinguished: invariant as mandatory constraints that
need to be verified in order to consider a given architectural specification valid and heuristic
constraints for which only a warning is produced when they are invalid. Architectural styles are
then defined based on structural types, i.e. types of components, connectors, ports and roles.
Each one encompasses a type name, a list of its substructure, constraints and properties. A
style is characterised by a set of properties, a set of constraints, structural types and a default
structure.
Darwin [MDEK95] relies on pi-calculus to formalise the behaviour of provided and required
ports as well as bindings. These formal definitions are used as input for static checking of im-
plementation conformance with respect to the specification. Additionally, Modes [HKMU06]
extend the Darwin component model with a representation of the supported behaviours of a
component, which are characterised by the correspondent interaction between required and pro-
vided ports. The interaction process between different behaviours is represented by Finite State
Processes that define a set of scenarios in which the component can operate, i.e. a composition
of all possible interaction sequences. Safety and liveness properties can be analysed using the
corresponding LTS representations. Constraints on architectural styles and component’s inter-
actions are specified using the Alloy language [Jac02], in which each specification consists of
signatures (component and field declarations), facts and predicates (constraints) and assertions
(properties).
Similarly, Wright ADL supports Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) to model the
behaviour of components and connectors to analyse the compatibility between a component
port and a connector role as well as to verify if the system configuration is free from deadlock.
Additional specifications on non-functional properties are supported by Wright ADL [VOKK]
to associate non-functional requirements to required interfaces and non-functional assurances
to provided interfaces. However, these specifications are based on textual notations and are
not linked to the behaviour of each component. Wang et. al [WPC06] also explored mappings
between architectural styles and DTMC representations of the entire system, though these map-
pings must be manually defined and the resulting models do not include the internal behaviour
of each component.
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2.5.2. Architecture and Adaptation
Some architectural models also provide support for architectural adaptation mechanisms. The
distinction between provided and required interfaces plays an important role in enabling a clear
separation between the component’s functionality and management/adaptation concerns as it
allows a third-party (external) component to determine the bindings between components.
In addition to encoding component’s structure using provided and required interfaces, FRAC-
TAL components [BCL+06] also include in a membrane that provides external control interfaces
to introspect and reconfigure its internal details, and a content that consists in a set of sub-
components. The membrane’s control interfaces normally correspond to several controller and
interceptor objects. These objects provide support for: a) obtaining the available external in-
terfaces of a component; b) binding and unbinding interfaces; c) adding, removing or replacing
sub-components; d) controlling behaviour, performing dynamic reconfigurations; e) starting or
stoping execution. In addition, a sub-component can be shared among various composite rela-
tionships in order to preserve encapsulation, without having to deploy an external component
to synchronise the sub-component state among all composite components.
Three levels of control are supported by FRACTAL components. The base level corresponds to
components as black-boxes since no interception or introspection capabilities are provided. The
next level corresponds to an interface that provides the means to find all external interfaces of a
component (client and server), though no form of control is supported. The upper levels openly
expose internal details, increased introspection and interception capabilities. The following are
examples of controllers provided by FRACTAL that can be extended and combined to supply
components with different reflective properties. Firstly, an Attribute Controller provides getter
and setters for components attributes. Secondly, a Binding Controller allows to bind and unbind
client interfaces to server interfaces. Thirdly, through a Content Controller one can list, add or
remove sub-components. Finally, a Life-Cycle Controller gives means for controlling behaviour,
performing dynamic reconfigurations or start or stop execution.
Furthermore, Sykes et al. [SHMK10] proposed a distributed algorithm to select architectural
configurations based on non-functional properties associated with each component. An architec-
tural configuration is selected based on an aggregated value of the non-functional parameters of
its components. For each non-functional property, a monitoring service supplies the correspond-
ing value provided by each component. However, the model does not consider dependencies
between the non-functional values provided by a component and the ones given by the compo-
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nents it requires. Grassi et al. [GMM13] extended Sykes’ approach by defining non-functional
properties based on the bindings between components. For example, the reliability of a compo-
nent is given by the product between the reliability of its internal behaviour and the reliability
provided by the components bound to its required interfaces. However, the reliability metric
used assumes that all interfaces of a component are bound, and although not associated with a
behavioural model of the components, does take into account the number of times components
are invoked.
2.5.3. Behaviour and Adaptation
The MOCAS (Model of Components for Adaptive Systems) model [BHuB09] focuses only on
behavioural adaptation relying upon the Unified Modelling Language (UML). MOCAS compo-
nents communicate asynchronously by sending and receiving signals. Each component sets a
UML state machine at runtime to characterise and realise its behaviour. This state machine
consists in a set of states which are connected through transitions, each one being designated by
an input signal, a guard (a boolean expression) and effects. A transition is triggered when the
component receives its input signal and its guard is verified. Effects consist in internal actions
to be performed as well as signals to be sent after the transition is handled. A state comprises
entry, do and exit sets of actions that are conducted when the state is reached, when it is
active and when it is exited, respectively. A state also includes invariants defined using OCL
expressions which together with guards designate business properties.
In order to become adaptive a MOCAS component is wrapped by a MOCAS container that
settles interaction between the component and its environment while providing adaptation ca-
pabilities [BHuB09]. Each component can have several sensors to monitor its environment. As
each sensor is an adaptive MOCAS component, it can be started and stopped or even change
its behaviour to be proactive, i.e. continuously monitoring the environment, or reactive, i.e.
start monitoring the environment after receiving a certain signal. Sensors send their view of the
environment through signals to an aggregator that centralises and reports sensed information
to other components. These can be an adaptive MOCAS component or other aggregators from
other components interested in that information. Furthermore, an evaluator component is re-
sponsible for deciding when to adapt the MOCAS component behaviour by using adaptation
policies. Each adaptation policy is encoded using state machines similar to the ones described
to characterise a component’s behaviour.
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Adaptive MOCAS components further comprise a coordination mechanism through connec-
tions among their aggregators to perform the following two types of coordinated adaptation:
• reactive: the component directly informs other components about its adaptation, which in
turn can set off their own self-adaptation process though they cannot stop the one started
by the first component. Components have to be hierarchically organised in order to avoid
adaptation loops.
• negotiated : when an adaptive component needs to adapt, the most suitable adaptation
policy is negotiated with other cooperating adaptive components.
Alternatively, feature-based approaches structure the functionality of a system as a set of
features and alternative configurations are defined as different combinations of active features
[EEM10, MLD+11a]. FUSION is a centralised framework [EEM10] that contains a learning
module to compute the impact that each feature has on non-functional properties. The learning
module relies on collected values of system metrics when each configuration of features is active.
The adaptation manager is activated when an application goal is violated and a new feature
configuration is selected such that it optimises the aggregated utility based on the learned
functions for the impact each configuration on non-functional properties. When the goal can
be achieved by more than one configuration of features, the impact functions are used to select
the most suitable one. After adaptation, the difference between the expected and actual impact
is measured to verify the accuracy of the learning process. When the difference is higher than
a given threshold the learning process is repeated and the aforesaid functions are fine-tuned.
Additionally, the enablement and disablement of features are the supported adaptation actions.
The framework continuously monitors the running system and computes the corresponding
utility. If a goal is violated, a new system configuration is computed in terms of enabled features
that maximises the utility.
Although the feature-based adaptation system proposed by Modi et al. [MLD+11a] requires
a mapping between a behaviour configuration and the corresponding values of non-functional
properties to be manually specified, the selection of a new configuration considers deployment
constraints as well as the costs associated with re-configuration. Deployment constraints define
resource requirements for each behaviour configuration as a set of active features. For instance,
at least 1MB of memory needs to be available, denoted as mem(1MB). Each configuration is asso-
ciated with corresponding qualitative non-functional values, which are mapped into numerical
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values between 0 and 1 through fitness functions. Moreover, a model of application context is
also considered using a DTMC representation, where each state represents a given context and
transitions between states denotes the probability of the application moving from one context
to another. Each context is also associated with utility values for non-functional properties in
order to express user preference. For instance, in an emergency scenario response time may be
more important than the screen resolution.
The adaptation manager performs the following steps when the application changes context
or the current configuration is no longer feasible due to its deployment constraints. Firstly, a
user benefit value, denoted by Bcurr, is calculated for each feasible configuration based on the
associated non-functional values and preferences of the current context. A future user benefit BF
is then calculated given the probabilities of moving from the current context to other contexts
and the benefit of the behaviour configuration for each possible subsequent context. The current
and future benefit are combined using an horizon h which controls the importance the application
user gives to current context compared to future contexts: Bagg = h . Bcurr + (1 − h) . BF .
Finally, the adaptation manager selects the behaviour configuration that maximises a trade-off
defined by a parameter alpha between aggregated benefit Bagg and the cost to adapt the system
from the current configuration : α . Bagg + (1− α) . Cost. Adaptation cost is defined based on
the cost to deploy the new features in the candidate configuration and undeploy the features in
the current configuration.
All the aforementioned approaches rely on non-functional parameters that are manually as-
sociated by a system designer as annotations to a model and are assumed to be correct. Filieri
et al. [FGT12] have used DTMC models to automatically verify the reliability properties of a
given system configuration. Profiling tools are used to keep the DTMC model of the system
updated at runtime [EGMT09], thus enabling continuous verification of the reliability prop-
erties. However, as DTMC-based approaches treat components as black-boxes as the DTMC
model of a composite component cannot be automatically constructed from the models of its
sub-components. Consequently, such approaches can only be used in an re-configuration pro-
cesses that relies upon alternative configurations defined at design-time. This limitation stems
from the fact that a new representation has to be manually defined for each system architectural
configuration. In the next Chapter we discuss in more detail different approaches for modelling
probabilistic behaviour and reliability.
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2.6. Background Summary
The adaptation techniques presented in Section 2.1 can be encoded at the architectural level
through addition or replacement of components and changes in bindings between them. A com-
ponent, in a generic sense, denotes encapsulation of behaviour, hence it can equally well be used
for the representation of software libraries, hardware devices or (web) services. Therefore, archi-
tectural adaptation provides the right level of abstraction to enable the definition of adaptation
mechanisms that are not specific to a particular programming language/execution environment.
Interception and proxy-based techniques can be seen as lower-level mechanisms that realise
architectural adaptation for a specific programming language or middleware framework.
In addition to being able to adapt their structure, autonomous systems need to determine when
and how the system should adapt. Action policies consist in reactive rules which specify the exact
steps for adaptation based on the current system state. However, such procedural constructs
require specifying all the situations in which adaptation is needed. Declarative specification such
as goal policies and utility functions are more suitable for autonomous systems as they enable
dealing with unanticipated states that require adaptation. Action policies can be used to realise
the plans generated to fulfil Goal or Utility policies.
Automating architectural reconfiguration requires integrating models of architecture, be-
haviour and non-functional properties to determine the possible alternative configurations, cal-
culating their non-functional properties and choosing the most suitable configuration. Existing
research does not fully address these aspects which are often left for subsequent design iter-
ations or considered in isolation even though they are clearly interdependent. For instance,
existing approaches that build upon architecture or behaviour models to generate alternative
configurations that maximise aggregated non-functional properties rely upon textual notations of
non-functional properties [SHMK10, MLD+11b] or monitoring components external to the sys-
tem [CG12], which do not provide the desired level of accuracy for adaptation mechanisms. On
the other hand, model-based analysis of reliability and performance using DTMC and CTMC
representations do not support automatic construction of the composite model of each con-
figuration from generic representations of each component. Consequently, only configurations
known at design time can be considered for reconfiguration. Although composable models of
system behaviour support verification of the soundness of new architectural configurations, the
construction of the corresponding composite representations does not take into account the ar-
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chitectural model, which can lead to incorrect analysis as the composite model does not reflect
active behaviour.
In this thesis we aim to provide automated mechanisms for architectural adaptation based
on a close correspondence between the architectural, behavioural and non-functional aspects of
component-based systems. Composability is a key aspect that we aim to preserve across all mod-
elling aspects as it enables automated analysis of architectural configurations not considered at
design-time. We aim to describe architectural aspects using Darwin [MDEK95] a compositional
for specifying the architectural structure of component based systems. The Darwin ADL also
supports explicit specification of provided and required functionality of a component, thereby
enabling an external (third-party) component to determine the bindings between provided and
required of different components. We aim to automate architectural reconfiguration by delegat-
ing to a management component the decision to bound a provided interface of one component
to a required interface of another. Additionally, we aim to describe the behaviour of each
component using Interface Automata [dAH01], a composable formalism. Although IA and Dar-
win specifications have some modelling aspects in common, these formalisms are considered in
isolation in existing approaches. As self-management requires a close integration between the
architectural and behavioural aspects of a system, we aim to associate input-output actions
with provided-required interfaces, and their synchronisation with bindings between provided
and required interfaces. We aim to explore these links to support the construction of composite
representations of the system behaviour that reflect the bindings between components. More-
over, we aim to use the composite representation of each system configuration to determine the
compatibility between components using safety analysis tools in LTSA [MK06]. Although ex-
isting work includes composable formalisms for architectural and behavioural aspects, there is a
lack of support for composable probabilistic models that support automated reliability analysis.
To this end, we aim to fill this gap by proposing Probabilistic Component Automata (PCA),
a compositional modelling formalism. We aim to extend Interface Automata with probabilistic
information as well as support for the representation of failure scenarios, failure propagation
and failure handling. By extending IA we aim to establish a close link between the behaviour
representation and probabilistic models of a system and also leverage the aforementioned link
between IA and Darwin models. By integrating architectural, behavioural and reliability com-
posable models we aim to define centralised and distributed reconfiguration mechanisms that
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enable systems made of autonomous components to re-configure themselves to preserve global
non-functional requirements, while ensuring the soundness of new configurations.
We start by reviewing in the next Chapter the existing literature on models to represent proba-
bilistic behaviour. We describe thereafter Probabilistic Component Automata, our probabilistic
modelling formalism.
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3. Modelling Probabilistic Behaviour and
Reliability
Automating architectural reconfiguration requires a close integration between composable mod-
els of architectural, behaviour, non-functional properties and management aspects. An essential
aspect is the composability of the models i.e., the ability to derive the representation of com-
posite components from the representations of their parts. Non-functional properties such as
reliability require extending behaviour models with stochastic information on the frequency
of execution of actions. However, existing probabilistic models do not support composability
as composing stochastic information is a challenging task [SV04]. To this end, we present in
this Chapter Probabilistic Component Automata (PCA), a composable formalism to model the
probabilistic behaviour of component-based systems. We extend Interface Automata with prob-
abilities and additional constructs for failure modelling, propagation and handling to support
automated analysis of reliability properties. The semantics of PCA models are intuitive and
closely resemble the behaviour of component-based applications. In addition, by establishing
a close link with architectural models, such as Darwin, we are able to automatically construct
the composite the composite representation of different architectural configurations. For each
architectural configuration, we modify the generic PCA representation of each component prior
to composition to reflect the bindings with other components. Reliability requirements of a
given system configuration are then automatically analysed using the corresponding composite
PCA model.
Before we describe in Section 3.3 Probabilistic Component Automata in detail, we start by
discussing in the next Section the differences between performance models and models of prob-
abilistic choices in terms of their semantics and the properties that can be analysed using each
type of model. We review thereafter the existing work on reliability analysis using models of
probabilistic choices.
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3.1. Comparison between CTMC and DTMC models
Discrete-Time Markov Chains (DTMC) and Continuous-time Markov Chains (CTMC) are both
probabilistic models that support stochastic model checking [KNP07]. While in a DTMC model
probabilistic choices are associated with single discrete steps between states, a CTMC model
represents the rates of transitions from one state to another. Probabilistic choice, in CTMC
models, occurs through race conditions when two or more transitions in a state are enabled.
In the next paragraphs we discuss the differences between these formalisms, as they have both
been used for reliability analysis [ST07, FGT12].
A DMTC is defined by a tuple 〈S, q, P, L)〉 where
• S is a finite set of states;
• q ∈ S is the initial state;
• P : S × S → [0, 1] is the transition probability matrix, where ∀s ∈ S∑s′∈S P (s, s′) = 1;
• L : S → 2AP is a labelling function that assigns to each state s ∈ S the set L(s) of atomic
propositions that are valid in that state.
Cheung [Che80] proposed using DTMC models to calculate the reliability of a system based
on the reliability of its components. In such representations the matrix P models the transfer
of control between components as follows: a label is assigned to each state si to denote that
component Ci has the control over the execution of the system and P (si, sj) represents a transfer
of control between component Ci and component Cj . If component Ci fails during its execution,
a transition to a global failure F absorbing state, i.e. without transitions to other states, is added
to state si, while P (si, F ) denotes the probability of such failure happening. A final absorbing
state C corresponds to the correct execution of the system.
Consider the e-commerce system used by Filieri et. al [FGT12] which consists of a web-service
that sells merchandise and integrates three external web-services: authentication, shipping and
payment. A high-level description of the behaviour of the system is depicted by the activity
diagram of Figure 3.1. The corresponding DTMC representation of the e-commerce system is
shown in Figure 3.2 [FGT12]. Following Cheung’s approach, each state is labelled with either
an internal action of the e-commerce system or with the name of an external service-based, e.g.
ExpShipping, while the probabilities of transitions between states model the usage profile as
well as the probability of failures. For instance, 35% of the users are returning customers while
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Figure 3.1.: Activity Diagram of an e-commerce System [FGT12]
Figure 3.2.: DTMC Model of e-commerce System [FGT12]
the ExpShipping service has 5% probability of failing. The following reliability properties can
then be analysed using this model:
• Probability of a request finishing without failures, i.e. the probability of reaching Success
state;
• Probability of a failure by the ExpShipping service for a returning customer;
• Probability of an authentication failure.
On the other hand, CTMC models are used to analyse performance metrics such as the mean
time for the system to fail. A CTMC is defined by a tuple 〈S, q, R, L〉 where
• S is a finite set of states;
• q ∈ S is the initial state;
• R : S ×S → [0, 1] is a rate matrix, where a transition can only occur between states s and
s′ if R(s, s′) > 0;
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• L : S → 2AP is a labelling function that assigns to each state s ∈ S the set L(s) of atomic
propositions that are valid in that state.
The matrix R specifies the rate at which a transition is made between states s and s′, which is
derived from the duration of making such transition. The semantics of CTMC models stipulates
that if a state has more than one outgoing transition, then a race condition occurs between
the enabled transitions from the state. In other words, the transitions are considered to be
running in parallel and the action that first finishes its execution determines the next state.
Furthermore, the time spent in each state s ∈ S before making a transition is designated as
its exit rate E(s), which corresponds to the time taken by the fastest transition to complete.
Given that all the outgoing transitions of a state s ∈ S are modelled using an exponentially
distributed random variable Xs,s′ with parameter λs,s′ = R(s, s
′), the exit rate E(s) is defined
as the minimum of those exponential distributions: min {Xs,1, . . . , Xs,n}, where n is the number
of states in S. The resulting distribution is also exponential whose rate is defined as E(s) =∑
s′∈S R(s, s
′). Moreover, the properties of the exponential distribution also stipulate that
P (Xs,s′ = min {Xs,1, . . . , Xs,n}) = λs,s′λs,1+ ... +λs,n . Therefore, the probability of a transition from
state s to state s′ being triggered before the others is given by R(s,s
′)
E(s) .
An embedded DTMC model is defined for a CTMC D model defined by tuple 〈S, q, R, L〉 as
D = emb(C) = 〈S, q, P, L〉, where for each s, s′ ∈ S:
P emb(C)(s, s′) =

R(s,s′)
E(s) if E(s) 6= 0;
1 if E(s) = 0 and s = s′;
0 otherwise.
Note that the embedded DTMC emb(C) stipulates, for each state s, the probability that a
transition to a state s′ finishes before the others. If the transitions from a state s represent
the execution of multiple actions then the probability defined by the embedded
DTMC is different than the probability represented in the DTMC associated with
the usage profile. For instance, the system can choose an action a with 90% and an action
b with 10%, regardless of the time they require to complete. If action b takes significantly
less time to complete than action a, then the embedded DTMC would define a significantly
lower probability for action a. On the other hand, if the transitions from state s denote multiple
outcomes of the same action a, the probabilities defined by P emb(C(s, s′) denote the probabilistic
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Figure 3.3.: CTMC Model of e-commerce System [FGT12]
choice over those outcomes. Given the rate ar associated with an action a, consider two possible
outcomes with probability p and 1− p. The rate of each transition can be defined as p . ar, the
exit rate of state s E(s) = p . ar + (1 − p) . ar denotes the rate of the action a executing in
state s. In this special cases, R(s,s
′)
E(s) designates the probability of each outcome of action a and
a CTMC model can be used in a similar way to a DTMC model for reliability analysis based on
the frequency of execution of failure and non-failure actions.
Consider now the CTMC model of the e-commerce system in Figure 3.3, whose rate matrix R
is obtained by combining the rate of each action (in requests per second) with the usage profile
defined by the DTMC model of the e-commerce in Figure 3.2. In other words, this representation
is constructed by considering the DTMC model shown in Figure 3.2 as the embedded DTMC
and by computing the rate of each transition R(s, s′) using the following formula :
R(s, s′) = E(s) . P emb(C) .
Note that the CTMC model does not support analysis involving failure scenarios as it does not
include transitions to failure states. Although the same procedure that was applied to transitions
denoting successful execution could be applied to transitions to failure states, the use of the same
rate for successful execution and failure scenarios implies that the amount of time to complete
the full execution of a service and the detection of its failure would be the same. The CTMC
model depicted in Figure 3.3 enables the analysis of the following properties:
• Probability that a session (from Login to Logout) requires at most x seconds to complete;
• Probability that the time needed for a returning customer until he/she checks out is less
than x seconds;
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• Probability that a new customer completes a full session using NormalShipping service
waiting no more than x seconds.
Therefore, the properties that can be analysed in CTMC models are different from those that
can be analysed in DTMC models. In the latter, analysis is concerned with the probability of
reaching a given state regardless of the time it takes, whereas in the former analysis is concerned
with throughput, utilisation, mean time to reach a state or probability to reach within x units
of time. In the rest of this Chapter we focus on models that represent probabilistic choice
as our focus is on reliability analysis, as previously described for DTMC models. We refer to
Kwiatkowska et al. work on Stochastic Model Checking [KNP07] for a more detailed comparison
between DTMC and CTMC models.
3.2. Models of probabilistic choice
Although DTMC models support automated analysis of reliability properties, a separate DTMC
representation is required to be specified for each architectural configuration as these represen-
tations cannot be automatically constructed from a DTMC model of each component. For
example, DTMC representations that follow Cheung’s approach [Che80] do not include the be-
haviour of a component, as each state only represents the execution of a single component.
Therefore, when different architectural configurations are considered, a new representation has
to be manually defined and the system needs to be profiled again to obtain a new transition
matrix P .
Even if the information in the system model is extracted from DTMC representations of
each component, there is no method to automatically construct the system model from those
individual DTMC representations. Although different extensions to Cheung’s work have been
proposed in an attempt to solve this limitation, they resort to manual specifications to link
different DTMC models and construct a DTMC of the system. For instance, Wang et. al
[WPC06] defined mappings between architectural patterns and DTMC representations of the
entire system, such mappings must be manually defined and the resulting models do not include
the internal behaviour of each component. On the other hand, Etessami et al. [EY09] extended
DTMC models with the notion of input and output states in order to model the behaviour
of each component as an individual DMTC. The model of the system is then constructed by
merging input-output states of DTMC models. Similarly to Wang et. al work, the links between
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input-output states are defined manually and the method does not overcome the main problems
associated with DTMC models, e.g. only sequential execution is modelled.
We illustrate these limitations in the next paragraphs using a series of small examples. Con-
sider the DTMC models A and B in figures 3.4(a) and 3.4(b), respectively. They both make a
choice from their initial state that leads to two other states (outcomes). When these two DTMC
models are composed, as shown in Figure 3.6, each step in the composed DTMC consists of
joint independent steps performed by the two components, as the parallel composition of two
DTMCs is synchronous.
0
1
2
〈0.5〉
〈0.5〉
(a) DTMC A
0’
1’
2’
〈0.7〉
〈0.3〉
(b) DTMC B
Figure 3.4.: Examples of DTMC Models
0, 0′ 1,2’
1,1’
2,1’
2,2’
〈0.35〉
〈0.15〉
〈0.35〉
〈0.15〉
Figure 3.5.: Synchronous Composition of DTMC Models A and B
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Consider now an alternative composition which aims at representing the concurrent execution
of A and B. The composite model in Figure 3.6 does not preserve the semantics of generative
systems as its transitions from composite state 〈0, 0′〉 do not sum up to 1. Intuitively, the DTMC
A is making a probabilistic choice in its state 0 which is independent from the probabilistic choice
made by B in state 0′. How should the probabilities from composite state 〈0, 0′〉 be changed
such that their sum equals 1? Normalising the probabilities for their sum is not always desirable
and valid as modelling concurrent execution of independent choices presents several challenges
[SV04].
0, 0′
1,0’
0,1’
2,0’
0,2’
1,1’
1,2’
2,1’
2,2’
〈0.5〉
〈0.5〉
〈0.7〉
〈0.3〉
〈0.7〉
〈0.3〉
〈0.7〉
〈0.3〉
〈0.5〉
〈0.5〉
〈0.5〉
〈0.5〉
Figure 3.6.: Composition of DTMC Models A and B
Furthermore, DTMC-based approaches assume that failures occur independently in compo-
nents bound to each other and cannot represent failure dependencies and failure propagation
across component bindings. Filieri et. al [FGGM10] extended Cheung’s approach to enable
modelling of failure propagation but their approach still does not support automatic construc-
tion of the model from the representations of its parts.
Alternatively, path-based approaches consider the reliability of components and communica-
tion channels. The behaviour of a system is modelled as disjoint subdomains to represent the
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system operational profile [KM97]. System reliability is then calculated from the reliability of
each subdomain. Yacout et al. [YCA04] represent subdomains (execution paths) using Message
Sequence Charts that are subsequently translated to a Component Dependency Graph (CDG)
under the assumption that the system architecture is hierarchical. The CDG begins with a
start node from which the execution paths are initiated and terminates with an end node, which
denotes the completion of all the paths. System reliability is calculated using a breadth-first
search on the CDG as follows: at each step, a component is visited by the algorithm and the
system reliability is calculated as
R = Rprevious ×RCi ×RTij × PTij ,
where Rprevious is the reliability of the components already visited, RCi is the reliability associ-
ated with component Ci, RTij is the reliability associated with the transfer of control between
Ci and Cj , and PTij is the probability of control being transferred from Ci to Cj . As loops may
be present in the CDG, each component is associated with an expected execution time and an
upper bound limit on the system execution time is specified to avoid infinite iterations of the
graph navigation algorithm. When this limit is reached, the reliability computation is stopped.
Furthermore, a separate CDG can be used to encode the behaviour of a composite component
[YCA04]. Zhang et al. [ZZCD08] extended the previous CDG-based model by applying the sub-
domains approach to each component to represent its operational profile, thus enabling more
fine-grained modelling and analysis.
However, path-based models encompass similar limitations to the ones described for DTMC
models, e.g. failures are assumed to be independent. Although the system model proposed by
Cheung et al. [CRMG08] is computed based on the representations of its components with sup-
port for the representation of internal behaviour, these representations are specific to the context
in which the components are deployed, hence they cannot be directly used in other systems. One
of the reasons for this limitation arises from the requirement of having fully probabilistic models,
where deterministic choices are made at each state. However, some aspects of a system may
not be probabilistic or cannot be modelled as a probabilistic choice, e.g. unknown execution
environment. Markov Decision Processes [DA98] are an extension of DTMC models that allow
for the representation of non-deterministic choices. In each state, a non-deterministic choice
between several discrete probability distributions over successor states is made. Although MDP
models support analysis of worst and best-case scenarios, exact probabilistic analysis requires
71
CHAPTER 3. MODELLING PROBABILISTIC BEHAVIOUR AND RELIABILITY
non-deterministic choices to be resolved first. A single or multiple adversaries, also known as
scheduler or policy, resolve(s) non-deterministic choices by specifying probabilities over paths,
thereby producing a DTMC representation. However, MDPs also present limitations when con-
structing composite representations from an MDP model of each component. For instance, if
two MDPs make independent deterministic choices from states s and s′, when composing these
models a non-deterministic choice is specified in for the composite state 〈s, s′〉, which needs
to be resolved later by an adversary. In addition, when two MDPs are composed, the deter-
ministic choices associated with required interfaces of a component are synchronised with the
non-deterministic choices associated provided interfaces bound to those required interfaces. Al-
though a component without provided interfaces can be modelled as an adversary, it cannot
resolve all the probabilistic choices expressed by bindings in lower levels of the composition
hierarchy.
In the next Section we discuss other approaches to compose probabilistic models.
3.2.1. Composable Probabilistic Models
Several probabilistic extensions have been proposed for Labelled Transition Systems based on:
• adding probabilities to every transition or to transitions labelled with the same action;
• making a distinction between probabilistic and non-deterministic states, where probabilis-
tic choices are only specified for the former;
• defining a transition function which supports both non-determinism and probabilistic
choices.
The first type of extension are denoted by generative and reactive probabilistic systems. In
generative systems a probability distribution is associated with all outgoing transitions from a
given state, since actions denote probabilistic choices performed by the system, and their sum
must equal 1. Formally, a generative PLTS model is defined by the tuple A = 〈S, q, E , µ〉 where
µ : ∆→ [0, 1] assigns a probability to each transition in ∆ such that
∀s ∈ S,
∑
(s,a,s′)∈∆
µ(s, a, s′) = 1.
When two generative systems are composed in parallel, it is not clear how the probabilities
of transitions in the composite model should be defined [SV04]. In the next paragraphs we
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illustrate different cases of parallel composition for composition the generative models in Figure
3.7.
0
1
2
a, 〈0.5〉
b, 〈0.5〉
(a) Generative PLTS
A
0’
1’
2’
a, 〈0.7〉
c, 〈0.3〉
(b) Generative PLTS B
Figure 3.7.: Examples of Generative PLTS Models
Given a composite state 〈s, t〉, a transition from state s to state s′ labelled with action a
and with probability pa (s
a, pa−−−→ s′) from one generative PLTS model, and a transition from
state t to state t′ labelled with action b and with probability pb (t
b, pb−−→ t′) from another gen-
erative PLTS model, synchronous parallel composition semantics defines that the transitions
are synchronised in the composite model as transition 〈s, t〉 ab, pa.pb−−−−−→ 〈s′, t′〉. The corresponding
composite generative PLTS using synchronous composition is shown in Figure 3.8.
The synchronous composition rule preserves the semantics of generative systems for this com-
posite model. However, if the rule is applied to the parallel composition between the generative
PLTS model A in Figure 3.7(a) and the generative PLTS model C in Figure 3.9, the resulting
composite model does not preserve the generative semantics of each state, as the sum of the
probabilities of outgoing transitions from the initial composite state 〈0, 0′′〉 in the corresponding
composite model show in Figure 3.10 does not sum to 1. In addition, the synchronous paral-
lel composition rules do not capture non-determinism associated with concurrent execution of
non-shared actions.
A parameterised parallel composition operator ‖σ,θ is proposed by Baeten et al. [BBS95] which
considers both synchronous and asynchronous transitions. When composing two generative
PLTS models A and B, the two parameters σ and θ are applied as follows. Consider the
composite state 〈s, t〉; transitions from state s and state t are synchronised with probability
1−θ and asynchronous transitions occur with probability θ; an asynchronous move is performed
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0, 0′ 1,2’
1,1’
2,1’
2,2’
aa, 〈0.35〉
ac, 〈0.15〉
ba, 〈0.35〉
bc, 〈0.15〉
Figure 3.8.: Synchronous Composition of Generative PLTS Models A and B
0”
1”
2”
a, 〈0.7〉
b, 〈0.3〉
Figure 3.9.: Generative PLTS Model C
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0, 0′′
1,1”
2,2”
aa, 〈0.35〉
bb, 〈0.15〉
Figure 3.10.: Synchronous Composition of Generative PLTS Models A and C
by model A with probability σ and by model B with probability 1 − σ. If only either A or B
can make a transition, the parameters σ and θ are not applied.
Another parameterised parallel composition operator ‖σL is defined by D’Argenio et al. [DHK99],
where synchronisation solely occurs between transitions with shared actions in the set of action
labels L. The factor σ denotes the probability that model A performs autonomous actions,
given that both A and B have decided not to synchronise at a given composite state 〈s, t〉.
The following cases denote the situations where a transition 〈s, t〉 a,P−−→ 〈s′, t′〉 is included in the
composite model:
• A makes an autonomous move, when B can also do an autonomous move:
s
a,p−−→ s′, t b,q−→ t′, a, b /∈ L, t′ = t then P = p.q.σ
ν(s, t, L)
;
• B makes an autonomous move, when A can also do an autonomous move:
s
a,p−−→ s′, t b,q−→ t′, a, b /∈ L, s′ = s then P = p.q.σ
ν(s, t, L)
;
• A makes an autonomous move, but B blocks as it cannot synchronise:
s
a,p−−→ s′, t b,q−→ t′, a /∈ L, b ∈ L, t′ = t then P = pq
ν(s, t, L)
;
• B makes an autonomous move, but A blocks as it cannot synchronise:
s
b,p−→ s′, t a,q−−→ t′, a /∈ L, b ∈ L, s′ = s then P = pq
ν(s, t, L)
;
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• A and B make a synchronous move:
s
a,p−−→ s′, t a,q−−→ t′, a ∈ L, then P = pq
ν(s, t, L)
;
• A makes an autonomous move, but B is in a deadlock state:
s
a,p−−→ s′, a /∈ L, t′ = t then P = p
ν ′(s, L)
;
• B makes an autonomous move, but A is in a deadlock state:
t
b,q−→ t′, b /∈ L, s′ = s then P = q
ν ′(t, L)
;
ν and ν ′ are normalisation factors defined as follows:
ν(s, t, L) = 1−
∑
s
a,p−−→s′
t
b,q−→t′
a,b ∈L
a6=b
pq,
ν ′(s, L) = 1−
∑
s
a,p−−→s′
a∈L
p.
Both normalisation factors distribute the probability of transitions that are blocked to the
transitions included in the composite model to ensure the semantics of generative systems are
preserved.
Although all the previous parallel composition operators enable the construction of compos-
ite models that comply with the semantics of generative systems. Each individual model can
only represent probabilistic choices that a component makes on its internal behaviour and on
invocations to other components through required interfaces, as generative models cannot cater
for non-deterministic choices associated with provided interfaces.
In contrast, reactive systems associate a discrete probability distribution with the outgoing
transitions of a state labelled with the same action. Therefore, actions are treated as input from
the environment, i.e. reactive PLTS only cater for non-deterministic choices as a model does
not decide which action is chosen at each state but only their possible outcomes. Formally, a
reactive PLTS model is defined by the tuple A = 〈S, q, E , µ〉 where µ : (s, a) → µs,a assigns a
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probabilistic distribution µs,a to state s ∈ S and action label a ∈ E , which in turn defines the
outgoing states and the associated probabilities µs,a : s
′ → [0, 1], s′ ∈ S such that
∀s ∈ S, ∀a ∈ E , if µs,a ∈ µ,
∑
s′∈S
µs,a(s
′) = 1.
Given two reactive PLTS models A and B, their composition is specified by A‖B = 〈SA ×
SB, 〈qA, qB〉, EA ∪ EB, µAB〉. For each composite state 〈s, t〉 and a ∈ EAB, µ〈s,t〉,a is defined as
follows:
• if a ∈ EA ∩ EB, then µ〈s,t〉,a : 〈s′, t′〉 → µs,a(s′)× µt,a(t′) ;
• if a ∈ EA ∧ a /∈ EB, then µ〈s,t〉,a : 〈s′, t〉 → µs,a(s′)× 1 ;
• if a ∈ EB ∧ a /∈ EA, then µ〈s,t〉,a : 〈s, t′〉 → µt,a(t′)× 1 .
Although the composition of reactive PLTS models does not require normalisation of probabil-
ities in the composite model, such representation does not enable exact probabilistic analysis as
non-deterministic choices performed by the environment need to be resolved. To this end, Prob-
abilistic Interface Automata (PIA) [PBU] introduce the composition of a probabilistic model of
the environment with a non-probabilistic model of the software system, which combines Inter-
face Automata with Markov Decision Processes. Although PIA can be composed, choices are
only resolved by a single probabilistic representation of the environment, similar to the scheduler
previously defined for MDP representations.
Alternatively, Probabilistic I/O Automata (PIOA) [WSS94] provide a hybrid solution by com-
bining reactive and generative systems. This is achieved by extending I/O Automata [LT87] with
probabilities and associating reactive semantics with input actions and generative semantics with
internal and output actions. A PIOA model is formally defined by the tuple A = 〈S, q, E ,∆, µ, δ〉,
where
• S is a finite set of states, q ∈ S is the initial state;
• E = E in ∪ Eout ∪ E int is a set of action labels comprise of a set of input actions E in, a set
of output actions Eout and a set of internal actions E int;
• ∆ ⊆ (S × E × S) is the set of transitions;
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• µ : ∆→ [0, 1] is the transition function subject to the following rules:
∀s ∈ S,
( ∑
(s,a,s′) ∈ ∆
a ∈ Eloc
µ(s, a, s′)
)
= 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
generative semantics
(3.1)
∀s ∈ S,∀a ∈ E in,
( ∑
(s,a,s′) ∈ ∆
µ(s, a, s′)
)
= 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
reactive semantics
(3.2)
• δ : S → [0,∞) is a state delay function which assigns a delay rate to each state.
When composing two PIOA modelsA = 〈SA, qA, EA,∆A, µA, δA〉 andB = 〈SB, qB, EB,∆B, µB, δB〉
the following cases are considered w.r.t. synchronisation of interface actions:
• synchronisation can occur between input actions, as in reactive systems;
• synchronisation involving output actions is only allowed for matching pairs of input-output
actions.
Therefore, parallel composition is only defined for compatible PIOA models, with disjoint sets of
output actions (EoutA ∩EoutB = ∅) and distinguishable internal actions such that E intA ∩EB = ∅ and
E intB ∩ EA = ∅. The composite PIOA AB = 〈SA × SB, 〈, qA, qB〉, EAB,∆AB, µAB, δAB〉 is defined
as follows:
• SAB = SA × SB;
• qAB = 〈qA, qB〉;
• EAB = E inAB ∪ EoutAB ∪ E intAB, where
1. E inAB = ( E inA ∪ E inB ) \ ( EoutA ∪ EoutB );
2. E intAB = E intA ∪ E intB ∪ ( E inA ∩ EoutB ) ∪ ( E inB ∩ EoutA );
3. EoutAB = ( EoutA ∪ EoutB ) \ ( E inA ∪ E inB );
• ∆AB = set of all 〈sA, sB〉 a−→ 〈s′A, s′B〉 such that
1. sA
a−→ s′A ∈ ∆A and sB a−→ s′B ∈ ∆B;
2. sA
a−→ s′A ∈ ∆A and sB a−→ s′B /∈ ∆B =⇒ sB = s′B;
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3. sB
a−→ s′B ∈ ∆B and sA a−→ s′A /∈ ∆A =⇒ sA = s′A;
• ∀〈sA, sB〉 ∈ SAB, δAB( 〈sA, sB〉 ) = δA(sA) + δB(sB)
• ∀〈sA, sB〉 a−→ 〈s′A, s′B〉 ∈ ∆AB
1. if a ∈ E inAB,
µAB( 〈sA, sB〉 a−→ 〈s′A, s′B〉 ) = µA(sA, a, s′A) . µB(sB, a, s′B);
2. if a ∈ EoutA ∧ a ∈ E inB ,
µAB( 〈sA, sB〉 a−→ 〈s′A, s′B〉 ) =
δA(sA)
δA(sA) + δB(sB)
. µA(sA, a, s
′
A) . µB(sB, a, s
′
B);
3. if a ∈ EoutB ∧ a ∈ E inA ,
µAB( 〈sA, sB〉 a−→ 〈s′A, s′B〉 ) =
δB(sB)
δA(sA) + δB(sB)
. µA(sA, a, s
′
A) . µB(sB, a, s
′
B);
4. if a ∈ E locA ∧ a /∈ E inB ,
µAB( 〈sA, sB〉 a−→ 〈s′A, s′B〉 ) =
δA(sA)
δA(sA) + δB(sB)
. µA(sA, a, s
′
A);
5. if a ∈ E locB ∧ a /∈ E inA ,
µAB( 〈sA, sB〉 a−→ 〈s′A, s′B〉 ) =
δA(sB)
δA(sA) + δB(sB)
. µB(sB, a, s
′
B);
Given that synchronisation occurs only between matching pairs of input-output actions, which
can correspond to the bindings between the provided and required interfaces of components, or
pairs of input-input actions, PIOA A and B perform a synchronous move from a composite
state 〈sA, sB〉 if they can both perform a matching action a. The synchronisation of matching
pairs of input-output actions results in a single transition labelled with an internal actions in the
composite PIOA. Rules 4 and 5 for ∆AB denote asynchronous execution of internal actions or
output actions of PIOA A (B) for which there is no corresponding input action in PIOA B (A).
The probability of composite transitions, as established by µAB, is described as follows. The
first rule denotes the synchronisation of input actions as defined for reactive systems. Rules 2
and 3 denote the probability of synchronised input-output pairs of actions where deterministic
choices performed by output actions are combined with non-deterministic choices associated
with matching input actions, while rules 4 and 5 specify the probability for internal and output
when they execute asynchronously. In both cases the state delay rate from each PIOA is used to
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normalise the transitions, thereby ensuring the semantics of generative systems are preserved.
The normalisation rule is underpinned by a race condition between the two PIOA, equivalent
to its use for CTMC models.
Although PIOA models overcome some of the problems of the models previously discussed by
combining the semantics of reactive and generative systems, the input-enabledness requirement
presents several difficulties when modelling the behaviour of software components. Consider the
case of modelling a single-threaded server component using a PIOA representation. The seman-
tics of PIOA models implies that the server must process requests from clients (input actions) at
any time, even when the server is internally handling a request. Input-enabledness also does not
support modelling of assumptions regarding interactions with the environment. For example,
when modelling a particular communication/interaction algorithm, e.g. TCP handshake, each
side assumes a particular order of interaction.
Alternatively Probabilistic Component Interface Protocols (PCIP) [KGM10] combine elements
of PIOA and IA to specify representations that do not require input-enabledness. A PCIP model
is defined by the tuple A = 〈S, q, E ,∆, µ, δ〉, and the construction of composite models is similar
to the rules previously described for PIOA models. Synchronisation is only applied to matching
pairs of input-output actions and delay rates are used for normalisation of transitions that
follow generative semantics. On the other hand, while input actions block until they can be
synchronised with the corresponding output action, as specified for IA models, the execution
of output actions is never blocked. When composing two PCIP models A and B, for a given
composite state 〈sA, sB〉, if A is ready to execute an output action1, i.e. sA a−→ s′A ∈ ∆A∧a ∈ EoutA ,
then the following two cases are considered by the parallel composition operator of PCIP:
• if B is ready to execute the corresponding input action, sB a−→ s′B ∈ ∆B ∧ a ∈ E inB , then
A and B interact synchronously and the transition 〈sA, sB〉 a−→ 〈s′A, s′B〉 is added to the
composite model, following synchronisation semantics of IA and PIOA;
• if B cannot execute the corresponding input action from state sB, then a transition
〈sA, sB〉 a−→ 〈EA, sB〉 is added to the composite model leading to an error state 〈EA, sB〉.
In contrast with IA models where output actions are blocked until a corresponding input action
is available for synchronisation, PCIP models consider blocking of output actions inconsistent
behaviour and model such scenario as erroneous transitions to a special error state. This syn-
chronisation semantics makes PCIP less suitable for reliability analysis where transitions to the
1The case where B executes the output action is equivalently defined.
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error state represent failures of actions, e.g. communication failures. Note also that analysis of
liveness properties can be used to verify if a given output action is always executed, without
having to explicitly represent in the model the situations where the execution of an output action
has been blocked.
Although input/output actions can be associated with provided/required interfaces, none of
the described models establishes a link between behaviour and architectural models. In fact,
when constructing the composite model for a given composition of components, these models
implicitly assume a configuration with single bindings between all provided and required in-
terfaces. How can one construct the composite representation for a configuration with unused
functionality? What changes need to be made to the model of a component to enable the repre-
sentation of multiple bindings to its provided interfaces? None of the previous models provides
the means to cater for these scenarios. In addition, these models normalise the probabilities of
concurrently executed actions using delay rates whose semantics is not well defined (see detailed
discussion on Section 3.3.4). We will discuss the normalisation applied by both PCIP and PIOA
in more detail in Section 3.3.2. Furthermore, failure scenarios are represented in the previous
models using transitions labelled with internal actions leading to failure state2. However, given
that failure actions are not explicitly represented, these models do not cater for failure handling
behaviour which requires a compositional semantics for failure actions.
3.3. Probabilistic Component Automata
Composable models of non-functional properties are required for autonomous systems to be able
to automatically analyse the non-functional properties of a system configuration by deriving its
representation from the (composite) models of its components. In this Section we propose our
composable modelling formalism, Probabilistic Component Automata (PCA), as a probabilistic
extension to Interface Automata, i.e. we follow the synchronisation semantics of IA and extend it
with probabilistic information. We describe the main operators to model PCA models for basic
components and their corresponding semantics. We extend the parallel composition operator
rules of Interface Automata to consider probabilistic information associated with transitions,
including rules for normalisation of concurrent execution of probabilistic choices. In contrast
with the parallel composition algorithm for IA models which requires the construction of the
2Other approaches to reliability analysis based on the probability of reaching an error state as a result of failures
are described in existing surveys [Gok07, KEC+08].
81
CHAPTER 3. MODELLING PROBABILISTIC BEHAVIOUR AND RELIABILITY
full product automaton, the algorithm we implement for composing PCA models is an extension
of the parallel compositional algorithm for LTS models. As a result, the composite model is
constructed iteratively without having to explore all possible composite states. Finally, we
describe re-labelling and hiding operators which, in conjunction with the parallel composition
operator, are integrated with the architectural models to enable automatic construction of the
composite representation for a given system configuration.
A Probabilistic Component Automaton is formally defined by the tuple A = 〈 S, q, E ,∆, µ 〉
where:
• S is a finite set of states and q ∈ S is the initial state;
• E = E in ∪ E loc:
– E in are input actions from the environment that follow reactive semantics;
– E loc = E int ∪Eout are locally controlled actions that follow generative semantics, where
∗ E int are internal actions and
∗ Eout are output actions.
• ∆ ⊆ (S × E × S) is the set of transitions;
• µ : ∆ → [0, 1] where µ(s, a, s′) denotes the probability of reaching state s′ from state s
through the execution of action a, subject to:
∀s ∈ S,
( ∑
(s,a,s′) ∈ ∆
a ∈ Eloc
µ(s, a, s′)
)
= 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
generative semantics
(3.3)
∀s ∈ S, ∀a ∈ E in,
( ∑
(s,a,s′) ∈ ∆
µ(s, a, s′)
)
= 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
reactive semantics
(3.4)
To cater for automated reliability analysis of different architecture configurations, we establish
a close link with architectural models, such as Darwin, when modelling basic components as well
as when automatically constructing the composite representation of each configuration based on
generic PCA representations of each component. Consider a simple Client-Server system based
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on a Client Component (Figure 3.11 ) and a Server Component (Figure 3.12 ), described using
Darwin’s graphical and textual notations. The Client component has a required interface r and
the Server component has a provided interface p.
component Client {
require r;
}
(a) Client - Darwin textual representa-
tion
(b) Client - Darwin
graphical representa-
tion
Figure 3.11.: Darwin Representations of Client Component
component Server {
provide p;
}
(a) Server - Darwin textual representa-
tion
(b) Server - Darwin
graphical representa-
tion
Figure 3.12.: Darwin Representations of Server Component
The corresponding PCA representations are given in Figures 3.13(b) and 3.14(b), respec-
tively. Input-output actions are associated with the interfaces of a component, where the set
{!request, ?response} is associated with required interface r of the Client component and the
set {?request, !response} is associated with provided interface p of the Server component. In
the general case for provided interfaces, an input action models the possibility of the associated
method being invoked followed by internal behaviour and an output action denotes that the
method result is being returned/sent. In the case of a required interface, an output action desig-
nates the invocation of the required functionality and an input action indicates the component
receiving the result of the invoked functionality. The PCA representations in Figures 3.13(b)
and 3.14(b) follow such structure.
(a) Client Component
0 1 2
!request 〈1.0〉 prepare 〈1.0〉
?response 〈1.0〉
(b) Client PCA
Figure 3.13.: Client Component and Associated PCA Representation
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(a) Server Component
0’ 1’ 2’
?request 〈1.0〉 process 〈1.0〉
!response 〈1.0〉
(b) Server PCA
Figure 3.14.: Server Component and Associated PCA Representation
We introduce in the following Sections the different operators to construct probabilistic rep-
resentations for basic and composite components.
3.3.1. Modelling Basic Components
PCA models are graphical representations that require the specification of a full model. Just as
Finite State Processes are used as the textual notation for describing the behaviour of compo-
nents which is then transformed in to LTS representations, we have defined Probabilistic Finite
State Processes (P-FSP) (see Section 3.6) for incremental textual specification of PCA models.
The correspondence between P-FSP expressions and PCA models is defined by the function
pca : E → PCA. Given a P-FSP expression E, pca(E) = 〈S, q, E ,∆, µ〉.
Prefix and choice are the basic operators to incrementally construct PCA models of basic
components, whose operational semantics is respectively defined by Rule 1 and Rule 23.
(a, pa → E) a,pa−−→ E
(Rule 1)
The prefix operator models the execution of a single statement represented as a transition,
which includes:
• an action type: ? for input, ! for output, no-symbol for internal, ∼ for internal failures,
∼? for input failures and ∼! for output failures;
• the execution probability p, and
• the action label a.
The corresponding PCA model is given by pca(a, pa → E) = 〈S∪{p}, p, E ∪{a},∆∪{(p, a, q)}, µ∪
{(p, a, q) → pa} 〉. Similarly to IA, input actions model the receiving end of a communication
channel, i.e. (interface) methods that can be called, or any other form of input whose execution is
3The operational semantics rules should be read as Hypothesis
Conclusion
.
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determined by the environment, whereas output actions model the invocation of methods, send-
ing of messages or any externally visible action whose execution is controlled by the PCA model.
Internal actions denote internal behaviour that is not externally visible to other components.
(a1, p1 −> E1 | . . . | an, pn −> En)
ai, pai−−−−→ Ei
(Rule 2)
The choice operator enables the representation of different options from a given state whose
semantics depend on the type of the actions a1 . . . an. If a1, . . . , an are input actions with the
same action label, as shown in Figure 3.15(a), then the choice operator is used as a syntactic
simplification for the behaviour described by the PCA model in Figure 3.15(b): after the envi-
ronment decides to execute the output action !a and synchronises with the corresponding input
action ?a, then the model performs a deterministic choice. This structure can also be used to
model multiple input values.
0
1
2
?a 〈0.3〉
?a 〈0.7〉
(a) PCA A
0’ 1’
2’
3’
?a 〈1.0〉
x 〈0.7〉
y 〈0.3〉
(b) PCA A′
Figure 3.15.: Example Case for Choice Operator with Input Actions
The second case denotes a choice between input actions with different action labels corre-
sponding to different requests from the environment. Each action can indicate different pro-
vided interfaces that can be invoked by the environment, or choices offered by a communication
protocol.
Lastly, if a1, . . . , an are locally controlled actions (internal or output) of different action labels,
then the choice operator models multiple outcomes of the same internal or output action, i.e.
if or switch statements.
In the general case, the P-FSP expression (a1, p1 −> E1 | . . . | an, pn −> En) describes
a PCA that initially engages in any action ai with probability pi according to the previous
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cases. The corresponding PCA model is formally defined by the following. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ n and
pca(Ej) = 〈Sj , qj , Ej ,∆j , µj〉, then pca((a1, p1 −> E1 | . . . | an, pn −> En ai,pi−−−→ Ei ) =
〈(
⋃
i
Si) ∪ {p}, p, (
⋃
i
Ei) ∪ {a1, . . . , an}, (
⋃
i
∆i) ∪ {(p, ai, qi) }, (
⋃
i
µi) ∪ {(p, ai, qi)→ pai}〉 .
3.3.2. Modelling Composite Components
While the previous operators enable the specification of basic components, the parallel compo-
sition operator ‖ is used to automatically construct the PCA model of a composite component
from the PCA models of its sub-components. The semantics of composite models is a probabilis-
tic extension of the composition semantics of IA models: synchronisation occurs only between
input and output actions to model the interactions between two components, while internal ac-
tions of different models are interleaved to denote their concurrent execution. Moreover, parallel
composition can only be applied to compatible PCA models. Two PCA (A, B) are compatible
iff:
E intA ∩ EB = ∅, E intB ∩ EA = ∅,
E inA ∩ E inB = ∅, EoutA ∩ EoutB = ∅.
These conditions ensure that synchronisation occurs solely between a single pair of input and
output actions. In practice, the conditions imply that parallel composition can only be applied
to synchronise single bindings to a provided interface. For configurations with multiple bindings,
the interface actions of the components involved have to be differentiated before constructing
the composite model, which we discuss later in Section 3.3.4.
A
(!a,pa)−−−−→ A′ , B (?a,pa′ )−−−−−→ B′
A||B
(a,
pa.pa′
η
)
−−−−−−→ A′||B′
, a ∈ EoutA ∧ E inB
A
(?a,pa)−−−−−→ A′ , B (!a,pa′ )−−−−−→ B′
A||B
(a,
pa.pa′
η
)
−−−−−−→ A′||B′
, a ∈ E inA ∧ EoutB (Rule 3)
A
(a,pa)−−−−→ A′
A||B
(a, pa
η
)
−−−−→ A′||B
, a /∈ EB B
(b,pb)−−−−→ B′
A||B
(b,
pb
η
)
−−−−→ A||B′
, b /∈ EA (Rule 4)
Rule 3 determines that synchronisation occurs only when both components are ready to com-
municate, as input (output) actions wait for a corresponding output (input) action to be ready
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for interaction. Rule 4 denotes autonomous moves from each automaton which are interleaved
to represent their concurrent execution. A normalisation factor η is applied in both cases to
preserve the generative semantics of locally controlled actions. We discuss in the next para-
graphs the interpretation for η and discuss the differences w.r.t. to the normalisation factors
previously described for generative PLTS models, PCIP and PIOA.
Normalisation
Consider the architectural model and the corresponding PCA models for the Client-Server sys-
tem in Figure 3.16 introduced earlier in this Chapter. The composite PCA model for the
Client-Server system depicted in Figure 3.16(b) has been automatically constructed by com-
posing in parallel the PCA representations of the Client and Server components, according to
the previous operational semantics for PCA models. Client and Server execute independently
their respective internal actions prepare and process, between the shared actions request and
response through which the Client and Server component synchronise. Although the Server is
ready to execute the output action response from the composite state 〈1, 2′〉, the Server blocks
until the Client is ready for synchronisation4, following the semantics of parallel composition for
Interface Automata. Similarly, in composite state 〈2, 1′〉 the Client does not execute the input
action response until it can synchronise with the corresponding output action from the Server.
To preserve the generative semantics for the composite state 〈1, 1′〉, the probabilities of tran-
sitions 〈1, 1′〉 prepare−−−−−→ 〈2, 1′〉 and 〈1, 1′〉 process−−−−→ 〈1, 2′〉 in the composite PCA need to normalised.
Note that the interleaving of actions prepare and process depicts the different execution orders
of the concurrent execution of the actions from the composite state 〈1, 1′〉 and the composite
state 〈2, 2′〉 denotes a system state where the two internal actions have both been executed,
regardless of their execution order. In fact, the probability of reaching state 〈2, 2′〉 from state
〈1, 1′〉 is independent of the normalisation factor used. As a result, our normalisation factor η
does not require any additional information from the system designer as it considers that both
components are equally likely to execute their actions before the other. When applied to the
Client-Server system, we define η as the sum of the probabilities of all locally controlled actions
from the composite state 〈1, 1′〉 : 2. The corresponding composite PCA is depicted in Figure
3.17.
4Asynchronous communication can be modelled using an intermediate buffer component.
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(a) Client-Server Architectural Configuration
0, 0’ 1, 1’ 2, 1’ 2, 2’ 1, 2’
request 〈1.0〉
prepare 〈pprepare〉
process 〈pprocess〉
prepare 〈1.0〉
process 〈1.0〉
response 〈1.0〉
(b) Client-Server PCA
Figure 3.16.: Client-Server System Models
0, 0’ 1, 1’ 2, 1’ 2, 2’ 1, 2’
request 〈1.0〉
prepare 〈0.5〉
process 〈0.5〉
prepare 〈1.0〉
process 〈1.0〉
response 〈1.0〉
Figure 3.17.: Composite PCA for Client-Server System Using Normalisation Defined by η for
PCA Models
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We will later distinguish specific cases which require a different definition of the normalisa-
tion factor η and formalise their calculation when defining the algorithm that the implements
the parallel composition operator in Section 3.5.1. In the next paragraphs we illustrate the
application of the different normalisation mechanisms described in Section 3.1 and discuss the
interpretation of the resulting probabilities in comparison with our normalisation factor η.
Consider the normalisation defined by the parallel composition operator ‖σ,θ [BBS95] to asyn-
chronous execution of actions. Figure 3.18 depicts the application of the σ factor to the probabil-
ities of transitions 〈1, 1′〉 prepare−−−−−→ 〈2, 1′〉 and 〈1, 1′〉 process−−−−→ 〈1, 2′〉 in the composite PCA in Figure
3.16(b). The normalisation factor σ stipulates in this case the probability that Client finishes the
execution of action prepare before the Server finishes the execution of action process. Given
that the Client and Server cannot synchronise on any action from state 〈1, 1′〉, the normalisation
defined by the parallel composition operator ‖σL is equivalent to ‖σ,θ in this case. Note that the
value of σ does not affect in both cases the probability of reaching state 〈2, 2〉 from state 〈1, 1〉.
0, 0’ 1, 1’ 2, 1’ 2, 2’ 1, 2’
request 〈1.0〉
prepare 〈σ〉
process 〈(1− σ)〉
prepare 〈1.0〉
process 〈1.0〉
response 〈1.0〉
Figure 3.18.: Composite PCA for Client-Server System Using Normalisation Defined by σ
[BBS95]
Furthermore, Figure 3.19 depicts the normalisation defined by PIOA based on delay rates
of states 1 of Client and 1′ of Server. Although the delay rate is defined for each state, if the
outgoing transitions from each simple state are labelled with the same action, then it can be
interpreted as modelling the duration of that action. Consequently, the normalisation defined
by δClient(1)δClient(1)+δServer(1′) can be interpreted as expressing the probability that the action prepare
finishes before the execution of action process. However, if one of the components performed
more than one internal action from state 1 or 1′, it is unclear how the normalised transitions
would be interpreted as the previous interpretation cannot be directly applied. A similar problem
is experienced by PCIP models, where normalisation is based on global delay rates used for all the
states of each component, i.e. δClientδClient+δServer . Although the authors of PCIP [KGM10] interpreted
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the normalisation factor as expressing how frequent a component executes in comparison with
others, such interpretation cannot be applied to the probabilities of transitions 〈1, 1′〉 prepare−−−−−→
〈2, 1′〉 and 〈1, 1′〉 process−−−−→ 〈1, 2′〉 as these denote the concurrent execution of internal action within
a session between the Client and the Server. In other words, the Client cannot execute action
prepare more frequently than the Server executes the action process as it can only execute
prepare after synchronising with the Server through action request.
0, 0’ 1, 1’ 2, 1’ 2, 2’ 1, 2’
request 〈1.0〉
prepare 〈 δClient(1)δClient(1)+δServer(1′) 〉
process 〈 δServer(1′)δClient(1)+δServer(1′) 〉
prepare 〈1.0〉
process 〈1.0〉
response 〈1.0〉
Figure 3.19.: Composite PCA for Client-Server System Using Normalisation Defined by PIOA
In summary, the existing mechanisms to normalise the probability of interleaved transitions
labelled with internal or output actions require additional parameters to achieve the same result
as our normalisation factor. We have performed sensitivity analysis on the different normal-
isation factors for concurrent execution of internal actions and obtained the same results for
properties that involved reachability of failure states. Furthermore, the normalisation used by
PIOA and PCIP models also presents interpretation issues regarding the values of delay rates
and their relationship with the outgoing transitions from each state. Furthermore, the compos-
ite representation of a generic architectural configuration of a system is generally constructed
by composing in parallel the models of each component. Given that a configuration may have
multiple bindings to a provided interface as well as unbound provided interfaces, we define in
the next Sections how the PCA model of each component can be adapted before composition
according to the architectural configuration of the system in which it is deployed.
3.3.3. Removing Unused Behaviour
Consider the following alternative Client-Server system as defined in Figure 3.20 and the asso-
ciate PCA representation for the new Server component in Figure 3.21. This PCA model denotes
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Figure 3.20.: Client-Server System Architecture with Unbound Provided Interface
a generic representation of the new Server component which can be used in any configuration
of bindings to its provided interfaces.
0’ 1’ 2’ 3’ 4’
?request 〈1.0〉
?pageStats 〈1.0〉
process 〈1.0〉
!response 〈1.0〉
extractInfo 〈1.0〉
!pageInfo 〈1.0〉
Figure 3.21.: Server PCA with Two Provided Interfaces
However, when this model is composed with the PCA model of the Client component in
Figure 3.13(b), then the corresponding composite PCA representation includes unused behaviour
associated with the unbound provided interface of the new Server component, as shown in Figure
3.22. As a result, the composite representation includes behaviour that is not going to be used.
Therefore, such composite representation cannot be translated to a DTMC model as it includes
transitions labelled with input actions which follow reactive semantics.
The interface operator @ is used in LTS models to relabel with the silent action τ transitions
labelled with actions not in the specified dataset. It is the dual of the hiding operator, which
we discuss in the next Section. In contrast, we define the interface operator @ to remove
unused behaviour associated with unbound provided interfaces. The operational semantics of
the operator are defined by Rule 5 and the implementation of this operator is described by
Algorithm 3.1.
A
(a,pa)−−−−→ A′
A
, a ∈ E inunused
A
(a,pa)−−−−→ A′
A
(a,pa)−−−−→ A′
, a /∈ E inunused (Rule 5)
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0, 0’ 1, 1’ 2, 1’ 2, 2’ 1, 2’
0, 3’ 0, 4’
request 〈1.0〉
?pageStats 〈1.0〉
prepare 〈0.5〉
process 〈0.5〉
prepare 〈1.0〉
process 〈1.0〉
response 〈1.0〉
extractInfo 〈1.0〉
!pageInfo 〈1.0〉
Figure 3.22.: Client-Server Composite PCA with Unused Behaviour
Given an input PCA model A = 〈S, q, E ,∆, µ〉 and a set of unused input actions E inunused ⊆ E in,
the algorithm performs a depth-first navigation of the PCA model and analyses the outgoing
transitions from each state. If a transition is labelled with an input action not in the set E inunused,
or any internal, output or failure actions, then it is added to the PCA A′. On the other hand,
if a transition is labelled with an input action in E inunused, then such transition is not added to
the output PCA model A′ and the navigation is not continued from the destination state of
that transition. As the execution of an input action is determined by an external automaton,
if an input action is not synchronised with a corresponding output action, then any subsequent
behaviour is not going to be executed, unless it originates from other paths in the automaton.
0’ 1’ 2’
?request 〈1.0〉
?req 〈1.0〉
process 〈1.0〉
!response 〈1.0〉
Figure 3.23.: Server PCA with Two Provided Interfaces - Shared Behaviour
Consider an alternative PCA representation in Figure 3.23 for a Server component with two
provided interfaces, where the Server includes a second interface associated with input action
?req for legacy reasons. In both cases, the PCA model of the new Server can be adjusted
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input : A = 〈S, q, E ,∆, µ〉 and E inunused
output: A′ = 〈S ′, q, E ′,∆′, µ′〉
1 boolean[] visited;
2 Queue states;
3 states.push(q);
4 while not states.isEmpty() do
5 currentState ← states.pop();
6 if visited[currentState] then
7 continue;
8 visited[currentState] = true;
9 if ∆(currentState) = ∅ then continue;
10 ;
11 foreach (currentState, e, s) ∈ ∆(currentState) do
12 if e ∈ E inunused then
13 continue;
14 else
15 addTransition((currentState, e, s)) to A′;
16 if s 6= q ∧ s 6= currentState then states.push(s);
17 ;
18 ;
Algorithm 3.1: Interface Operator Algorithm
according to the architectural configuration in Figure 3.20 by applying the interface operator
(Server’ @ { request }), thus producing a model that is equal to the PCA of the original
Server and thus can be used construct a composite representation that reflects the architectural
configuration of the system. While in the PCA representation of Figure 3.21, the interface
operator discards all paths initiated by transition 0′ ?pageStates−−−−−−−→ 3′ as these are never executed
by the Server, when applied to the PCA representation in Figure 3.23 the interface operator
keeps the behaviour from state 1′ as the state 1′ is reached from another path, i.e. 0′ ?request−−−−−→ 1′.
3.3.4. Relabelling
The relabelling operator is used as a means to apply relabelling functions to models in order
to change the names of action labels. It is normally used to ensure that models synchronise
on the correct action labels when composing them. For example, two components may be
bound to compatible provided and required interfaces but there may be a mismatch between
the corresponding interface actions. In the general case, the relabelling operator takes as input a
relabelling mapping as follows {newlabel1/oldlabel1, . . . , newlabeln/oldlabeln}. The operational
93
CHAPTER 3. MODELLING PROBABILISTIC BEHAVIOUR AND RELIABILITY
semantics of the relabelling operator are defined by Rule 6, where f represents a mapping relation
over action labels.
A
(a,pa)−−−−→ A′
A/f
f(a,pa)−−−−−→ A′/f
(Rule 6)
When the relation defines a 1-N mapping {a} × L, a ∈ E , each transition (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆ is
replaced by #(L) transitions labelled with the action labels in L. In addition to the re-labelling
as used in LTS, the probability associated with those transitions is defined by µ(s, a, s′) in the
case of input actions and µ(s,a,s
′)
#(L) for others, where µ(s, a, s
′) denotes the probability of reaching
state s′ from state s through the execution of action a.
Modelling Multiple Bindings
While the previous operators support the specification of basic and composite components with
single bindings to each provided interface, the re-labelling operator / can be used to rename
transitions labelled with interface actions of a component to support requests from multiple
bindings. The components that share the common resource also need to rename their interface
actions accordingly so that individual requests from each component can be distinguished.
Figure 3.24.: Two Clients-Server Architectural Configuration
When multiple Clients are bound to the Server’s provided interface, as shown in Figure
3.24, the Server PCA needs to be extended to handle requests from multiple clients. Figure
3.25 depicts the result of applying the re-labelling operator / to the interface actions request
and response as follows: Server / { {c1.request, c2.request}/request, {c1.response,
c2.response}/response }. The same can be achieved using a process sharing operator similar
to the one defined for LTS [MK06] which substitutes interface actions of a component by pre-
fixed actions that represent the interaction with multiple bindings: The resulting PCA model
constructed as {c1, c2}::Server and is shown in Figure 3.25.
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0” 1” 2”
?c1.request 〈1.0〉
?c2.request 〈1.0〉
process 〈1.0〉
!c1.response 〈0.5〉
!c2.response 〈0.5〉
Figure 3.25.: Server PCA with Multiple Bindings
The PCA models of the two clients are derived from the original Client PCA in Figure
3.13(b) by relabelling all its actions in order to fully distinguish their execution. For instance,
the PCA model for Client 1 shown in Figure 3.26(a) is constructed as follows: Client / {
{c1.request}/request, {c1.prepare}/prepare, {c1.response}/response }. Alternatively,
the prefix operator can be used to add a prefix to all the actions of a model. To this end, the
model for Client 2 can be constructed by the following P-FSP expression: c2:Client.
0 1 2
!c1.request 〈1.0〉 c1.prepare 〈1.0〉
?c1.response 〈1.0〉
(a) Client 1 PCA
0’ 1’ 2’
!c2.request 〈1.0〉 c2.prepare 〈1.0〉
?c2.response 〈1.0〉
(b) Client 2 PCA
Figure 3.26.: Client 1 and 2 PCA Models
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Consider now the composite model constructed using the following P-FSP expression c1:Client
‖ c2:Client ‖ {c1,c2}::Server in Figure 3.27. Although the modified Server PCA includes
multiple input actions from state 0′′ and multiple output actions from state 2′′, the Server com-
ponent can only handle one Client at each time. After Client 1 and Server synchronise through
action c1.request, they execute concurrently their internal actions c1.prepare and process,
whose probabilities are defined according to the previous rule for normalisation factor η. Note
that Client2 needs to wait for the session between Client1 and the Server to finish before it can
interact with the Server. Although from the composite state 〈2, 0′, 2′′〉 the modified Server PCA
can execute two output actions c1.response and c2.response, the Server can only interact with
Client1 as Client2 is waiting to be able to initiate a session with the Server, i.e. Client2 can only
execute c2.request. Consequently, the probability of transition 〈2, 0′, 2′′〉 c1.response−−−−−−−→ 〈0, 0′, 0′′〉
needs to be normalised to reflect that the Server can only interact with one Client at a time.
However, this scenario represents a different type of normalisation and requires a different defi-
nition for the normalisation factor η: the sum of the probabilities of enabled output actions from
a given state. In the Client-Server example, the second case for normalisation is applied to the
transitions labelled with enabled output actions from state 2′′ of Server. This normalisation
corresponds to redistributing the probabilities of blocked transitions labelled with output actions
to the remaining transitions with enabled output actions. It is applied before synchronisation in
order to avoid changing: a) the original probabilities of internal actions; b) the normalisation
associated with concurrent execution of internal actions.
Normalisation is also applied at state 〈0, 0′, 0′′〉 to the requests originating from Client 1 and
Client 2. Given that these actions correspond to concurrent requests from the two clients, we
have applied the first case of normalisation factor η and the normalised probabilities denote
that the two Clients use the Server equally. However, it is important to distinguish this case
as normalisation across clients often needs to take into account their differing usage profiles i.e.
some clients may use the server more frequently than others. Informally, this is analogous to
having different normalisation factors for sessions originating from different clients and for the
interleaving of actions within a session.
Note that three different kinds of normalisation are applied, each with a slightly different
meaning. The following cases define also the order in which normalisation is applied.
• in the first case normalisation is applied to a single PCA model to enabled output actions
in order for the probabilities of blocked transitions to be distributed to enabled actions;
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0, 0’, 0”
1, 0’, 1” 2, 0’, 1” 2, 0’, 2” 1, 0’, 2”
0, 1’, 1” 0, 2’, 1” 0, 2’, 2” 0, 1’, 2”
c1.request 〈0.5〉
c2.request 〈0.5〉
c1.prepare 〈0.5〉 process 〈1.0〉
process 〈0.5〉
c1.prepare 〈1.0〉
c1.response 〈1.0〉
c2.prepare 〈0.5〉 process 〈1.0〉
process 〈0.5〉
c2.prepare 〈1.0〉
c2.response 〈1.0〉
Figure 3.27.: Client-Server Composite PCA with Multiple Bindings
• in the second case normalisation is applied to requests originating from separate clients to
model how often they use a shared resource;
• in the third case normalisation is applied to transitions in the composite model labelled
with output and internal actions to normalise the probabilities of concurrently executed
actions.
The normalisation factors defined for generative PLTS, PCIP and PIOA do not support the
presented scenarios as a general rule is applied to all states.
We formalise later in Section 3.5.1 the value of η for the above cases when we describe the
algorithm that implements the parallel composition operator. In the next Section we define the
constructs for failure modelling in PCA models and the corresponding semantics.
97
CHAPTER 3. MODELLING PROBABILISTIC BEHAVIOUR AND RELIABILITY
3.4. Reliability Modelling and Analysis
We introduce failure actions to explicitly model failure scenarios, failure propagation and failure
handling behaviour. While internal failures represent unexpected executions such as runtime
exceptions, transitions labelled with output failure actions model externally visible failures, such
as communication failures. Both internal and output failures follow generative semantics as they
are locally controlled. On the other hand, an input failure action (s,∼?e, ERROR) denotes that a
PCA is able to handle the failure of the corresponding output action from another component,
hence these actions follow reactive semantics as their execution is determined by the PCA that
fails.
The operational semantics of the parallel composition for failure propagation and failure han-
dling in PCA is intuitively similar to exception handling in Object-Oriented programming lan-
guages. An output failure action can be interpreted as an exception being thrown while an input
failure action denotes the catch clause in a try-catch block. This allows to express a variety of
failure handling behaviours. For example, the failure of an inner component can be handled by
an outer component or by another component at the same level. The path initiated by an input
failure action can be mapped to the behaviour specified in a catch block.
0’ 1’ 2’-1’
?request 〈1.0〉 process 〈1.0〉
!response 〈0.99〉
∼!error 〈0.01〉
Figure 3.28.: Server PCA with Failures
In Figure 3.28 we show a modified version of the server PCA of our example, where the Server
fails with a probability of 1% from state 2′ and state −1′ denotes an ERROR state. When the
PCA of the unreliable Server is composed with the Client PCA, the output failure action error
is propagated to the composite PCA and the ERROR state in the Server PCA becomes a global
ERROR state (Figure 3.29). In other words, the failure of a single component, if not handled,
leads to the failure of the composite component. Nonetheless, as the transition to the composite
failure state is labelled with an external output action, the failure can still be later handled by
another component, similar to the way failures are propagated in Object-Oriented languages.
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While failure propagation is covered by Rule 4 for non-shared actions, the operational semantics
for failure handling is defined in Rule 5.
0, 0’ 1, 1’ 2, 1’ 2, 2’ 1, 2’-1, 2’
request 〈1.0〉
prepare 〈0.5〉
process 〈0.5〉
prepare 〈1.0〉
process 〈1.0〉
response 〈0.99〉
∼ error 〈0.01〉
Figure 3.29.: Client-Server Composite PCA with Failures
A
(∼!a, pf )−−−−−→ ERROR , B
(∼?a, pfhandling )−−−−−−−−−−−→ B′′
A||B
(a,
pf .pfhandling
η
)
−−−−−−−−−−−→ reset(A)||B′′
(Rule 5)
Alternatively, the Client PCA can be extended to handle the failure of the response action
(Figure 3.30) using an input failure action followed by failure handling behaviour (Rule 5). In
this case, the composition of the input and output response failure actions becomes an internal
transition of the composite component that does not lead to the ERROR state. Note that the
Client can also use an input failure action to prevent a failure of the Server from being handled
by other components.
0 1 2 3
!request 〈1.0〉 prepare 〈1.0〉
?response 〈1.0〉
∼?error 〈1.0〉
errorPage 〈1.0〉
Figure 3.30.: Client PCA with Failure Handling
After the failure action is handled, the Server PCA then resets its behaviour to the initial state
while the Client PCA continues its execution based on the specified failure handling behaviour.
Finally, internal failures are treated in the same way as other internal actions. When two
automata are composed, internal failure actions lead the composite automaton to a global ERROR
state.
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0, 0’ 1, 1’ 2, 1’ 2, 2’ 3, 0’ 1, 2’
request 〈1.0〉
prepare 〈0.5〉
process 〈0.5〉
prepare 〈1.0〉
process 〈1.0〉
response 〈0.99〉
error 〈0.01〉
errorPage 〈1.0〉
Figure 3.31.: Client-Server Composite PCA with Failure Handling
3.5. Composite Analysis
After describing all the process algebra rules for constructing composite models, we formalise in
the next paragraphs how a composite model A‖ = A1‖ . . . ‖An is constructed by the algorithm
that supports the parallel composition operator. We then describe in Section 3.5.3 the hiding
operator which reduces a PCA model to its interface representation.
3.5.1. Parallel Composition Algorithm
Given n input models A1 = 〈S1, q1, E1,∆1, µ1〉, . . . , An = 〈Sn, qn, En,∆n, µn〉, the composite
model A‖ is defined by 〈S‖, q‖, E‖,∆‖, µ‖〉:
• S‖ ⊆ S1 × · · · × Sn ;
• q‖ = 〈q1, . . . , qn〉 ;
• ∆‖ and µ‖ defined below.
The algorithm keeps a queue of states that need to be analysed, which starts with the initial
composite state q‖ = 〈q1, . . . , qn〉. At each step, the algorithm analyses a state 〈s1, . . . , sn〉
and determines which transitions can be executed based on the operational semantics defined
earlier in this Chapter. After determining the possible transitions from a given composite state
〈s1, . . . , sn〉, the algorithm calculates their probabilities based on the probabilities defined for
individual models and the different cases of the normalisation factor. We describe in the next
paragraphs the different cases considered by the algorithm.
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As previously mentioned in Section 3.3.2, parallel composition can only be applied to com-
patible PCA models. A PCA Ai = 〈Si, qi, Ei,∆i, µi〉 is compatible if ∀i, j ∈ [1, n] ∧ i 6= j, the
following conditions are verified:
E intAi ∩ EAj = ∅, E intAj ∩ EAi = ∅,
E inAi ∩ E inAj = ∅, EoutAi ∩ EoutAj = ∅.
As a result, synchronisation of input-output pairs can only occur between two models.
Synchronisation Between Input and Output Actions
If two models are able to synchronise from state 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 through a pair of input-output
actions, then a transition (〈s1, . . . , sn〉〉, a, 〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉) is added to ∆‖, an internal action a is
added to E int‖ and the composite state 〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉 is added to the queue for further analysis.
The two models Ai and Aj can synchronise if:
• (si, a, s′i) ∈ ∆i and (sj , a, s′j) ∈ ∆j ;
• (a ∈ E ini ∧ a ∈ Eoutj ) or (a ∈ E inj ∧ a ∈ Eouti ).
Given that only two models Ai and Aj can make a synchronous move, the composite state
〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉, is defined as for all other models k ∈ [1, n] ∧ k 6= i ∧ k 6= j as s′k = sk. The same
construction applies to all of the following rules.
Synchronisation Between Input Failure and Output Failure Actions
Failure handling is represented by the synchronisation between an input-failure action and the
corresponding output-failure action. In the case that a model Ai handles a failure from a model
Aj , a transition (〈s1, . . . , sn〉, a, 〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉) where s′j = qj is added to ∆‖ as model Aj has been
reset, an internal action a is added to E int‖ as the failure has been handled and the composite
state 〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉 is added to the queue for further analysis. Failure handling occurs if:
• (si, a, s′i) ∈ ∆i and (sj , a, s′j) ∈ ∆j ;
• (a ∈ Efail−ini ∧ a ∈ Efail−outj ).
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Non-shared Actions
We now consider transitions labelled with non-shared actions. A transition (〈s1, . . . , sn〉, a, 〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉)
is added to ∆‖, where s′j = sj ∀j ∈ [1, n] ∧ j 6= i as only model Ai progresses. The composite
state 〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉 is then added to the queue for further analysis. If a is a non-shared input
action, i.e. a ∈ E ini ∧ a 6∈ Eoutj ,∀j ∈ [1, n] ∧ j 6= i, then a is added to E in‖ . Similarly, if a is a
non-shared output action, i.e. a ∈ Eouti ∧ a 6∈ E inj ,∀j ∈ [1, n] ∧ j 6= i, then a is added to Eout‖ .
In the case of internal actions, a transition (〈s1, . . . , sn〉, a, 〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉) is added to ∆‖ and the
action label a is added to E int‖ .
We define in the next paragraphs how the probabilities of composite transitions are defined,
including the probability of transitions from a state with blocked transitions.
Probability of Composite Transitions - µ‖
We now define the probabilities of transitions in the composite model ∆‖. We start by deter-
mining the probability of transitions labelled with input actions that are not synchronised, as
these are the only that do not require further normalisation.
From a state 〈s1, . . . , sn〉, the probability of a transition (〈s1, . . . , sn〉, a, 〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉) ∈ ∆‖
is defined by µi(si, a, s
′
i) when the input action is executed by model Ai. Similarly, from a
state 〈s1, . . . , sn〉, the probability of a transition (〈s1, . . . , sn〉, a, 〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉) ∈ ∆‖ is defined by
µi(si, a, s
′
i) when the internal action is executed by model Ai. However, µi(si, a, s
′
i) may not be
the final probability in the composite model as it may have to be normalised.
Furthermore, transitions labelled with shared output actions cannot execute when the corre-
sponding input action is not ready for synchronisation. We define enabled(si, s1, . . . , sn) as the
set of output actions from state si that are not blocked by each model Aj from state sj , where
j ∈ [1, n] ∧ j 6= i:
enabled(si, s1, . . . , sn) = {a ∈ ∆ei (si)∧a ∈ Eoutj : ∃sj ∈ (s1, ..., sn) ∧ (a ∈ ∆ej(sj)∧a ∈ E inj )∨(a 6∈ Ej)}.
Consequently, output actions in the enabled set may need to be normalised before synchronising
with input actions. From a composite state 〈s1, . . . , sn〉, the probability of output actions from
state si of Ai are normalised as follows:
∀(si, a, s′i), a ∈ Eouti , µ′i(si, a, s′i) =
µi(si, a, s
′
i)
ηenabled(si, s1, . . . , sn)
,
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where ηenabled(si, s1, . . . , sn) is defined as
ηenabled(si, s1, . . . , sn) =
µenabledi (si, s1, . . . , sn)∑
(si,aout,s′i)∈∆(si) µi(si, a
out, s′i)
,
and µenabledi (si, s1, . . . , sn) is defined as
µenabledi (si, s1, . . . , sn) =
∑
(si,a,s
′
i)∈∆i
a∈ enabled(si,s1,...,sn)
µi(si, a, s
′
i)
This normalisation effectively corresponds to distributing the probability of blocked output
actions to enabled output actions.
Furthermore, the probability of synchronised transitions (〈s1, . . . , sn〉, a, 〈s′1, . . . s′n〉) is firstly
defined as:
µ′‖(〈s1, . . . , sn〉, a, 〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉) =
(
wi . µ
′
i(si, a, s
′
i)
)
. µj(sj , a, s
′
j), if a ∈ E inj ∧ a ∈ Eouti ,
where wi denotes the weight associated with normalisation of actions in multiple bindings sce-
narios. Otherwise wi is equal to 1 for composite models that do not involve multiple bindings
to provided interfaces. After the previous two normalisation cases are applied, the probability
of locally controlled actions that can be executed from a given composite state 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 is
normalised to preserve the generative semantics associated with these transitions as follows:
µ‖(〈s1, . . . , sn〉, a, 〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉) =
µ′‖(〈s1, . . . , sn〉, a, 〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉)∑
(〈s1,...,sn〉,a,〈s′1,...,s′n〉)∈∆‖(〈s1,...,sn〉) µ
′
‖(〈s1, . . . , sn〉, a, 〈s′1, . . . , s′n〉)
.
Note that the existing mechanisms in the literature for normalising the probability of transi-
tions labelled with internal or output actions cannot cope with all the above cases as they are
based on a single rule which focuses on normalising independent choices from different models,
e.g. interleaved transitions.
3.5.2. Reliability Analysis
A composite PCA that does not have input actions can be translated to a DTMC model which
we annotate with state variables finish and fail to represent successful executions and the
occurrence of failures. The probability of the system successfully executing without failures for
a single request can be automatically analysed using the translated DTMC model based on the
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following PCTL formula: 1 − P=?[s = fail U ¬(s = finish) ], the complement probability
of the system failing for a single request. Note that this analysis can be generalised to verify
how likely the system is to fail after N requests and additional variables can be added to the
model to enable sensitivity analysis on the impact of changes on a) the probability of failure of
a component; b) clients execution profile and c) bindings configuration.
3.5.3. Hiding
The composite model for a complex system often large as it contains many internal states and
transitions. We define the hiding operator \{a1, . . . , an} to remove, when possible, the transi-
tions in a PCA A labelled with the internal action {a1, . . . , an} and propagates their probability
to the remaining transitions, while maintaining the probabilistic reachability properties of the
original process. If all the transitions labelled with internal actions are removed from the original
model, then the hiding operator reduces a PCA to its interface behaviour representation, i.e.
with only input and output actions that denote interactions via provided and required interfaces.
Removing transitions labelled with internal actions is more complex than removing unused be-
haviour as it requires propagating the probability of the deleted transitions whilst preserving
the reachability properties of the original model. We devote the the entirety of the next Chapter
to the algorithm that implements the hiding operator to help reduce the state space, thereby
mitigating the state-explosion problem associated with composite representations.
Note that we apply a different semantics to the hiding operator that is generally defined for
other process algebras where it is used to replace action labels with a special action label τ . In
those process algebras, actions that are relabelled with τ can no longer be used to synchronise
with other models. This is not necessary for PCA models as the parallel composition operator
rules prevent synchronisation involving internal actions.
3.5.4. Profiling
The probabilities associated with internal and output actions of a PCA representation can be
obtained by profiling the system and counting the number of times each action was executed
over a certain period of time. The initial probabilities can be extracted by simulating or running
the system for an initial bootstrapping period. As the execution profile of each component can
change at run-time, the initial system representation can become inaccurate. Whilst it is possible
to count the number of actions executed at run-time, this information still needs to be integrated
104
3.6. TOOL SUPPORT - LTSA-PCA
with the initial profile. This has been addressed by Epifani et. al [EGMT09] in the case of a
single DTMC representation for the whole system. A new transition matrix P ′ (posterior) is
calculated from the previous transition matrix P (prior) and the recent information extracted
from execution traces (likelihood of each transition). This method can be analogously applied to
update the probabilities associated with the internal and output actions of a PCA representation.
In contrast with DTMC models, as profiling for PCA models is performed independently by each
component, when a component is replaced the execution profile of the remaining components
can be re-used to construct the composite model of the new configuration. Moreover, as PCA
representations take into account the component’s internal behaviour, changes in the execution
profile of a single component can be detected sooner, thus improving the accuracy of the overall
system representation.
3.6. Tool Support - LTSA-PCA
In this Section we briefly describe our extension the LTSA model checker [MK06] to support
the specification, construction and analysis of PCA models. The full description of LTSA-PCA
is given in Appendix B.
In the same way that LTS models are incrementally specified using Finite State Processes
(FSP), we have defined the extension Probabilistic Finite State Processes (P-FSP) to support the
specification of PCA models. All the operators described in this Chapter have been implemented
in LTSA-PCA according to the operational semantics defined in the previous sections. For
example, the prefix and choice operators of FSP have been extended to consider the type of each
action as well as its probability. The behaviour of each component is specified using a P-FSP
expression which is then compiled to a PCA model. The parallel composition operator is then
used to automatically construct the composite PCA model of a given system. Each model can
be adjusted prior to composition using the interface and relabelling operators in order to reflect
the architectural configuration. Automated reliability analysis is performed by translating a
closed composite PCA to a DTMC model and then analysing its reliability properties in PRISM
model checker [KNP]. Finally, behavioural analysis is supported by existing tools in LTSA.
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3.7. Summary and Related Work
Modelling the probabilistic behaviour of distributed systems is a challenging problem. It requires
finding a reasonable interpretation of probabilities for the representation for each component,
which is then preserved when composing models to construct the representation of a system
configuration. Hybrid models that associate reactive semantics with input actions and generative
semantics with internal and output actions provide an important contribution by enabling the
representation of behaviour that a component controls and actions whose execution is chosen by
others. However, the composition semantics of existing hybrid models hinders their applicability
to model the behaviour of composite components.
In addition, composable modelling of failure scenarios is also very limited. Although failure
actions can be modelled using internal actions that lead to an absorbing failure state, this
approach does not support the representation of failure handling behaviour. Existing approaches
also do not consider in detail the implications of the architectural model when constructing the
composite model for a system configuration, which results in the following limitations:
• if the configuration comprises unbound provided interfaces, then the composite model
cannot be used for exact probabilistic analysis as it includes unresolved non-deterministic
choices associated with input actions that are not used by other components;
• there is no support for configurations comprising multiple components bound to a single
provided interface as only single bindings to provided interfaces are supported. Even if
best- and worst-case analysis is used, as in the case of MDPs, the analysis would not be
correct as it would be based on a model includes behaviour that is never used.
Probabilistic Component Automata overcome the limitations of existing models by combin-
ing and extending elements from existing work in a coherent model that corresponds closely
to architectural component models based on Architecture Description Languages, such as Dar-
win [MDEK95]. By establishing a close link with architectural models, the individual model
of each component can be automatically adjusted according to a specific configuration of bind-
ings. In addition, explicit modelling for failure actions is supported by PCA representations and
the associated semantics follow closely programming models in object-oriented languages and
distributed component models. In addition to providing an intuitive semantics for modelling
the probabilistic behaviour of basic components, we defined a suitable semantics for construct-
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ing composite probabilistic behaviour representations. Therefore, the specification burden for
complex systems can be reduced by modelling each component individually.
Furthermore, the use of fine-grained representations that take into account the internal be-
haviour of components also improves the responsiveness of reliability analysis. Since the usage
profile of provided interfaces of an inner component is determined by outer component(s), the
reliability provided by the inner component can only be computed when the probabilities associ-
ated with the equivalent output actions in the automaton of an outer component are propagated
to the input actions in the composite automaton. If the probabilities associated with these out-
put actions change, the new reliability values can be readily computed thus facilitating the
detection of violations of reliability requirements. In contrast, if internal behaviour is not taken
into account and the overall system representation is not automatically constructed using the
representation of its parts, new reliability values can only be measured after enough data that
reflects the new behaviour of the composite component has been collected by profiling tools.
The compatibility of two components with respect to their interface behaviour (see Section
2.2.2) can be verified using the model checking tools available for LTS representations [MK06]
extracting the underlying IA model from the composite PCA model. Although we use the same
techniques as IA for analysing the compatibility between two components, we modify the original
PCA models before composition in order to reflect the architectural configuration of the system.
Although the semantics of the underlying formalisms on which they are based is different,
there are close similarities between PCA models and performance process algebras such as
PEPA [Hil96]. Informally, in PEPA, a composite performance model is constructed from the
representations of its parts, rates are used instead of probabilities for locally controlled actions
and passive rates are assigned to passive actions, which are analogous to input actions. Addition-
ally, in PEPA only a model without any passive rates can be used for performance analysis, as
a composite model without passive actions can be translated to a CTMC representation. While
PEPA can be informally seen as a compositional formalism to build a composite CTMC model
of a system for analysis of its performance properties, PCA can be seen as a compositional
formalism to construct the composite DTMC model of a system for analysis of its reliability
properties.
Notwithstanding that composability facilitates incremental elaboration and enables the def-
inition of more fine grained representations, due to the interleaving of internal actions, the
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composite PCA for a large system may suffer from state-explosion. We discuss how we can
contribute to address this problem in the next Chapter.
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Reliability Analysis
Composability is a fundamental aspect for automating analysis of alternative architectural con-
figurations based on composite models that are automatically constructed from the representa-
tions of individual components. However, due to the interleaving of actions that are concurrently
executed in different components, composite models may face state-explosion which hinders the
scalability of the analysis. Although fine-grained detail is needed for the specification and pro-
filing of the probabilistic behaviour of each component, each PCA model can be simplified to its
interface behaviour before composition to reduce the number of interleaved transitions, thereby
mitigating the state-explosion problem. Such reduction process requires a minimisation tech-
nique to remove internal behaviour whilst preserving the reachability properties of the original
model.
Compositional Reachability Analysis (CRA) [CK96] has been proposed to help mitigate the
state-explosion associated with the composition of LTS and thereby potentially improving the
scalability of their composition [GS91]. Consider two LTS Q = 〈SQ, qQ, EQ,∆Q〉 and P =
〈SP , qP , EP ,∆P 〉 representing the behaviour of two components. In the composite behaviour
Q||P , Q imposes behaviour contextual constraints on P [CK96]. Such constraints are captured
by an interface process I such that the properties which hold for Q||I also hold for Q||P . This
requires that I is behaviourally equivalent to P ↑ αQ, i.e. a process that is constructed by
restricting B to the actions in Q. The main steps for building the interface process I of P
constrained by Q are as follows:
• for every transition (s, e, s′) ∈ ∆P , if e /∈ EQ delete transition (s, e, s′);
• merge states s and s′ into a single state.
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However, this CRA method [CK96] cannot be directly applied to PCA representations, or prob-
abilistic models in general, as it does not take into account the probability of deleted transitions.
How can the probability of deleted transitions be propagated to remaining transitions?
In this Chapter we propose an algorithm that extends the principles of CRA to probabilistic
generative systems and discuss its application to reduce PCA models to their interface behaviour.
We describe the steps taken by the algorithm to delete transitions and evaluate its computational
complexity. Using a series of small examples we empirically show that the reduced models
preserve the reachability properties of the original representations. We further use two example
WebServer systems to illustrate the size reduction obtained by the algorithm. The formal
verification of the correctness of the algorithm is discussed in Section 4.3 and its full specification
is given in Appendix A.
4.1. Reduction Algorithm
Before presenting the reduction algorithm for PCA models the following definitions are required
based on a generic PCA model 〈S, q, E ,∆, µ〉:
• ∆(s) = {(s, e, s′) ∈ ∆ | s′ ∈ S, e ∈ E}: the successor transitions of a state s ∈ S;
• ρ(s) = {(s′, e, s) ∈ ∆ | s′ ∈ S, e ∈ E}: the predecessor transitions of a state s ∈ S;
• ∆s(s) = {s′ | (s, e, s′) ∈ ∆, s′ ∈ S, e ∈ E}: the states of successor transitions of a state
s ∈ S;
• ρs(s) = {s′ | (s′, e, s) ∈ ∆, s′ ∈ S, e ∈ E}: states of predecessor transitions of a state s ∈ S;
• ∆e(s) = {e | (s, e, s′) ∈ ∆, s′ ∈ S, e ∈ E}: the actions of successor transitions of a state
s ∈ S;
• ρe(s) = {e | (s′, e, s) ∈ ∆, s′ ∈ S, e ∈ E}: the actions of predecessor transitions of a state
s ∈ S;
input : P = 〈S, q, E ,∆, µ〉 and E intremove ⊆ E intP
output: IP = 〈SI , qI , EI ,∆I , µI〉
1 [P’, markedStates, cyclicPaths] = firstPhase(P, E intremove)
2 IP = secondPhase(P’, markedStates, cyclicPaths, E intremove)
Algorithm 4.1: PCA Reduction Algorithm
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The reduction algorithm (Algorithm 4.1) receives as input a PCA model P = 〈S, q, E ,∆, µ〉
and a sub-set of its internal actions E intremove. Note that it may be desirable to keep transitions
labelled with certain input actions for the analysis of properties that require those actions. The
algorithm analyses the transitions of each state and checks if transitions labelled with internal
actions in the set E intremove can be deleted based on whether their probabilities can be propagated
forwards to subsequent transitions or backwards to prior transitions. In the next paragraphs we
discuss the different situations analysed by the algorithm before describing how an input model
is reduced.
Firstly, transitions labelled with input or output actions must be kept by the algorithm as these
are necessary for synchronisation with other components. Input actions that are not used for
synchronisation can be removed using the interface operator introduced in the previous Chapter,
but no propagation of probabilities is needed in such case. Additionally, transitions labelled with
internal actions which are not included in the input action set E intremove and self-loop transitions
that start and end at the same state must also be kept. We avoid removing these transitions as
their probabilities cannot be simply propagated. Alternatively, we could calculate the steady-
state probabilities and then propagate them but such calculation would significantly increase
the complexity of the reduction algorithm as it requires information regarding the entire model.
In contrast, the deletion of non-cyclic transitions only requires local information. Formally, the
algorithm keeps a transition (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆ if one of the following conditions holds:
a /∈ E intremove (4.1)
s = s′(self-loop transition) (4.2)
For single non-cyclic transitions labelled with an internal action in E intremove, the algorithm first
tries to delete a single transition labelled with an internal action in E intremove and its probability is
propagated forward if its destination state does not have other incoming transitions. In the
example model of Figure 4.1, the transition s
a−→ s′ can be considered for deletion as the state s′
does not have other incoming transitions.
On the other hand, if state s′ has other incoming transitions, these can still be deleted provided
that all those transitions are labelled with internal actions in E intremove and they all come from
the same source state s. This case is illustrated by Figure 4.2 where transitions s
a−→ s′, s a′−→ s′
and s
a′′−→ s′ verify the previous conditions and can therefore be considered by the algorithm
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... s s’
...
...
...
...
...
a 〈µa〉
a1 〈µa1〉
a2 〈µa2〉
a4 〈µa4〉
a3 〈µa3〉
a5 〈µa5〉
Figure 4.1.: Forward Propagation of a Single Transition
for deletion and their aggregated probability propagated forward to the outgoing transitions of
state s′.
... s s’
...
...
...
...
...
a 〈µa〉
a’ 〈µa′〉
a” 〈µa′′〉
a1 〈µa1〉
a2 〈µa2〉
a4 〈µa4〉
a3 〈µa3〉
a5 〈µa5〉
Figure 4.2.: Forward Propagation of Multiple Transitions
Transitions (s, ai, s
′) are therefore propagated forward only iff all the following conditions
hold:
#(ρe(s
′)) ⊆ E intremove (Incoming transitions are labelled with actions in the set E intremove) (4.3)
#(ρs(s
′)) = 1 (Incoming transitions to state s′ come from the same source state) (4.4)
∆(s) 6= ∅ (Existence of transitions for forward propagation) (4.5)
∆e(s
′) ∩ E in = ∅ ( Invalid propagation to input actions ) (4.6)
s′ 6= q ( Invalid propagation to outgoing transitions of initial state q ) (4.7)
∆e(s
′) ∩ Eout = ∅ ( Invalid propagation to output actions ) (4.8)
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The first condition 4.3 prevents the removal of transitions labelled with actions not in the
deletion set E intremove. Conditions 4.4 and 4.5 ensure that the probability of incoming transitions
to state s′ can be propagated forward and that there are outgoing transitions from state s′ to
which the aggregated probability can be propagated. Condition 4.6 prevents probabilities from
being propagated to transitions labelled with input actions to avoid violation of their reactive
semantics. Similarly, condition 4.7 prevents forward propagation to outgoing transitions of the
initial state as the transitions to be deleted cannot be executed before the outgoing transitions of
the initial state are executed. Additionally, the transitions are not deleted if the destination state
s′ has outgoing transitions labelled with output actions, as defined by condition 4.8. Although
this situation does not affect the correctness of individual models, it changes the probabilities
when composing with other models. We discuss this in more detail in Section 4.2.2 and in the
Appendix A.
s’ ...
...
...
s1
...
...
...
s2
...
...
... ...
a1 〈µa1〉
a2 〈µa2〉
a3 〈µa3〉 a4 〈µa4〉
a5 〈µa5〉
a6 〈µa6〉
a7 〈µa7〉
a8 〈µa8〉
a9 〈µa9〉
a10 〈µa10〉
a11 〈µa11〉
a12 〈µa12〉
a13 〈µa13〉
Figure 4.3.: Backward Propagation of Multiple Transitions
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If one of the above conditions is not verified, the algorithm tries to propagate the transitions
backwards. It first groups incoming transitions to state s′ based on their source state and then
analyses them separately. Each group of transitions (s, ai, s
′) with the same source state s is
deleted and their aggregated probability propagated backwards iff all the following conditions are
satisfied:
#(∆e(s)) ⊆ E intremove ( Transitions from state s are labelled with actions in E intremove ) (4.9)
#(∆s(s)) = {s′} ( All transitions from state s have s′ as the destination state ) (4.10)
s 6= q (Invalid propagation to incoming transitions to the initial state q ) (4.11)
For each group of transitions that originate from the same source state, conditions 4.9 and
4.10 ensure that the algorithm only removes them if they are all labelled with internal actions
in the set E intremove and the source state does not have have other outgoing transitions. This
is the case of state s1 in Figure 4.3. Note the conditions 4.6 and 4.8 required for forward
propagation do not need to be verified in the case of backward propagation as condition 4.10
implies that the aggregated probability of the transitions to be deleted is 1. Therefore, the
probability of transitions labelled with input actions is not changed. Moreover, condition 4.11
prevents backward propagation to incoming transitions of the initial state as the transitions to
the incoming transitions to the initial state are only executed after the deleted transitions are
executed.
Similarly to the original CRA method for LTS models, when transitions (s, ai, s
′) are deleted
the states s and s′ are merged. In other words, the outgoing transitions of state s′ are updated
to originate from state s when the probability deleted transitions is propagated forward, and the
incoming transitions to state s are updated to have as destination state s′ when the probability
of deleted transitions is propagated backwards.
4.1.1. Algorithm Description
The process of reducing a PCA model P is divided in two phases, where the transitions of each
state of model P are analysed to determine which transitions can be removed. During the first
phase (Algorithm 4.2), the algorithm visits all the states and transitions of the input model
P using a depth-first search to delete, when possible, single transitions labelled with internal
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actions. The following information is also collected during the first phase which is later used in
the second phase:
• states with multiple incoming transitions;
• the number of cyclic paths that start (and by definition end) at a given state, which also
includes self-loop transitions.
The navigation process described in Algorithm 4.2 starts from the initial state by adding it
to the queue of states to be analysed (line 3 - Algorithm 4.2) and the navigation continues as
long as there are states in the queue to be analysed (line 4 - Algorithm 4.2). After removing
the next state to be analysed from the queue (currentState in line 5 - Algorithm 4.2), the first
step consists in specifying that the state currentState has been visited (line 7 - Algorithm 4.2)
to ensure the outgoing transitions of each state are traversed only once. The algorithm then
analyses all its outgoing transitions ∆(currentState) (line 8 - Algorithm 4.2) and decides whether
each transition is kept in the intermediate reduced model P ′ according to the previously defined
conditions for forward propagation (lines 11-18 - Algorithm 4.2). Finally, when a transition
labelled with an internal action in E intremove cannot be deleted in the first phase of the algorithm
(lines 19-21, Algorithm 4.2), it is added to the intermediate reduced model and its destination
state s is marked for later analysis. After analysing each transition, if its destination state has
already been visited, the algorithm needs to determine whether this refers to multiple paths
merging at the same state or if it is a cyclic path (lines 21-26 - Algorithm 4.2). This information
is paramount for the second phase of the algorithm to ensure the navigation progresses in the
presence of cyclic paths.
The second phase takes as input the intermediate reduced model P ′ produced by the first
phase along with the number of cyclic paths for each state and the states marked for analysis.
While in the first phase the input PCA model was traversed using a depth-first algorithm,
the second-phase uses a breadth-first navigation to guarantee that a state is only considered
for analysis after all its incoming transitions have been traversed. These transitions are only
traversed when the incoming transitions to their source state have been examined for deletion.
The recursive application of this condition ensures that the incoming transitions of a state are
only analysed when all the possible reductions up to the source state of each of those transitions
have been applied.
The navigation process starts from the initial state (line 4 - Algorithm 4.3), though its in-
coming transitions cannot be analysed in the first iteration of the navigation process (line 6 -
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input : P = 〈S, q, E ,∆, µ〉 and E intremove
output: P ′ = 〈S ′, q, E ′,∆′, µ′〉, markedStates, cyclicPaths
1 boolean[] markedStates; boolean[] visited;
2 int[] cyclicPaths; Stack 〈 〈Integer, Set〉 〉 states;
3 states.push(q);
4 while not states.isEmpty() do
5 currentStateInfo ← states.pop();
6 currentState ← currentStateInfo.first();
7 visited[currentState] = true;
8 foreach (currentState, e, s) ∈ ∆(currentState) do
9 if e /∈ E int ∨ e /∈ E intremove then
10 addTransition
(
(currentState, e, s)
)
to P ′;
11 else
12 if currentState = s then
13 addTransition
(
(currentState, e, s)
)
to P ′;
14 cyclicPaths[currentState]++;
15 continue;
16 if

|ρ(s)| = 1 ∧
s 6= q ∧
∆(s) 6= ∅ ∧(
µ(currentState, e, s) = 1 ∨ ∆e(s) ∩ E interface = ∅
)
 then
17 collapseForward
(
currentState, s, µ(currentState, e, s)
)
;
18 else
19 addTransition
(
(currentState, e, s)
)
to P ′;
20 markedStates[s] = true;
21 if visited[s] then
22 statesVisitedUpToCurrentState ← currentStateInfo.second();
23 if s ∈ statesVisitedUpToCurrentState then
24 cyclicPaths[s]++;
25 continue;
26 add s to statesVisitedUpToCurrentState
27
28 if s 6= q ∧ s 6= currentState ∧ !visited[s] then
29 states.push( 〈s, statesVisitedUpToCurrentState〉 )
30
Algorithm 4.2: First Phase
Algorithm 4.3) as their source states have not yet been analysed. We therefore force the first
iteration of the navigation process to only traverse the outgoing transitions of the initial state
(line 25 - Algorithm 4.3), even if it had been marked for analysis. Nonetheless, the incoming
transitions to the initial state are analysed as the last step of the algorithm (lines 31-35 - Algo-
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input : P ′ = 〈S ′, q, E ′,∆′, µ′〉, boolean[] markedStates, int[] cyclicPaths, E intremove
output: IP = 〈SI , qI , EI ,∆I , µI〉
1 int[] nTimesVisited
2 Queue states
3 states.push(qI)
4 analyseInitialState ← markedState[qI ];
5 markedState[qI ] ← false;
6 while not states.isEmpty() do
7 currentState ← states.pop();
8 if markedState[currentState] then
9 ρagg ← Dictionary
(
s, {(s, e, currentState) ∈ ∆′ | s ∈ ps(currentState)}
)
10 µagg ← Dictionary
(
s,
∑
µ(s, e, cs)
)
, s ∈ ps(currentState)
11 if |ρs(currentState)| = 1 then
12 s← single predecessor state
13 if ρe-agg(s) ⊆ E intremove ∧ s 6= currentState then
14 if
(
∆(currentState) 6= ∅ ∧(
µagg(s) = 1 ∨ ∆e(currentState) ∩ E interface = ∅
) ) then
15 collapseForward
(
s, currentState, µagg(s)
)
16 else
17 if
∆s(s) = {currentState} ∧
(
µagg(s) = 1 ∨ ρe(s) ∩ E interface = ∅
)
then
18 collapseBackward (µagg(s), s)
19 else
20 foreach s ∈ ρs(currentState) do
21 if

ρe-agg(s) ⊆ E intremove ∧
s 6= currentState ∧
∆s(s) = {currentState} ∧(
µagg(s) = 1 ∨ ρe(s) ∩ E interface = ∅
)
 then
22 collapseBackward (µagg(s), s)
23
24 foreach (currentState, e, s) ∈ ∆(currentState) do
25 if currentState 6= s then
26 nTimesVisited[s]++
27 continue;
28 if nTimesV isited[s] =
(
ρ(s)− cyclicPaths[s] ) ∧ s 6= q then
29 states.push(s)
30
31 if analyseInitialState then
32 states.push(qI);
33 analyseInitialState ← false;
34 markedState[qI ] ← true;
35 goto 7;
Algorithm 4.3: Second phase
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rithm 4.3), which we describe later in this Section. For each outgoing transition of the initial
state, the algorithm visits their destination state s and increases the number of visited non-cyclic
incoming transitions of state s (lines 26-27 - Algorithm 4.3). Thereafter, the destination state s
is added to the queue of states if the following conditions hold (line 28 - Algorithm 4.3):
• all the incoming transitions to state s have been visited by the algorithm, apart from cyclic
paths that start and end at state s;
• the destination state is not the initial state.
While the second condition ensures that only a single full navigation is performed on the input
PCA model, the first condition nV isits[s] = ρ(s) − cyclicPaths[s] ensures that navigation
progresses before cyclic paths are analysed by the algorithm as these cannot be traversed until
the outgoing transitions for state s have been considered.
When the algorithm considers a state for analysis (line 8 - Algorithm 4.3), it only examines its
incoming transitions if the state has been previously marked during the first phase of the algo-
rithm (line 9 - Algorithm 4.3), i.e. if there is at least one incoming transition to the currentState
labelled with an internal action in E intremove. If the state has been marked for analysis, the fol-
lowing two steps are performed before the incoming transitions can be considered:
• the incoming transitions are aggregated in a Dictionary ρagg that indexes the transitions
by their source state (line 10 - Algorithm 4.3);
• the probabilities of incoming transitions are aggregated by the source state in another
Dictionary µagg (line 11 Algorithm 4.3).
When all the incoming transitions to the current state come from the same source state s
(line 12 - Algorithm 4.3), then the algorithm first tries to propagate forward their aggregated
probability to the outgoing transitions of the currentState (line 16 - Algorithm 4.3) according to
the conditions defined for forward propagation (lines 13-16 - Algorithm 4.3). If the aggregated
probability cannot be propagated forward, then algorithm tries to propagated it backwards to the
incoming transitions of the source state s according to the conditions for backward propagation
(lines 18-19 - Algorithm 4.3).
On the other hand, if the incoming transitions of the current state come from different source
states (line 21 - Algorithm 4.3), then each group of transitions indexed by the source state s is
analysed separately. For each group, the transitions are deleted and their aggregated probability
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1 foreach (s′, e′, s′′) ∈ ∆(s′)) do
2 change (s′, e′, s′′) to (s, e′, s′′) µ(s, e′, s′′) = µ(s′, e′, s′′)× µcf
Algorithm 4.4: collapseForward(s, s′, µcf )
propagated to the incoming transitions of source state s if they verify the previously defined
conditions for backward propagation. Note that as each group is analysed independently, even
if the transitions of one group cannot be deleted it does not prevent the transitions from other
groups from being removed.
1 foreach (s′′, e, s) ∈ ρ(s) do
2 change (s′′, e, s) to (s′′, e, s′) µ′(s′′, e, s′) = µ′(s′′, e, s)× µcb
Algorithm 4.5: collapseBackward(s, s′, µcb)
After all states have been visited and all incoming transitions to marked states have been
analysed, the incoming transitions of the initial state can now be considered for deletion if the
initial state had been marked for analysis during the first phase (lines 31-35 - Algorithm 4.3).
To this end, the initial state qI is added to the queue of states, marked for analysis and the
reduction process is applied to the incoming transitions of the initial state. Although the same
operations and conditions are applied for the second analysis of the initial state, the navigation
process does not continue after analysing its incoming transitions as the destination states s of
outgoing transitions of the initial state are not pushed to the queue as the following condition is
verified: nV isits[s] > (ρ(s)− cyclicPaths[s]). Note that the variable analyseInitialState needs
to be set to false before executing the goto statement to ensure the algorithm does not enter
into an endless loop.
4.1.2. Examples
We first illustrate a full execution of the reduction algorithm using the example in Figure 4.4.
0 1
2
3 4
a 〈1.0〉
b 〈0.6〉
c 〈0.4〉
x 〈1.0〉
d 〈1.0〉
Figure 4.4.: Example PCA Model for Reduction Algorithm
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Consider the application of the reduction algorithm to the PCA model in Figure 4.4 based
on the following set of actions to be removed : E intremove = {b, c, x}. The algorithm starts by
considering the outgoing transitions of the initial state. Given that the action label a is not in
the set E intremove, the transition 0 a,1.0−−−→ 1 is kept in the intermediate model and the state 1 is
added to the queue to be considered by the algorithm. Although the action label c is included
in the set E intremove, the 1 c,0.4−−−→ cannot be removed by the algorithm as state 3 has other incoming
transitions which may not have been fully reduced. Nonetheless, state 3 is marked for analysis
during the second phase. On the other hand, the transition 1
b,0.6−−−→ 2 is propagated forward
to transition 2
x,1.0−−−→ 3 as state 2 does not have other incoming transitions, x is an internal
action and b is in the set E intremove. In addition, state 2 is added to the queue of states so that its
outgoing transitions can be analysed. The algorithm then continues by analysing the outgoing
transitions of state 3 which cannot be removed as they are not labelled with actions in the set
E intremove. Finally, when analysing the transition 2 x,0.6−−−→ 3 the algorithm cannot remove it from
the intermediate model and propagate its probability forward as state 3 has other incoming
transitions which also need to be analysed before the transition 2
x,0.6−−−→ 3 can be removed.
Given that no further reduction can be performed, the first-phase terminates and returns the
intermediate model in Figure 4.5, with state 3 marked for analysis.
0 1 3 4
a 〈1.0〉
x 〈0.6〉
c 〈0.4〉
d 〈1.0〉
Figure 4.5.: Example PCA Model for Reduction Algorithm - Output of First Phase
The second phase starts at the initial state 0 but continues the navigation until state 3 as state
1 is not marked for analysis. When analysing the incoming transitions to state 3, the algorithm
decides to remove them and propagate their probabilities to the outgoing transitions of state 3
as its incoming transitions come all from the same state and are all labelled with transitions in
the set E intremove. Given that no other state was marked for analysis, the algorithm finishes the
second phase and produces the reduced PCA model in Figure 4.6.
In the next paragraphs we consider a series of small examples to illustrate the application of
the reduction algorithm to particular scenarios.
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0 1 4
a 〈1.0〉 d 〈1.0〉
Figure 4.6.: Example PCA Model for Reduction Algorithm - Reduced Model
Forward Propagation of Single Transitions
We start by recalling the conditions for forward propagation of transitions (s, ai, s
′):
#(ρe(s
′)) ⊆ E intremove ( Incoming transitions are labelled with actions in the set E intremove )
#(ρs(s
′)) = 1 ( Incoming transitions to state s′ come from the same source state )
∆(s) 6= ∅ ( Existence of transitions for forward propagation )
∆e(s
′) ∩ E in = ∅ ( Invalid propagation to input actions )
s′ 6= q ( Invalid propagation to outgoing transitions of initial state q )
∆e(s
′) ∩ Eout = ∅ ( Invalid propagation to output actions )
0 1
2 4
3
a 〈0.4〉
b 〈0.6〉
c 〈1.0〉
d 〈0.7〉
e 〈0.3〉
Figure 4.7.: Example PCA Model A1 for Forward Propagation
The second condition ensures that the reachability properties of other paths in the input model
are preserved by preventing the deletion of a single transition s
a−→ s′ when state s′ has other
incoming transitions. For instance, in the example PCA model A1 in Figure 4.7, the algorithm
cannot deleted the transition 0
b,0.6−−−→ 2 and propagated its probability to transitions 2 d,0.7−−−→ 3
and 2
e,0.3−−−→ 4 as the reachability of paths 0 a,0.4−−−→ 1 c,1−→ 2 d,0.7−−−→ 3 and 0 a,0.4−−−→ 1 c,1−→ 2 e,0.3−−−→ 4
would be changed from 0.28 and 0.12 to 0.168 and 0.072, respectively.
Propagation to Input Actions
On the other hand, the fourth condition ensures that the reactive semantics of input actions
are preserved. Consider another example PCA in Figure 4.8. If the probability of transitions
121
CHAPTER 4. TOWARDS SCALABLE COMPOSITIONAL RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
0
b,0.6−−−→ 2 is propagated to transitions 2 ?d,1.0−−−→ 3 and 2 e,1.0−−−→ 4, it would violate the reactive
semantics of input actions d (as shown in Figure 4.9(a)), where a discrete probability distribution
is associated with outgoing transitions of a state labelled with the same action.
0 1
2 4
3
a 〈0.4〉
b 〈0.6〉 ?d 〈1.0〉
e 〈1.0〉
Figure 4.8.: Example PCA Model A2 for Forward Propagation - Input Actions
Alternatively, the probability of transition 0
b,0.6−−−→ 2 could be propagated only to the transition
2
e,1.0−−−→ 4, thereby producing the PCA model in Figure 4.9(b). Although this model preserves
both reactive an generative semantics, it does not preserve the compositional reachability prop-
erties of the original model in Figure 4.8 when composing with another model, as discussed in
the next paragraphs.
0 1
4
3
a 〈0.4〉
?d 〈0.6〉
e 〈0.6〉
(a) Invalid reduced PCA
model A′2 from PCA A2 -
propagation to input actions
0 1
4
3
a 〈0.4〉
?d 〈1.0〉
e 〈0.6〉
(b) Valid reduced PCA
model A′′2 from PCA A2
- propagation to input
actions
Figure 4.9.: Example Reduced PCA Models from A2 for Forward Propagation - Input Actions
Preservation of Composition Semantics
The composite models in Figures 4.11(b) and 4.11(a) depict the composition between another
PCA model B in Figure 4.10 and the original model in Figure 4.8 as well as between the model
B and the reduced model in Figure 4.9(b).
Although the probability of reaching state 〈4, 0′〉 from the initial state 〈0, 0′〉 is preserved in
the composite of Figure 4.11(b), the probability of reaching of states 〈3, 1′〉 and 〈4, 0′〉 is changed
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0’ 1’
!d 〈1.0〉
Figure 4.10.: Example PCA model B - Preservation of Compositional Semantics
from 0.3 and 0.4 to 0.5 and 0.2, respectively. Therefore, our reduction algorithm does not delete
a single transition s
a−→ s′ and propagates its probability forward to the outgoing transitions of
state s′ if at least one of these transitions is labelled with an input action.
0,0’ 2,0’
1,1’
3,1’
4,0’
a 〈0.4〉
b 〈0.6〉 d 〈0.5〉
e 〈0.5〉
(a) Composite PCA model A2‖B
0,0’ 3,1’
1,1’
4,0’
a 〈0.2〉
d 〈0.5〉
e 〈0.3〉
(b) Composite PCA model
A′′2‖B
Figure 4.11.: Example Composite Models for Preservation of Compositional Semantics
When the transition to be deleted has a probability of 1, then its propagation does not
change the probabilities of outgoing actions of state s, even if these are labelled with input
actions. Additionally, propagating the probability of transitions labelled with internal actions
to subsequent transitions labelled with either internal or output actions does not affect the
compositional properties of the reduced model if these transitions are also not labelled with
output actions: ∆e(s) ∩ Eout = ∅ ∨∆e(s′) ∩ Eout = ∅.
0
1
2 3
a 〈0.6〉
b 〈0.4〉
!c 〈1.0〉
(a) Example PCA model C
0’ 1’ 2’
x 〈1.0〉 ?c 〈1.0〉
(b) Example PCA model D
Figure 4.12.: Example PCA Models C and D for Preservation of Compositional Semantics
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0, 0’ 0, 1’
1, 0’
2, 0’
1, 1’
2, 1’ 3, 2’
a 〈0.3〉
x 〈0.5〉
b 〈0.2〉
x 〈1.0〉
a 〈0.6〉
b 〈0.4〉
x 〈1.0〉
c 〈1.0〉
Figure 4.13.: Composite PCA Model C‖D - Preservation of Compositional Semantics
Consider the example models C in Figure 4.12(a), D in Figure 4.12(b) and their composition in
Figure 4.13. The probability of reaching 〈1, 1′〉 from the initial state 〈0, 0′〉 is given by the paths
〈0, 0′〉 a,0.3−−−→ 〈1, 0′〉 x,1.0−−−→ 〈1, 1′〉 and 〈0, 0′〉 x,0.5−−−→ 〈0, 1′〉 a,0.6−−−→ 〈1, 1′〉
(
(0.3 . 1.0) + (0.5 . 0.6) = 0.6)
, while the probability of reaching state 〈3, 2′〉 is given by 〈0, 0′〉 b,0.2−−−→ 〈2, 0′〉 x,1.0−−−→ 〈2, 1′〉 c,1.0−−−→
〈3, 2′〉 and 〈0, 0′〉 x,0.5−−−→ 〈0, 1′〉 b,0.4−−−→ 〈2, 1′〉 c,1.0−−−→ 〈3, 2′〉
(
(0.2 . 1.0 . 1.0) + (0.5 . 0.4 . 1.0) = 0.4
)
.
Consider the reduced model C ′ by removing the transition 0 b,0.4−−−→ 2 from C and propagating
its probability to the transition 2
!c,1.0−−−→ 3. If the model C ′ in Figure 4.14(a) is composed with
model D, the probability of reaching states 〈1, 1′〉 and 〈3, 2′〉 is not preserved in the composite
model depicted in Figure 4.14(b). For example, the probability of reaching state 〈1, 1′〉 is given
by the paths 〈0, 0′〉 x,
1.0
1.6−−−→ 〈0, 1′〉 a,0.6−−−→ 〈1, 1′〉 and a,
0.6
1.6−−−→ 〈1, 0′〉 x,1.0−−−→ 〈1, 1′〉, hence 1.21.6 = 0.75
which is different than the probability of reading state 〈1, 1′〉 in the composite model of (Figure
4.13) corresponding to the composition between the original model C and the PCA model D.
As transitions labelled with output actions can be blocked by another model, the reduction
algorithm cannot change how their probability is normalised.
Propagation of Multiple Transitions
We now illustrate the backward propagation of multiple transitions from multiple source states,
as forward propagation of multiple transitions from the same source state is equivalent to the
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0
1
3
a 〈0.6〉
!c 〈0.4〉
(a) Reduced PCA
model C′ from PCA
model C
0, 0’
1, 0’
0, 1’
1, 1’
3, 2’
x 〈 1.01.6 〉
a 〈 1.01.6 〉 x 〈1.0〉
a 〈0.6〉
c 〈0.4〉
(b) Composite PCA model C′‖D
Figure 4.14.: Reduced PCA Models C ′ and Composite Model C ′‖D for Preservation of Compo-
sitional Semantics
case of propagating the probability of a single transition. Consider the example PCA G in
Figure 4.15.
0 1 3
2
4
a 〈1.0〉
!b 〈0.3〉
!c 〈0.7〉
x 〈0.3〉
y 〈0.3〉
z 〈0.4〉 ?d 〈1.0〉
Figure 4.15.: Example PCA Model G - Propagation of Multiple Transitions from Multiple Source
States
We obtain the reduced model G′ in Figure 4.16 by removing the transitions 2 x,0.3−−−→ 3, 2 y,0.3−−−→ 3
and 2
z,0.4−−−→ 3 from the original model G and propagating their aggregated probability to the
incoming transitions of state 2, therefore preserving the reachability of paths that involve state
3, namely 0
a,1.0−−−→ 1 !b,0.3−−−→ 3 ?d,1.0−−−→ 4 and 0 a,1.0−−−→ 1 !c,0.7−−−→ 3 ?d,1.0−−−→ 4.
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0 1 3 4
a 〈1.0〉
!b 〈0.3〉
!c 〈0.7〉
?d 〈1.0〉
Figure 4.16.: Example Reduced PCA Model G′ - Propagation of Multiple Transitions from Mul-
tiple Source States
On the other hand, the transitions 1
x,0.3−−−→ 3, 1 y,0.3−−−→ 3 and 1 z,0.1−−−→ 3 of the example PCA H
in Figure 4.17 cannot be propagated forward as the outgoing transition of state 3 (3
?d,1.0−−−→ 4)
is labelled with an input action, and cannot also be propagated backwards as it would change
the probability of reaching state 2 from the initial state through path 0
a,1.0−−−→ 1 c,0.3−−−→ 2. The
transition must therefore be kept.
0 1 3
2
4
a 〈1.0〉
x 〈0.3〉
y 〈0.3〉
z 〈0.1〉
c 〈0.3〉
?d 〈1.0〉
Figure 4.17.: Example Reduced PCA Model H - Invalid Propagation of Multiple Transitions
Reduction of Cyclic Paths
In the second phase of the algorithm a state s is considered to be ready for analysis when
it has been visited by all its incoming transitions, apart from cyclic paths that start at that
state s. Nonetheless, these paths are reduced in subsequent iterations of the algorithm. We
describe in the following paragraphs how the example PCA model I in Figure 4.18, which
includes cyclic paths, is reduced by the two phases of the algorithm based on the action set
E intremove = {x, y1, y2, y3, y4, y5}.
In the first phase the single transitions 1
y1,0.8−−−→ 3 and 3 y3,1.0−−−→ 4 are deleted, as these are the
only incoming transitions to state 3 and 4. The PCA models in Figures 4.19(a) and 4.19(b)
correspond to the intermediate reduced models after the deletion of those transitions. In the
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0 1
2
3 4 5
a 〈1.0〉
x 〈0.2〉
y1 〈0.8〉
y2 〈0.5〉
y3 〈0.5〉
y4 〈1.0〉
y5 〈1.0〉
Figure 4.18.: Example PCA Model I - Reduction of Cyclic Paths
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4 5
a 〈1.0〉
x 〈0.2〉
y2 〈0.4〉
y3 〈0.4〉
y4 〈1.0〉
y5 〈1.0〉
(a) Reduced PCA model I ′1 from PCA I
0 1
2
5
a 〈1.0〉
x 〈0.2〉
y4 〈0.4〉
y3 〈0.4〉
y5 〈1.0〉
(b) Reduced PCA model I ′′1 from PCA I
′
1
Figure 4.19.: Reduced PCA Model I ′ after Executing First Phase on Model I - Reduction of
Cyclic Paths
second phase, the transitions 1
y4,0.4−−−→ 5 and 1 y3,0.4−−−→ 5 are deleted when analysing the incoming
transitions of state 5 as these verify the properties for deletion and forward propagation, namely:
• the transitions consist of all the incoming transitions to state 5 and they originate from
the same source state 1;
• the outgoing transitions of state 5 are not labelled with input actions.
The final reduced model is shown in Figure 4.20. Note that the cyclic path has been reduced
to a cyclic transition 1
y5,0.8−−−→ 1. This corresponds to the best case scenario for reducing cyclic
paths as loop transitions cannot be further deleted by the reduction algorithm.
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0 1
2
a 〈1.0〉
x 〈0.2〉
y5 〈0.8〉
Figure 4.20.: Final Reduced PCA Model I ′2 from PCA I - Reduction of Cyclic Paths
4.2. Evaluation
After having described in detail all the steps performed by the two phases of the reduction
algorithm, we evaluate in Section 4.2.1 its time complexity and illustrate the reductions in size
of composite models that can be achieved in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1. Time Complexity
We given an upper bound for the worst case time complexity of the reduction algorithm for a
generic input PCA B = (S, q, E ,∆, µ) to be reduced w.r.t. the set of actions E intremove ⊆ E intB . The
time complexity of each phase is determined by the time complexity of the navigation algorithm
used and the time complexity of the steps conducted at each state for analysing and deleting
transitions labelled with internal actions in the set E intremove. Given that both depth-first and
breadth-first algorithms have the same time complexity
(
#(S)) + (#(∆)) when transitions are
represented using an adjacency list, we define the time complexity of both phases as:
O
(
#(S) + #(∆) + #(S) . cost(Analysis+Deletion)
)
.
In the first phase, the time complexity for checking the conditions for deleting and propagating
the probability of a deleted single transition currentState
eint,p−−−→ s to the outgoing transitions
∆(s) of its destination state s is defined as follows:
• the conditions |ρ(s)| = 1 and ∆(s) 6= 0 have constant time complexity as it consists in
verifying the size of an auxiliary data structure created when the PCA representation is
instantiated;
• the conditions ∆(s) 6= ∅, ∆e(s) ∩ Eout = ∅ and ∆e(s) ∩ E in = ∅ take #
(
∆(s)
)
steps to
execute;
• deleting the transition and propagating its probability to outgoing transitions of state s
takes #
(
∆(s)
)
steps to complete.
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Therefore, the cost of analysing and deleting transitions in the first phase is given by
O
(
#
(
∆(s)
)
+ #
(
∆(s)
) )
.
In the navigation process of the second phase, if a state has been marked for analysis then two
dictionary ρagg and µagg are created before analysing the cases for deleting transitions. Given
that the number of keys of the dictionaries is known in advance
(
#
(
ρs(currentState)
) )
, creating
these dictionaries using hashmap implementations takes #
(
ρ(currentState)
)
to complete. The
algorithm then considers two cases for analysis. When the incoming transitions to currentState
come all from the same source state (#
(
ρs(currentState)
)
= 1), then the following steps are
applied:
• evaluating the condition ρe−agg ⊆ E intremove can be verified when constructing ρagg and µagg,
hence we assume it has a constant time complexity;
• the conditions ∆(currentState) 6= ∅ and ∆e(currentState) ∩ E in take #
(
∆(currentState)
)
steps to execute;
– if the conditions are valid, deleting the transition and propagating its probability to
outgoing transitions of state s takes #
(
∆(currentState)
)
execution steps;
• the conditions ∆s(s) = {currentState} and ρe(s)∩E in = ∅ are verified when the transition
cannot be collapsed forward and take #
(
∆(s)
)
and #
(
ρ(s)
)
steps to complete, respectively;
– deleting the transition and propagating its probability to incoming transitions of state
s takes #
(
ρ(s)
)
execution steps;
The time complexity associated with the first case is then given by:
O
(
#
(
∆(currentState)
)
+ #
(
∆(currentState)
)
+ #
(
∆(s)
)
+ #
(
ρ(s)
)
+ #
(
ρ(s)
))
.
On the other hand, if the incoming transitions to the currentState come from different source
states (|ρs(currentState)| > 1), then the following steps are applied to each group of transitions
indexed by their source state s:
• evaluating the condition ρe−agg(s) ⊂ E intremove can be verified when constructing ρagg and
µagg, hence we assume it has a constant time complexity;
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• the conditions ∆s(s) = {currentState} and ρe(s) ∩ E in = ∅ take #
(
∆(s)
)
and #
(
ρ(s)
)
steps to be verified, respectively;
• deleting the transition and propagating its probability to incoming transitions of state s
takes #
(
ρ(s)
)
execution steps.
The time complexity associated with the second case is then given by:
O
(
#
(
ρs(currentState)
)
.
(
#
(
∆(s)
)
+ #
(
ρ(s)
)
+ #
(
ρ(s)
)) )
.
The time complexity of the reduction algorithm is defined by the time complexity of the two
phases. Given that the number of incoming and outgoing transitions of each state s is not
uniform, we replace in the previous time complexity formulae #
(
ρ(s)
)
and #
(
∆(s)
)
by ρ¯ and
∆¯ denoting the average incoming and outgoing transitions for all the states in the model. The
time required to execute the reduction algorithm can then be defined by:
#(S) + #(∆) + #(S) .
(
2.∆¯︸︷︷︸
first phase
+ ρ¯ + max(3 . ∆¯ + 2 . ρ¯, ρ¯ . ∆¯ + 2 . ρ¯2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
second phase
)
,
and the corresponding asymptotic time complexity given by
O
(
#(S) + #(∆) + #(S) .
(
∆¯ + ρ¯ + ρ¯ . ∆¯ + ρ¯2
))
.
Assuming the average number of incoming (ρ¯) and outgoing transitions (∆¯) of the states in
the original PCA model are determined by the logarithm of the number of the total transitions(
log
(
#(∆)
))
, the time complexity of the reduction algorithm is quasilinear on the number of
transitions and states of the original model:
O
(
#(S) + #(∆) + #(S) . log2
(
#(∆)
))
.
In contrast, existing state reduction techniques defined for generative systems have signifi-
cantly higher time complexity. For instance, Baier and Hermans [BH97] proposed an algorithm
to minimise a generative PLTS by removing transitions labelled with the silent action τ . The
algorithm starts with an initial partition of states Xinit, i.e. a set of state equivalent classes
{C1, . . . , Cn}, such that ∪i Ci = S and Ci are pairwise disjoint. This partition is successively
refined by a splitter by finding pairs of states belonging to one equivalent class Ci for which the
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probability of reaching states in other equivalence classes through
(
s(
τ−→)∗ a−→ ( τ−→)∗s′
)
which
denotes a sequence of zero or more non-observable transitions labelled with the internal action τ ,
followed by a transition labelled with action a ∈ E and succeed by zero or more non-observable
transitions labelled with the internal action τ . In the worst case n = #(S) refinement steps need
to be performed before the refinement algorithm cannot further refine the equivalence classes
{C1, . . . , Cn}. On top of that, and calculating the probability over a path may require solving a
linear equation system with n variables and n equations as it may require information about the
whole model [Che80]. As a result, the time complexity of this minimisation/reduction algorithm
for generative PLTS systems is cubic in the number of states [BH97].
4.2.2. Empirical Evaluation
We now consider two example systems that resemble the structure of standard Web-Server appli-
cations. We analyse composite models with increasing number of clients to estimate the gains in
model size reduction and associated reduction in the execution time for reliability analysis when
using the reduction algorithm to compute the overall system representation. In the first system,
the Server is a composite component that includes a Web-Server backend sub-component which
handles requests from Clients and interacts with other backend sub-components (a Cache and
a Database) to obtain the requested content, as depicted by Figure 4.21. The second system
Figure 4.21.: Web-Server Architectural Configuration
(Web-Server2), whose architectural configuration is shown in Figure 4.22, is an extension of the
first system that includes a backup server which is used when the main Server fails to send the
requested content.
We report in Table 4.1 the results for the first Web-Server system when using from 2 to
6 Clients and for the second Web-Server system from 2 to 4 clients. Each row contains the
name of the system, the original size of the composite automaton that represents the overall
system behaviour, the size of the composite automaton when reduction is used, the total time
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Figure 4.22.: Web-Server2 Architectural Configuration
to analyse a system using the non-reduced and the reduced representations. The execution time
is then split into the time it takes to build the composite representation and the the time it
takes to analyse the system reliability in PRISM model checker [KNP] using the PCTL formula
1 − P=?[s = fail U ¬(s = finish) ]. The column No Reduct. denotes the time to compute
the composite representation without using the reduction algorithm, while the column Reduct.
represents the time to reduce the component representations and then construct the composite
system model using the reduced representations. Each composite PCA is then translated to a
DTMC representation for analysis of reliability properties in PRISM, as these models do not
contain input actions. The analysis time obtained from PRISM includes the time to construct
the internal data structures in PRISM from the DTMC representation, as well as the time
to analyse the overall system reliability, though the time to translate a closed PCA to the
corresponding DTMC specification in PRISM is negligible. The results reported hereafter have
been collected on a Macbook Pro with the following specifications: 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7, 8 GB
1600 MHz DDR3, 256GB SSD.
We first note that the composite models obtained after applying the reduction algorithm are
considerably smaller despite the fact that it is not always possible to reduce all the transitions
in order to preserve the probabilistic semantics. The reduction is particularly significant for
larger models where the number of interleaved transitions associated with concurrent execution
of different components is exacerbated. For smaller models, e.g. Web-Server with 2 and 3 clients
and 1 server, applying the reduction algorithm and then composing requires broadly the same
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Original Size Reduced Size Execution Time
Name States Transitions States Transitions No Reduct. Analysis Reduct. Analysis
Web-Server (2 Clients) 104 224 12 (88%) 28 (88%) 0.029s 0.031s 0.028s (3%) 0.002s (93%)
Web-Server (3 Clients) 304 808 36 (88%) 96 (88%) 0.035s 0.446s 0.032s (8%) 0.013s (97%)
Web-Server (4 Clients) 800 2528 91 (89%) 283 (88%) 0.041s 3.792s 0.031s (25%) 0.049s (98.7%)
Web-Server (5 Clients) 1984 7264 218 (89%) 778 (89%) 0.062s 32.564 0.042s (32%) 0.296s (99.1%)
Web-Server (6 Clients) 4736 19712 505 (89%) 2041 (90%) 0.125s 298.327 0.055s (56%) 1.724 (99.42%)
Web-Server2 (2
Clients)
696 2062 75 (89%) 212 (90%) 0.042s 2.67 0.029s (31%) 0.044s (98%)
Web-Server2 (3 Clients) 5552 19208 184 (96%) 636 (96%) 0.125s 314.6s 0.039s (56%) 1.439 (99.8%)
Web-Server2 (4 Clients) 44743 174280 2176 (95%) 8960 (94%) 0.844s > 600s 0.082s (90%) 51.6s (> 99.99%)
Table 4.1.: Reduction Algorithm Evaluation Results - Web-Server Systems 1 and 2
amount of time as composing non-reduced models. When the number of client components is
increased to 4, 5 and 6, the time to compute the composite representation is reduced by 25%,
32% and 56%, respectively. In fact, since the reduction algorithm collapses internal transitions
of the composite Server component that cause the state-explosion in the non-reduced composite
representation, the time to reduce the representation of the Client and Server components and
then compute the composite representation barely changes when the number of clients was
increased. Consistent with the reduction in size of the overall model, the analysis time in PRISM
is remarkably reduced for larger systems. In particular we achieve a reduction of 99.42% when
a system with 6 Clients is analysed. The results obtained with a more complex system (Web-
Server2) indicate the effectiveness of the reduction algorithm in different scenarios. In fact,
for a system with 2 Servers and 4 Clients we achieve a reduction of more than 99.99%. We
do not provide the exact figure for the analysis time in PRISM associated with this system as
we aborted the analysis after 10min, before PRISM was able to finish the construction of the
internal data structures for analysing the DTMC model of the Web-Server system. These results
show the usefulness of the reduction algorithm as an effective technique for scalable reliability
analysis of component-based systems.
4.3. Formal Verification
In the previous Section we have empirically verified, that the models produced by the reduction
algorithm preserve the properties of the original model. In order to show that the properties
are preserved in the general case for any input model, we have to show that the behaviour
of the reduced model is equivalent to the one of the original model when abstracting from
internal behaviour. In the context of automata based models, formal verification of the reduction
algorithm consists in showing that the reduced model is weakly bisimilar to the original input
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model. This corresponds to showing that the behaviour of the reduced model is equivalent to the
one of the original model when abstracting from internal behaviour, which the algorithm tries
to remove. In the next paragraph we summarise the steps required for the formal verification of
the reduction algorithm, while the full details are discussed in Appendix A.
Formally, weak bisimilarity is defined based on a bisimulation relationship R that defines a
mapping between states which are considered equivalent, according to some properties [Hil96].
These properties are specific to both the behavioural equivalence and the model to which they are
applied. We extend existing notions of both strong and weak bisimulation for non-probabilistic
and probabilistic versions of Labelled Transitions Systems to define the conditions for strong and
weak bisimulation for PCA models. To verify that the reduced PCA model is weakly bisimilar
to the input PCA model, we first formalise each case of the reduction algorithm described
in the previous sections as a transformation Ti which is applied to an arbitrary state of an
original model A. We then demonstrate that each transformation Ti, when applied to a model
A produces a weakly bisimilar model based upon a bisimulation relationship RTi . We then
show that a sequence of transformations Ti applied to model A also produces a weakly bisimilar
model. This effectively corresponds to establishing that the bisimulation relationships RTi are
transitive. Therefore, we show that the application of any sequence of transformations applied
by the reduction algorithm also produces a weakly bisimilar model. Finally, we show that if
two PCA models A1 and A2 are weakly bisimilar as defined by an equivalence relationship
RTi (A1 RTiA2), the models resulting from the application of any operator on PCA models
to A1 and/or A2 are also weakly bisimilar. Consequently, given an original model A1 and an
expression involving any operator supported by PCA, the model A1 can be replaced by a weakly
bisimilar model A2 whilst preserving weak bisimulation. This corresponds to showing that the
weak bisimulation is a congruence for PCA.
Alternatively, weak refinement of Abstract Probabilistic Automata (APA) [DKL+13] could be
used for compositional reliability analysis. As weak refinement of APA is a weaker notion that
weak bisimulation, the reduced models obtained through weak refinement could be potentially
smaller than the ones we obtain using our reduction algorithm. However, weak refinement
for APA requires exponential time complexity [BKLS09] while the complexity of the reduction
algorithm presented in this Chapter is quasilinear.
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4.4. Summary and Related Work
Although composability is paramount for supporting automatic construction of fine-grained in-
dividual generic representations for each component that can be used in any architectural con-
figuration, the interleaved transitions associated with the concurrent execution of actions from
different components hinders the use of composable formalisms for modelling and analysing
the behaviour of distributed applications. To this end, the reduction algorithm described in
this Chapter reduces the PCA model of each component to their interface representation by
removing, when possible, transitions labelled with internal actions and propagating their prob-
abilities to surrounding transitions, whilst preserving the reachability properties of the original
model even when composed with other models. As a result, the complexity of constructing
composite models is decreased by reducing the representation of each component before com-
posing with others. Note that the reduction algorithm also allows to preserve the encapsulation
of composition components in the architectural model regarding the structure of their internal
sub-components. After composing the PCA representations of its sub-components, the corre-
sponding composite PCA model for the composite component can be reduced to its interface
actions, thereby removing the behaviour of its sub-components and hiding it from external com-
ponents. This is similar to the encapsulation of internal bindings between sub-components that
architecture models provide.
The complexity of reliability analysis is also significantly reduced by using smaller representa-
tions computed by the reduction algorithm. As the effort of reducing the size of the automaton
for analysis is performed before using PRISM model checking tools, the complexity of analysing
different properties on the same model is minimised. In fact, the experimental results suggest
that the gains obtained by applying the reduction algorithm before composing are much greater
than the gains obtained by the state reduction techniques performed in PRISM on the DTMC
model translated from the non-reduced composite model. Note that the time complexity of the
reduction algorithm for the worst case is quasilinear on the number of transitions and states
of the original model, these results indicate that the time complexity of reduction techniques in
PRISM is greater than the time complexity of our reduction algorithm. We also reduce the PCA
models at each level of a composition hierarchy, i.e. before and after constructing composite
representations, with the aim of limiting the size of composite representations linear in the num-
ber of states of individual models. This also allow us to preserve representations of sub-parts of
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the system which can be re-used when other parts are adapted. In contrast, the state reduction
techniques in PRISM can only be applied to the final DTMC model of the system.
Our algorithm is also more efficient than existing state reduction techniques defined for gener-
ative systems [BH97] that involve a recursive refinement which requires analysis of the full model
at each iteration. In contrast, our reduction algorithm for PCA models performs an iterative
navigation process and deletes incoming/outgoing transitions to a state when their deletion does
not affect the reachability properties of surrounding states and transitions. While the algorithm
defined by Baier and Hermains [BH97] cannot be applied to PCA models as it does not cater for
reactive semantics associated with input actions, our reduction algorithm can also be applied
to generative PLTS systems as these can be seen as a special case of PCA models without in-
put actions. Although a compositional analysis algorithm which seeks to apply CRA concepts
to systems with input/output actions has been proposed before for PIOA models [SP99], the
resulting automaton may be inconsistent with PIOA semantics. For example, the algorithms
deletes transitions labelled with a non-observable action that lead to an absorbing state but this
is not appropriate since their probabilities cannot be propagated to other transitions. Although
we have empirically verified for the examples described in this Chapter that the reduced PCA
models produced by our reduction algorithm preserve the reliability properties of the original
models, we have not shown that this result holds for any general input model. In Appendix A we
show that a generic input model and the reduced representation produced by the algorithm are
equivalent according to notions of probabilistic behaviour equivalences. In the next Chapter we
discuss how the work hitherto presented can be combined with existing approaches to defined
a multi-view framework that closely integrates architectural, behavioural and non-functional
aspects of a component-based systems to automate architecture reconfiguration.
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Autonomic computing [KC03] advocates departing from traditionally integrated management
functions (e.g. FCAPS: fault, configuration, accounting, performance and security) and moving
towards locally integrated autonomous operation, though it has not addressed the integration
with software design of adaptive systems. Traditionally, the design of systems and service
management has been separated from the design of the software system [LDS+08]. For example,
the analysis of quality-of-service (QoS) parameters is often based on profiling tools, which are
external observers with respect to the software system. But if the software changes, there may
be a considerable delay until the changes are detected. Moreover, modern systems are becoming
increasingly dynamic and adaptive, particularly in the case of novel service architectures and
pervasive systems (e.g. sensor networks, body area networks, embedded systems) where the
physical system itself may rapidly evolve at run-time. In such systems a separation between the
design of the management system and the design of the system itself is less obvious.
Several approaches associate non-functional parameters with components and select configu-
ration changes based on aggregated measures of the non-functional parameters of their compo-
nents. Sykes et al. [SHMK10] consider the components independently, Grassi et al. [GMM13];
extend this to account for dependencies between components. But neither consider the be-
havioural aspects, which are necessary to accurately assess the system’s reliability. Indeed, a
component’s reliability depends on how and which parts of its behaviour are used. Feature
driven models [EEM10, MLD+11a] consider alternative implementations that can be changed
at run-time, though these are not composable and cannot be easily analysed. Similarly, existing
approaches for reliability analysis are based on DTMC models that consider each component as
a black-box. In addition, a new DTMC has to be manually defined for each architectural con-
figuration as the DTMC model of a composite component cannot be automatically constructed
from models of its sub-components.
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Self-management frameworks implement variations of a MAPE loop (Monitoring, Analysis,
Planning and Execution) but integration with software models (Knowledge) is also limited. The
Self-Managed Cell (SMCs) [SL10] framework supports distributed and composable autonomous
components through Event-Condition-Action (ECA) policies. Rainbow [GCH+04] integrates
architectural models with ECA policies that change system parameters on the basis of their
costs and benefits given as annotations. But in such frameworks changes must be anticipated
in advance when policies are defined.
We build herein upon the work presented in the previous chapters and show how component
reconfiguration can be automated by using a multi-view framework that closely integrates ar-
chitectural, behavioural and non-functional aspects of a component-based systems. In Section
5.1 we present a general methodology that encompasses model extraction and analysis while
integrating architectural, behavioural and management views of application components. We
then show in Section 5.2 how reconfiguration can be achieved using a centralised method where
a single node selects architectural configuration that verifies reliability requirements, e.g. max-
imising system reliability. We also describe a distributed version of the reconfiguration method
where each component autonomously decides on its internal configuration and evaluate the
performance of reconfiguration processes in Section 5.3.
5.1. Notational Elements
Component-based models can be reconfigured by changing the bindings between provided and
required interfaces. We use component in a generic sense to denote encapsulation of behaviour
and assume that components are composable, i.e. a composite component is realised as a con-
figuration of sub-components. When multiple configurations achieve the desired functional be-
haviour, non-functional properties such as reliability are used to select the configuration to
deploy. Management services monitor system behaviour, measure non-functional parameters
and enact reconfiguration changes to preserve the system’s reliability. Component-based appli-
cations and services can therefore be seen from an architectural, behavioural or management
perspective. However, multiple perspectives of the same system may be inconsistent [FKN+92]
so their interdependencies need to be discussed at some length.
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5.1.1. Architectural View
The architectural view comprises the components, their provided and required interfaces as well
as their bindings; for composite components, sub-components and internal bindings are also
specified. Components provide encapsulation of behaviour and autonomy: each component can
be seen as managing its internal configuration of sub-components and adapting it to achieve the
required reliability, though this need not be the case, and a distinction can be drawn between
autonomous and non-autonomous components if necessary. Similarly to Sykes et al. [SHMK10],
we use the Darwin [MDEK95] notation to represent the system’s architecture.
We show in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 the Darwin graphical and textual notations of Client and
Server, respectively, where the Client component specifies a requirement interface r and the
Server component defines a provided interface p.
component Client {
require r;
}
(a) Client - Darwin Textual Representa-
tion
(b) Client - Darwin
Graphical Representa-
tion
Figure 5.1.: Darwin Representations of Client Component
component Server {
provide p;
}
(a) Server - Darwin Textual Representa-
tion
(b) Server - Darwin
Graphical Representa-
tion
Figure 5.2.: Darwin Representations of Server Component
The corresponding graphical and textual representations to a composite ClientServer System
are depicted in Figure 5.3, where the textual notations consists of a list of component instances
and bindings between their provided and required interfaces.
We define for each component C PC = { p1, ..., pn} as the set of its provided interfaces and
RC = { r1, ..., rn} as the set of its required interfaces.
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component CS-System {
inst
A:Client;
B:Server
bind
A.r – B.p;
}
(a) Textual Representation of a Client-
Server System using Darwin
(b) Graphical Representation of a Client-Server
System using Darwin
Figure 5.3.: Darwin Representations of Client-Server System
5.1.2. Behavioural View
The behavioural view comprises the representation of the components’ probabilistic behaviour
described using our modelling formalism PCA. Input-output actions are associated with the
interfaces of a component, where the set E(C.i) denotes the interface actions associated with
interface i of component C, where i ∈ PC or i ∈ RC . In the case of provided interfaces,
an input action models the possibility of the associated method being invoked followed by
internal behaviour and an output action to denote that the method result is being returned/sent.
A corresponding pair of output-input actions is associated with a required interface, where
the output action designates the invocation of the required functionality and an input action
indicates the component receiving the result of the invoked functionality.
The behaviour representation of composite components is automatically constructed by com-
posing in parallel the models of its sub-components. Input and output actions are synchronised
to model interactions between two components i.e. communication along component bindings,
and internal actions are interleaved to denote their concurrent execution. Although a compo-
nent’s PCA model is independent from the configuration in which the component is deployed,
it needs to be adjusted prior to composition in order to reflect the bindings in the architec-
tural model. This is achieved by removing unused behaviour associated with unbound provided
interfaces and by relabelling actions associated with multiple bindings to a provided interface.
While in the architectural view, the interfaces of a component hide its internal behaviour,
in the behavioural view the hiding operator removes internal behaviour, thereby transforming,
when possible, a component’s PCA into a representation that only includes interface actions.
The same principle applies to composite components that encapsulate their internal structure
in the architectural view.
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An underlying Interface Automata representation can be automatically extracted from both
simple and composite PCA models by removing probabilities from transitions between states.
This representation is then used to determine compatibility of components with bindings between
provided and required interfaces.
The architectural and behavioural view are therefore not independent but closely correspond
to each other. In the next Section we describe the management services required to automate
architectural reconfiguration and discuss their link to the architectural and behaviour view.
5.1.3. Management View
While the architectural view represents the components, their interfaces and bindings, and the
behavioural view models the probabilistic state transitions and their reachability, the manage-
ment view concerns maintaining the component inventory, monitoring component execution to
calculate the state transition probabilities, detecting violations of desirable properties, as well
as deciding upon and performing reconfiguration.
Components can be self-managed i.e. implementing their own management services and man-
aging their own internal configuration of sub-components. For the purpose of the distributed
reconfiguration algorithm presented in Section 5.2.3 we consider each component as an au-
tonomous system, i.e. managing the internal configuration of its sub-components. However, the
management of several components, or a whole sub-hierarchy of component configurations can
be ensured by a single management system. Indeed, at the other end of the spectrum, man-
agement can be fully centralised as we describe in Section 5.2.1. But whether distributed or
centralised, the management view must contain at least the following elements.
Monitoring
The Monitoring function is responsible for updating the behavioural models relying upon exe-
cution traces to keep an accurate and consistent representation of the system execution profile.
Changes in a component’s execution profile must be detected and the probabilities µ associated
with the transitions in the PCA model of each component must be updated. This includes the
probabilities of all transitions including failures (i.e. transitions to the ERROR state).
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Instance Inventory
Re-configuring a system requires knowing at all times which components are available and thus
maintaining an inventory of available components and their characteristics. Typically, this re-
quires discovering new components when they become available and detecting their failure or
absence. The components can be services or embedded devices such as sensors whose presence
can be detected at run-time. In addition, the presence of a new component does not in itself
trigger reconfiguration, as such changes can occur only in response to violations of non-functional
requirements such as service-level objectives. Note that functional compatibility between com-
ponents interfaces is not sufficient to ensure components can be bound as their behaviour may
be mismatched, e.g. different protocol versions. Conventional (i.e. non-probabilistic) analysis
techniques can be applied to the underlying Interface Automata representations of two compo-
nents with bindings between their interfaces to detect the presence of deadlocks or violation of
pre-determined constraints.
Decision-Making
The previous management components along with the behavioural and architectural views pro-
vide the means for Decision-Making components to reason about the system in order to analyse
the need for adaptation in order to satisfy goal and utility policies. In the next Section we detail
the steps of a reconfiguration process that enables the identification of necessary architectural
changes that maximise reliability.
5.2. Architectural reconfiguration
When multiple functionally equivalent architectural configurations are available, non-functional
properties are used to select the most suitable configuration. PCA models are applied to au-
tomatically construct a composite representation for a given configuration based on the rep-
resentation of each component. Although the calculation of reliability properties for a given
configuration can be automated using the composite representation, the bindings between com-
ponents determine how such representation is constructed. We focus in the next Section on
selecting the architectural configurations which maximise reliability where the system’s reliability
is analysed using the composite PCA representation. We first describe a centralised solution to
construct the composite model of each alternative architecture configuration (Section 5.2.1) and
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then present the distributed case where each component behaves autonomously and selects the
most reliable configuration of its sub-components (Section 5.2.3).
5.2.1. Centralised Algorithm
The first step of the reconfiguration algorithm consists in determining the possible architectural
configurations that satisfy the functional requirements of the system. A centralised management
keeps an instance inventory of available component instance C = {C1, . . . , Cn}, where each Ci
is associated with a set of provided interfaces PCi = { p1, ..., pn} and a set of required interfaces
RCi = { r1, ..., rn}. An architectural configuration is then specified using Darwin based on the set
of components Carch and the bindings between their compatible provided and required interfaces.
The probabilistic behaviour of each component Ci is defined by the PCA: ACi = 〈 SCi , qCi ,
ECi , ∆Ci , µCi〉.
We then use the dependency analysis algorithm defined by Sykes et al. [SHMK10] to deter-
mine the set of all possible functional architectural configurations { Barch1 , . . . ,Barchn } from
the set of available component instances C and functional requirements of the system. For each
configuration of bindings Barchi , if the provided interfaces of the components in Carchi are all
bound to required interfaces of components in Carchi , then the composite behavioural represen-
tation for Barchi is given by the parallel composition of the PCA models of its components:
AC1‖ . . . ‖ACn , ACi ∈ Carch, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, n = #(Carchi).
The architectural configurations produced by the dependency analysis algorithm guarantee
that all functional requirements of each component are satisfied, i.e. all required interfaces are
bound to a provided interface. However, the algorithm assumes that all required interfaces are
needed even when not all provided interfaces of all components are bound as some function-
ality may not be used. We describe in the next paragraphs how the configurations generated
by the aforesaid dependency analysis algorithm [SHMK10] can be refined to only to consider
the functional dependencies of the active behaviour of each component. In other words, some
required interfaces of each component may not be needed as some of its provided interfaces are
not bound.
For each architectural configuration Barchi of bindings between provided and required inter-
faces of a set of components, the following steps are applied to all components in Barchi :
1. Remove behaviour associated with unbound provided interfaces:
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• given set of unbound interfaces
unboundCi = {pj ∈ PCi | 6 ∃(Ci.pj −−Ck.rj) ∈ bindings(Barchi)} ;
• determine sub-set of input actions associated with unbound interfaces
unboundECi =
⋃
p∈unboundCi
ECi(p) ∩ E inCi ;
• compute PCA ACi−Barchi denoting active behaviour w.r.t. Barch using the interface
(@) operator:
ACi−Barchi = ACi @ unboundECi ;
2. Compute interface representation IACi−Barchi by removing internal behaviour:
IACi−Barchi = ACi−Barchi \ E
int
Ci−Barchi ;
3. Update Barchi based upon active functional dependencies:
• determine set of active required interfaces
fundep = {r | r ∈ RCi ∧ ECi(r) ⊆ EIACi−Barchi } ;
• remove bindings to inactive required interfaces RCi \ fundep from Barchi
4. Revise interface representation IACi−Barchi of components that had provided interfaces
bound to the required interfaces removed in the previous step;
• if all the bindings to provided interfaces of component Ci are removed, then Ci is
removed from Carchi ;
• repeat step 4 for components that were required by Ci.
Note that determining the functional dependencies between the provided and required interfaces
of each component only requires the system designer to specify the input-output actions asso-
ciated with each interface, which are also necessary to adjust the PCA representation of each
component according to the bindings of a particular architectural configuration. The same steps
are applied to all architectural configurations generated by the dependency analysis algorithm
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and the reconfiguration algorithm constructs the corresponding composite PCA model for each
alternative configuration Barchi using the revised PCA representations IACi−Barchi computed
during the functional dependency analysis.
If the configuration B′archi includes multiple bindings to a provided interface, we use the rela-
belling operator to modify the interface representation IACi−Barchi of the components involved
in order to support and distinguish requests from different components. The composite model
corresponding to the revised configuration B′archi is then obtained by composing in parallel the
interface representation of each component:
AB′archi
= IAC1−B′archi
‖ . . . ‖ IACn−B′archi .
Before the reliability of each configuration B′archi is analysed, we extract the underlying Inter-
face Automata representation from the composite model AB′archi
and verify if the configuration
does not lead to deadlock states due to behaviour mismatch between components in Carchi .
If the composite IA model has deadlock states, then configuration B′archi is discarded by the
re-configuration algorithm.
For each valid configuration, the interface representation IACi−B′archi
of each of the components
involved does not contain behaviour associated with unbound provided interfaces. As a result,
the composite model AB′archi
is a closed representation, i.e. it does not contain input actions
as these have all been synchronised with the corresponding output actions. Such model is
automatically translated to a corresponding DTMC representation which is then used for analysis
of reliability properties in PRISM model checker. The reconfiguration algorithm then selects the
valid configuration that maximises the reliability of the system. The management component(s)
then instantiate the new bindings when the components are ready for reconfiguration, e.g.
according to the tranquility criterion [VEBD07].
5.2.2. Example Web System for Centralised Reconfiguration
We describe in the next paragraphs how centralised reconfiguration is applied to a Web system
example, whose architectural configuration is shown in Figure 5.4.
The Web system comprises the following components:
• Client makes requests for web pages to the
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• Server which uses a backend infrastructure to obtain dynamic text content and images
for the pages requested by the Client;
• a composite component Backend-1 provides both text content and images relying upon
two databases (DB-1 and DB-2).
component B1 = {
inst
S:Server;
C:Client;
B1:Backend-1;
dB1:DB1;
dB2:DB2;
bind
S.getWebPage −− C.getWebPage
B1.getImage −− S.getImage
B1.getContent −− S.getContent
B1.getContentDB −− dB1.getContentDB
B1.getImageDB −− dB2.getImageDB
}
(a) Textual representation of the Web-
System using Darwin
(b) Graphical representation of the WebSystem using Darwin
Figure 5.4.: Description of Configuration B1 of the WebSystem using Darwin
This system is instantiated with the bindings configuration B1 in Figure 5.4. Since the config-
uration B1 does not have unbound interfaces, the corresponding composite PCA representation
can be simply obtained as the parallel composition of the interface representation of each com-
ponent in B1:
IAClient−B1 ‖ IAServer−B1 ‖ IABackend-1−B1 ‖ IADB1−B1 ‖ IADB2−B1 .
Consider that a new component Backend-2 becomes available. As it provides images from
a separate database DB-3 an alternative configuration B2, depicted in Figure 5.5, can be con-
sidered for reconfiguration. In contrast with B1, the composite representation for B2 cannot be
simply obtained through the parallel composition of AClient, AServer, ABackend-1 and ABackend-2 as
this would imply that the required interface getImage of component Server is bound to (synchro-
nised with) both Backend-1 and Backend-2. Therefore, the PCA representation of Backend-1
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component B2 = {
inst
S:Server;
C:Client;
B1:Backend-1;
B2:Backend-2;
dB1:DB1;
dB3:DB3;
bind
S.getWebPage −− C.getWebPage
B2.getImage −− S.getImage
B2.getImageDB −− dB3.getImageDB
B1.getContent −− S.getContent
B1.getContentDB −− dB1.getContentDB
}
(a) Textual representation of the Web-
System using Darwin
(b) Graphical representation of the WebSystem using Darwin
Figure 5.5.: Description of Configuration B2 of the WebSystem using Darwin
needs to be adjusted to include only the actions associated with interfaces used in configuration
B2:
IBackend-1−B1 =
(
ABackend-1 @ E(getContent)
)
\ E intBackend-1.
Given that the provided interfaces of other components in B2 are all bound, their interface
representation is simply obtained by removing the internal actions of each model.
The composite PCA model corresponding to configuration B2 is then given by the parallel
composition of the interface representation of each component:
AB2 = IClient−B2 ‖ IServer−B2 ‖ IBackend-1−B2 ‖ IBackend-2−B2 ‖ IDB1−B2 ‖ IDB3−B2 .
The algorithm then calculates the reliability of B2 to determine if the system needs to be recon-
figured.
5.2.3. Distributed Reconfiguration
The described centralised reconfiguration process assumes a centralised management system that
has knowledge about all components, their architecture, configuration and behaviour represen-
tation. However, in many cases (e.g. services, pervasive systems) central control may not be
possible and components need to be autonomous. Although knowledge about alternative bind-
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1 {ICu , RCu} = receive (Cu)
2 A′C = AC@unboundEC ; IC−Cu = A′C \
{
EC −
(
EICu ∪
⋃
j∈RC E(j)
)}
3 IC = IC−Cu ‖ ICu
4 R′C = ∅
5 foreach r ∈ RC do
6 if E(r) ∩ EIC 6= ∅ then
7 add r to R′C
8
9 maxReliability = −∞
10 BmaxReliability = ∅
11 Cavailable = availableComponentInstances ()
12 foreach B ∈ permutations (Cavailable,R′C) do
13 AB = IC
14 foreach Cl ∈ B do
15 IC−Cl = IC \
(
EC −
⋃
i∈B(Cl)
)
16 send (IC−Cl , Cl)
17 ICl = receive (Cl)
18 AB = AB ‖ ICl
19
20 reliabilityAB = reliability(AB)
21 if reliabilityAB > maxReliability then
22 maxReliability = reliabilityAB
23 BmaxReliability = B
24
25 if PC 6= ∅
26 IC = IC−Cu ‖ ICl1‖ ... ‖ ICln , ICli ∈ BmaxReliability
27 I ′C = IC \
(
EIC − EICu
)
28 send (I ′C , Cu)
Algorithm 5.1: Distributed Assembly Algorithm
ings can be exchanged between components e.g. using gossip algorithms [SMK11], the choice
of reconfiguration needs to be performed locally. This requires them to exchange information
regarding their interfaces and behaviour so that each component can analyse the reliability
properties of alternative reconfiguration. We describe in the next paragraphs a distributed re-
configuration process that defines how components exchange information for selecting between
alternative instances for their required functionality in order to maximise the system reliabil-
ity. Note that the local choice performed at each component is based on the reachability of
a generic failure state, without being specific to the execution of particular (failure) actions.
Consequently, the described process for exchanging information between components is specific
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to such reliability property. In contrast, the centralised approach supports the analysis of any
reliability property as the central node has knowledge about the PCA models of all components.
The general algorithm is described in Algorithm 5.1 and is divided in two phases. A de-
scendent phase enables each component C to determine which of its required interfaces are
needed based on information received from upstream dependencies regarding which provided in-
terfaces of component C are going to be used. Component C can thereafter calculate alternative
configurations to the required interfaces computed in the previous step. For each alternative
configuration B, component C sends to each component in B which of its provided interfaces
are needed and how component C would use them if configuration B were to be instantiated.
The descendent phase continues until components without required interfaces are reached; an
ascending phase starts thereafter where each component locally selects between alternative con-
figurations to its required interfaces and sends the resulting model to its upstream dependencies
until a component without provided required interfaces is reached. In the next paragraphs we
describe in more detail each phase of the distributed reconfiguration process.
The descendent phase is initiated from a component C1 with no provided interfaces, i.e. the
root of a composition hierarchy, which then calculates all its possible bindings to its required
interfaces and available component instances (Algorithm 5.1 - lines 11-12). For each alternative
configuration B, the component C1 transmits to each sub-component the PCA representation
dictating how the provided interfaces of the sub-component would be used if configuration B
were to be instantiated (Algorithm 5.1 - lines 12-16). At each step of the descendent phase, a
component receives a PCA representation from an upstream dependency and adjusts its PCA
representation according to the provided interfaces required by upstream dependencies. It then
determines which of its required interfaces are needed and performs the previously described
steps for its downstream dependencies. The descendent phase stops when a leaf component is
reached. An ascendant phase is then started where each component selects the configuration
that maximises its reliability, and propagates a PCA model that reflects that choice upwards in
the hierarchy, until the root of the composition hierarchy is reached.
These computations do not need to be repeated at each change. For example, if a component
C becomes unavailable, the component(s) that used C have to select an alternative configu-
ration to meet their functional requirements. As these components instances have calculated
all the possible configurations w.r.t. to their required interfaces (Algorithm 5.1 - lines 11-22),
no computation is required for downstream dependencies. However, as the new configuration
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is less reliable, these component instances need to send their new reduced PCA to upstream
dependencies (Algorithm 5.1 - lines 24-26), which may lead to changes in the configuration
which previously produced the highest reliability. Similarly, when a new component C becomes
available, existing component instances that have matching required interfaces can run the re-
configuration algorithm based on the new set of available component instances (Cavailable). If the
new configurations with the new component C produce a higher reliability, then a new reduced
PCA representation is sent to upstream dependencies, which may themselves select a different
configuration.
When the execution profile of a component C changes, the transition probabilities in its PCA
model change accordingly. Therefore, the reliability of the possible configurations involving C
may not be the same. To calculate the new reliability value for each configuration, the component
C re-constructs a new composite model based on the PCA representations received from both
upstream and downstream dependencies, similar to the steps performed when selection a new
configuration. The component C sends to its upstream dependencies a new composite model in
the following two cases:
• the reliability of the new configuration is higher than the reliability of the configuration
configuration and the component C decides to switch to the new configuration;
• or the updated reliability of the current configuration is lower than the previous reliability.
In both cases, the changes in the reliability provided may trigger further architectural changes
in higher levels of the composition hierarchy.
Although the same PCA model of each component is used in all configurations and restricted
using the interface and hiding operators, the reliability provided by a component is not the same
in different configurations as it is determined by the following factors:
• probability of failure actions in the PCA model of the component;
• how the component is used by upstream bindings;
• reliability provided by downstream dependencies.
For example, a component may have a failure action with a high probability but if that action is
rarely used in a given configuration it will have a small impact on the overall reliability. While
the probability associated with a transition is given by the component’s execution profile, the
frequency with which it is called depends on the probability of the output actions in upstream
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components. Therefore, the reliability of a component is always defined with respect to a
particular configuration. The descendent phase of the algorithm ensures that each component
knows how it is going to be used by upstream components and the hiding operator ensures only
interface actions are used in the behavioural descriptions exchanged. In the ascendant phase,
the composite representation computed contains the propagation and handling of failures from
downstream dependencies. As a result, in the ascendant phase, the selection of the most reliable
configuration is based on the reliability of downstream dependencies combined with the execution
profile of upstream bindings propagated during the descendent phase. Although each component
makes a local choice, the descendent phase of the reconfiguration algorithm ensures that a
component has all the information about the choices performed by upstream dependencies which
enables the component to select a configuration that maximises the reliability of the composition
hierarchy.
5.2.4. Example WebSystem for Distributed Reconfiguration Algorithm
In the case of the Web system presented in the last Section, the described distributed algorithm
starts a descendent phase from the component instance Client as this component does not have
provided interfaces. The Client projects its behaviour representation AClient to the actions
corresponding to its interface getWebPage
(E(getWebPage)) using hiding operator and then
sends it to the Server. The Server first receives the reduced PCA from Client which corresponds
to the interactions of Client with Server (Algorithm 5.1 - line 1). The Server then uses the
interface operator to remove the behaviour associated with unbound provided interfaces and the
hiding operator to remove internal behaviour (Algorithm 5.1 - line 2). Thereafter, the Server
computes the sub-set of its required interfaces of which its bound provided interfaces to Client
are functionally dependent on (Algorithm 5.1 - lines 4 - 7). The set of active required interfaces is
then used in combination with the available set of component instances (Backend-1) to generate
all the possible bindings configurations to the active required interfaces of Server (Algorithm
5.1 - line 12): B1 = Backend-1.getImage 7→ Server.getImage,
Backend-1.getContent 7→ Server.getContent;
For each configuration B, the component instance Server computes the representation of each
component instance Cl in B that corresponds to bindings between Server and Cl in B (Algorithm
5.1 - lines 13 - 15). This representation reflects how the Server uses each component instance in a
given configuration B based on how its provided interfaces are used by an upper level component,
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in this case Client, without including the behaviour associated with the interactions with the
upper level component. The Server then waits for these component instances (Backend-1 in
this case) to send a PCA representation that reflects their downstream choices based on the
same steps performed by Server (Algorithm 5.1 - line 17). The algorithm stops when the
first phase reaches the leaf components DB1 and DB2, i.e. without required interfaces, as no
permutations of bindings to required interfaces can be calculated (Algorithm 5.1 - line 12). The
distributed reconfiguration algorithm starts thereafter an ascendant phase where DB1 and DB2
send to Backend-1 their interface PCA representation using the hiding operator (Algorithm 5.1
- line 25 - 28). Upon receiving the PCA representations from DB1 and DB2, Backend-1
calculates a composite PCA from these representations that denotes its bindings to DB1 and
DB2, reduces it using the hiding operator and sends it to the Server. The Server then repeats
the same steps and sends its corresponding reduced PCA representation to the Client. The
ascendant phase of the algorithm finishes when the Client the receives the representation from
Server, as the Client component does not have provided interfaces (Algorithm 5.1 - line 25).
Although no central choice over alternative configurations to required interfaces is performed,
each component selects a configuration based on the choices made by the Client and propagated
along the composition hierarchy.
When Backend-2 becomes available, the Server can consider the following alternative con-
figurations to its required interfaces (algorithm 5.1 - line 11):
ServerB1 = Backend-1.getImage −− Server.getImage,
Backend-1.getContent −− Server.getContent
ServerB2 = Backend-2.getImage −− Server.getImage
Backend-1.getContent −− Server.getContent
In the next paragraphs we describe the steps performed by the distributed reconfiguration
algorithm to compute the representations for configuration B2 (shown in Figure 5.6) as the
representations for configuration B1 have been created in the initial run of the algorithm.
Figure 5.6.: Configuration Used to Generate Intermediate PCA for Server Component
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In the process of computing the reliability of configuration B2, the Server uses the hiding
operator to compute PCA representations that denote how the Server uses Backend-1 and
Backend-2, according to the bindings in B2. The Server then sends these representations to
Backend-1 and Backend-2 and the distributed reconfiguration process continues from those
components. After receiving the reduced PCA from Server (Algorithm 5.1 - line 1), Backend-1
uses the interface operator to construct a PCA representation that includes the behaviour as-
sociated with the interface getContent, thereby removing the behaviour associated with its
unbound interface getImage. Thereafter, Backend-1 identifies which of its required interfaces
need to be bound to provide the interface that is used by Server (Algorithm 5.1 - lines 4 - 7).
For example, Backend-1 identifies that DB-2 is not needed to provide interface getContent, as
shown in Figure 5.7. Backend-1 then sends DB-1 a reduced PCA representation which denotes
how it uses the interface getContent and also how Backend-1 is used by the Server (algorithm
5.1 - lines 15 and 16). As DB-1 is a leaf component, it replies to Backend-1 by sending its
interface PCA representation (algorithm 5.1 - lines 27 and 28). When receiving the interface
representation from DB-1, Backend-1 computes the composite representation from the repre-
sentations sent by its downstream dependencies (DB− 1) and its interface representation w.r.t.
the Server (algorithm 5.1 - line 26). The steps performed by Backend-2 are very similar to the
ones performed by Backend-1 and are therefore omitted.
The execution of the distributed assembly algorithm continues on the Server after theBackend-1
and Backend-2 have sent their representations to enable the Server to decide between the avail-
able alternative configurations (algorithm 5.1 - line 17). To this end, the Server calculates the
composite representation corresponding to the configuration B2 using the representations sent
by Backend-1 and Backend-2 and the PCA model of the Server (algorithm 5.1 - line 18). As
this composite representation also includes how the Client uses the Server, it does not con-
tain input actions and can therefore be translated to a DTMC to calculate the reliability of B2
provided to the Client component (algorithm 5.1 - line 20). In the case that the configuration
B2 achieves a higher reliability than B1, the Server calculates a composite representations that
includes its downstream dependencies (Backend-1 and Backend-2) and sends it to the Client
to enable it to make a decision on the new configuration. If the Client decides to change the
reconfiguration of the system, then bindings defined by configuration B2 are established along
the component hierarchy.
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Figure 5.7.: Configuration of Backend-1 Component in System Configuration B2
5.3. Evaluation
Using the WebSystem example we evaluate the time taken by the both versions of the reconfig-
uration algorithm to compute the necessary PCA representations for the selection of alternative
configurations. Of particular interest is the overhead introduced by the distributed re-assembly
algorithm since it computes intermediate representations at each descending and ascending step.
We use the centralised algorithm as a baseline for comparison.
In the centralised algorithm selecting the most reliable configuration is based on the composite
representation of all components in each configuration. Thus, we compare in Table 5.1 the time
required to construct and analyse each configuration individually and the total time denotes the
time required to compute all configurations sequentially.
The distributed algorithm recursively constructs the intermediate representations that enable
local choice at each component with alternative configurations for its required interfaces. In
contrast with the centralised case, the time to construct each configuration denotes the time
to construct all the intermediate representations, for both the descendent and the ascendant
phases until the Server can select the configuration with the highest reliability. Note however
that some of the computations could be done concurrently as the components are distributed.
Nevertheless, for comparison purposes, we place ourselves in the worst case scenario and com-
pute sequentially the intermediate PCA representations for B1 and B2. We ignore the network
delay for transmitting the intermediate representations as such delays are dependent on the
deployment context and the size of the reduced models is small (results in Table 5.1).
Centralised Distributed
Configuration B1 59ms 89ms
Configuration B2 54ms 92ms
Total 113ms 223ms
Table 5.1.: Architectural Assembly Evaluation Results
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Although the WebSystem is only a small example and further evaluation at larger scales is
certainly needed, the figures herein presented suggest that the overheads of computing inter-
mediate representations are not prohibitive and can be easily compensated if the components
execute concurrently. This is due to the gains in size obtained by reducing the PCA of each
component to its interface representation based on the algorithm described earlier in Chapter 4.
5.4. Summary
(Self-) adaptation of autonomous systems, whether distributed applications or services is driven
by non-functional aspects that need to be automatically, rather than manually, associated with
their software models. This requires a close integration between the architectural, behavioural,
non-functional and management concerns. Architectural models that do not consider the be-
haviour representation of each component cannot determine the functional dependency between
provided and required interfaces of a single component as well as the compatibility between
component interactions. Consequently, the generated configurations can include incompatible
components that lead the system to inconsistent states as well as components with bindings to
required functionality that is not used by active behaviour. The latter is of special importance
to pervasive and ubiquitous systems as it leads to unnecessary allocation of resources. On the
other hand, architectural models which rely upon textual notations or external monitoring com-
ponents for the non-functional aspects of component cannot accurately calculate the aggregated
non-functional values of each configuration. Composability of models – deriving a composite
model from the models of its parts – is also a key requirement for autonomous systems to be
able to reason and adapt. Even if models of non-functional properties are combined with archi-
tectural representations, if these models are not composable then the adaptation processes must
rely on user input and pre-defined scenarios of change.
In the framework described in this chapter, including the reconfiguration algorithms, we ensure
a close correspondence between the elements of the different views. Provided and required
interfaces of each component specified in the architectural view using Darwin are associated with
input and output interfaces in the PCA representation of each component included the behaviour
view. Management services keep both architectural and behavioural views updated at run-time
by maintaining a repository of available component instances and monitoring the execution
profile of each component to update the probabilities of transitions labelled with internal and
output actions. Bindings between provided and required interfaces in the architectural view
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correspond to synchronisation of input-output actions in the behavioural view. When generating
alternative configurations of the system’s architecture, the interface operator is used to adjust the
PCA representation of each component to reflect the behaviour associated with bound provided
interfaces. The same representation is used to determine which required interfaces are needed
to satisfy functional requirements. Moreover, an underlying IA model is extracted from the
modified PCA representation of each component to analyse the compatibility of components
with bindings between their provided and required interfaces, which is then used to filter invalid
configurations that would lead the system to inconsistent states. For each valid architectural
configuration, the corresponding composite PCA model is automatically constructed from the
modified PCA representations of each component, which reflect the bindings specified by the
configuration. Reliability properties of each configuration are then automatically analysed to
enable autonomous selection of the configuration that maximises the global reliability of the
system.
Reducing the behaviour of each component before constructing the composite model in the
case of the centralised reconfiguration, and before exchanging information with other components
in the distributed version of the reconfiguration algorithm, improves the feasibility of model
based adaptation using composable models. The reported execution times suggest the approach
can be used in scenarios where reconfiguration needs to be decided under a second. Another
important aspect of reducing the behaviour to interface models is that it allows the suppliers
of different autonomous components such as hardware devices to exchange models that do not
expose their underlying (and often proprietary implementations), which cannot be removed
from the PCA representation of such components as it is necessary to monitor the execution
profile of internal computations. However, whether applications are composed of distributed
autonomous components or built as centralised systems is not only determined by performance
considerations but also driven by the use of different suppliers or different hardware devices. So
the methodology we propose remains applicable in many contexts.
A self-managing (sub-)system can be seen as a composition of autonomous entities, which
include both functional and management components. While management components need to
be aware of system models and adaptation capabilities, third-party bindings support provided by
Darwin enables a separation between functional and management components. Self-management
also requires encapsulation of the components’ internal behaviour. This is needed for commercial
as well as technical reasons: internal behaviour should not be disclosed. Our ability to reduce
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a component’s behaviour to its interface behaviour using the hiding and interface operators
preserves encapsulation defined in the architectural model, thereby enabling the components
to exchange these interface representations to allow each autonomous component to make its
own local reconfiguration decisions, whilst maximising the global reliability properties by taking
into account how upstream dependencies use its provided functionality. When architectural,
behavioural and management models are integrated, when models are composable and can be
reduced to their interfaces, it is possible for systems made of autonomous components to re-
configure themselves to preserve global non-functional requirements.
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6. Evaluation
In this Chapter we illustrate how Probabilistic Component Automata can be applied in practice
using an example e-Banking system from Java EE [Ora], where it is employed to demonstrate
how different Java-based component technologies can be used to build Service-Oriented systems.
This example system provides a realistic application, of a small-moderate size and with several
sources of failure, thus enabling a practical evaluation for PCA and the reduction algorithm
presented in Chapters 3 and 4.
We start by describing the e-Banking system, its functionality and architecture. We show
how PCA can model the probabilistic behaviour of each component by manually translating
Java code to Probabilistic Finite State Processes (P-FSP) using a list of systematic rules and
extracting the execution profile of each component from execution traces. We then combine the
constructed PCA for each component with the system architecture to automatically generate
the composite model of the entire system. The composite model is employed to analyse relevant
operational and reliability properties. These can be used to verify Service Level Agreements as
well as to trigger adaptation processes. Finally, we evaluate the time complexity gains obtained
by the hiding operator on the analysis of such properties.
6.1. e-Banking Case Study System
The e-Banking system is structured as a three-tier architecture present in many web-based
applications: application layer, business logic layer and data management (see Figure 6.1).
The application layer consists of two types of clients: an Application client which is used by
administrators to manage customers and accounts, and a Web client that is used by customers
to access account histories and perform transactions. The Web client is built using JavaServer
Faces technology, whereas the Application client is implemented using Java Swing. Both
clients access the information related to customers, accounts, and transactions via the following
Enterprise Java Beans (EJBs).
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Figure 6.1.: Architectural Configuration of the e-Banking System from [Ora]
The Transaction, Account and Customer EJB components implement the business logic
of the e-Banking system. These components are responsible for responding to client requests
and performing the necessary updates on the Database. Note that not all the functionality
provided by the EJB components is used by both clients. Access to the Database is conducted
using Java Persistent Entities (JPEs) Transaction, Account and Customer, which provide an
object view of the three tables in the Database with the same names. Each EJB component
uses methods that encapsulate SQL queries from these JPEs to retrieve and update data from
the Database.
6.1.1. Modelling Probabilistic Behaviour
In this Section we describe how we have manually extracted a P-FSP representation for each
component in the e-Banking system from its Java source-code. These P-FSP are then compiled
into PCA models which are independent from the context in which the components are deployed,
and can hence be used in any configuration.
Each Java Persistent Entity (JPE) encompasses methods that encapsulate the queries per-
formed on the Database. For example, Listing 6.1 shows an example of a query-method mapping.
However, the code for the JPEs is not considered known, i.e. they are external components. As
a result, their behaviour representation only contains the interface methods. The P-FSP rep-
resentation of each method starts with an input action, which denotes that the method can be
invoked, and is then followed by two possible outcomes: a) an output action that represents
a successfully executed query and, when applicable, the result returned; b) an output failure
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action denoting that an exception has been raised due to a failure during the query execution.
The same mapping procedure can be applied in a general case where the implementation of
external components is not known. In the case of the Account Entity, the translated P-FSP
model for the code in Listing 6.1 and the corresponding PCA representation are depicted in
Listing 6.2 and Figure 6.2, respectively.
Listing 6.1: Partial Java Code for AccountEntity JPE
@NamedQuery(name = ”Account . FindById” ,
query = ”SELECT a FROM Account a WHERE a . id = id ” )
Although the main purpose of failure actions is to model failure scenarios, their semantics is
flexible to accommodate other interpretation, as exceptions in the case of Java code.
Listing 6.2: Partial P-FSP for AccountEntity JPE
AccountEntity = (
?<1.0> accountFindByIDQuery −>
( !<0.99> accountFindByIDQueryResult −> AccountEntity
|˜ !<0.01> accountFindByIDQueryResult −> ERROR
)
( . . . )
) .
Figure 6.2.: Partial PCA Representation of Account Java Persistent Entity
We now illustrate the mapping between other Java constructs and P-FSP using the method
createAccount in the AccountControllerBean (Listing 6.3).
Listing 6.3: Java Code for createAccount method of AccountControllerBeanJavaCode
public Long createAccount ( AccountDeta i l s d e t a i l s , Long customerId )
throws I l l ega lAccountTypeExcept ion , CustomerNotFoundException ,
Inval idParameterExcept ion {
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// makes a new account and en te r s i t in to db ,
Account account = null ;
Customer customer = null ;
Debug . p r i n t ( ” AccountControl lerBean createAccount ” ) ;
i f ( d e t a i l s . getType ( ) == null ) {
throw new Inval idParameterExcept ion ( ” n u l l type ” ) ;
} else i f ( d e t a i l s . g e tDe s c r i p t i on ( ) == null ) {
throw new Inval idParameterExcept ion ( ” n u l l d e s c r i p t i o n ” ) ;
} else i f ( d e t a i l s . getBeginBalanceTimeStamp ( ) == null ) {
throw new
Inval idParameterExcept ion ( ” n u l l beginBalanceTimeStamp” ) ;
} else i f ( customerId == null ) {
throw new Inval idParameterExcept ion ( ” n u l l customerId ” ) ;
}
try {
customer = em. f i n d (
Customer . class ,
new Long ( customerId ) ) ;
i f ( customer == null ) {
throw new CustomerNotFoundException ( ) ;
}
} catch ( Exception ex ) {
throw new EJBException ( ex ) ;
}
try {
account = new Account (
d e t a i l s . getType ( ) ,
d e t a i l s . g e tDe s c r i p t i on ( ) ,
d e t a i l s . getBalance ( ) ,
d e t a i l s . ge tCred i tL ine ( ) ,
d e t a i l s . getBeginBalance ( ) ,
d e t a i l s . getBeginBalanceTimeStamp ( ) ) ;
em . p e r s i s t ( account ) ;
account . addCustomer ( customer ) ;
} catch ( Exception ex ) {
throw new EJBException ( ex ) ;
}
return account . ge t Id ( ) ;
}
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The method signature is represented as an input action in the P-FSP model in Listing 6.4,
indicating that the method can be invoked by another component. The interface exceptions
InvalidParameterException, IllegalAccountTypeException, CustomerNotFoundException
are represented as output failure actions, as these can be handled by other components. Al-
though the AccountControllerBean handles the exceptions/failures related to interactions with
the database, it raises an eJBException to the next level in the component hierarchy, i.e. to
be handled by the components that interact with the AccountControllerBean. The inter-
action with the DB is performed by invoking the method em.find (Customer.class , new
Long(customerId)) , which is modelled in P-FSP using an output action corresponding to
the invocation of the method customerFindByIDQuery offered by the Customer Entity. This
is then followed by the input action customerFindByIDQueryResult to receive the query re-
sult, and the input failure action customerFindByIDQueryResult, which represents the failure
handling behaviour when the customerFindByIDQuery fails.
Listing 6.4: P-FSP for createAccount method of AccountControllerBean
AccountControl lerBean = (
?<1.0> createAccount −> <1.0> ver i fyParametersAccount −>
(˜!<0.01> inval idParameterExcept ionAccountContro l lerBean −>
ERROR
|!<0.99> customerFindByIDQuery −>
(˜?<1.0> customerFindByIDQueryResult −>
!<1.0> eJBExceptionAccountControl lerBean −> ERROR
|?<1.0> customerFindByIDQueryResult −>
(!<0.01> customerNotFoundExceptionAccountControllerBean
−> ERROR
|!<0.99> accountCreateAccount −>
(˜?<1.0> accountCreateAccountResult −>
˜!<1.0> eJBExceptionAccountControl lerBean
−> ERROR
|?<1.0> accountCreateAccountResult −>
!<1.0> executedCreateAccount
−> AccountControl lerBean
)
)
)
)
) .
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In general, the manual translation of an interface method in Java to P-FSP is based on the
following rules:
• the method signature is denoted by an input action;
• internal actions, such as if statements and loops, are represented using internal actions;
• invocation of methods from other classes/components is depicted as output actions;
– to model synchronous method calls, an output action is followed by an input action,
even when the method does not have a return result;
– if the method has declared some interface exceptions, these can be handled by using
input failure actions with the same name.
• exceptions are represented as output failure actions;
• the final action of the interface method representation is an output action that denotes
the return statement, which is implicit for methods without a return result.
Moreover, since different classes may have methods with the same name, the label of the input
action that represents the method signature can be prefixed with the class name, e.g. Account-
ControllerBean.createAccount. When constructing the composite model of a system, this allows
to distinguish the invocation of methods with the same name but from different classes, as
synchronisation is performed based only on the action name.
In the next Section we cover how the P-FSP models translated from Java code are used to
automatically construct the composite model of the entire e-Banking system.
6.1.2. Composite Model
The composite AccountControllerBean depicted in Figure 6.4 could be constructed using the
parallel composition as follows:
‖CompositeAccountBean =
(AccountControllerBean ‖ AccountEntity ‖ CustomerEntity), where input/output actions
associated with the bindings between provided/required interfaces are synchronised and inter-
nal actions are interleaved. However, not all the provided interfaces of the AccountEntity and
CustomerEntity JPEs are used by the AccountControllerBean. We therefore remove the be-
haviour associated with unbound provided interfaces using the interface operator on the input
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Figure 6.4.: Composite Account Controller Bean
actions that are not bound as composite representations with unused behaviour associated with
unbound provided interfaces cannot be used for analysis of reliability and operational properties.
For instance, the AccountEntity is constructed as: ‖AccountEntity = AccountEntityFull @
{findIDQuery, findByTypeQuery, findByBalanceQuery, findByCreditLineQuery, findByBeginBalanceQuery,
findByBeginBalanceTimeStampQuery }. The behaviour associated with these provided inter-
faces is kept as in the original representations, including all internal actions. All results reported
hereafter are for models where unbound behaviour has been removed.
We construct the models for the Customer Controller Bean and Transaction Controller
Bean in a similar way as: ‖CompositeCustomerBean = (CustomerControllerBean ‖ CustomerEntity),
‖CompositeTransactionBean = (TransactionControllerBean ‖ TransactionEntity). Fur-
thermore, hierarchical composition is supported by composing composite models. For instance,
the P-FSP expressions for the Application Client and Web Client are ‖CompositeAppClient
= (WebClient ‖ CompositeAccountBean ‖ CompositeTransactionBean)
and ‖CompositeWebClient = (WebClient ‖
CompositeAccountBean ‖ CompositeTransactionBean). The sizes of the models produced by
the previous P-FSP expressions are reported in Table 6.1.
While the previous P-FSP representations for the Web Client and the Application Client
correspond to a single-threaded component with single bindings to each provided interface, in
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Figure 6.5.: Composite Web Client
Figure 6.6.: Composite App Client
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#(States) #(Transitions)
Account Controller Bean
(ACB)
61 92
Account Entity 6 15
Customer Entity 3 6
Composite ACB 61 92
Customer Controller Bean
(CCB)
35 52
Customer Entity 5 12
Composite CCB 35 52
Transaction Controller
Bean (TCB)
50 90
Transaction Entity 3 6
Composite TCB 50 90
Application Client 38 75
Composite ACB 53 80
Composite CCB 27 40
Composite Application
Client
116 161
Web Client 26 54
Composite ACB 11 15
Composite TCB 45 82
Composite Web Client 88 113
Table 6.1.: Size of PCA Models for Composition
the composite configuration of the e-Banking system the Account Controller Bean has mul-
tiple bindings to its provided interfaces as it used by both clients. Consequently, the interface
actions of the Account Controller Bean need to be relabelled to allow for the representation
of concurrent interactions with multiple clients. For example, the method getDetailsAccount
in the CompositeAccountBean model is relabelled as follows:
‖CompositeAccountBeanShared = CompositeAccountBean /
{ {getDetailsAccountWeb, getDetailsAccountApp} / getDetailsAccount,
{returnDetailsAccountWeb, returnDetailsAccountApp} / returnDetailsAccount } . Sim-
ilarly, the corresponding input/output actions in the Web Client and the Application Client
also need to be relabelled to distinguish the requests from the two clients and to enable the
synchronisation with the relabelled actions of the Account Controller Bean.
The final composite model for the entire e-Banking system has 8507 states and 24718 tran-
sitions and contains a large number of internal states and transitions. We have further ap-
plied the hiding operator to the components of the e-Banking system to reduce the model of
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Figure 6.7.: Composite e-Banking System
each component to its interface behaviour before composition by removing internal behaviour.
For example, the reduced model for the AccountEntity is computed as ||AccountEntity =
AccountEntityFull \ E intAccountEntityFull, where AccountEntityFull represents the PCA model
of the Account Entity without unbound provided interfaces. The gains obtained by reducing
all the components of the system to their interface representation before composition are shown
in Table 6.2. Since we had already removed behaviour associated with unbound interfaces, these
figures represent primarily the removal of internal behaviour and the associated interleaved exe-
cutions in the composite model. Even in this case the gains are significant and their implications
in terms of analysis are discussed below.
# States # Transitions
Composite e-Banking Model 8507 24718
Reduced e-Banking Model 2246 (73.5 %) 8430 (65.9 %)
Table 6.2.: Size of Original and Reduced Composite Models for the e-Banking System
6.2. Probabilistic Analysis
To analyse the probabilistic characteristics of the e-Banking system, we need to associate prob-
abilities with the output and internal actions of each component. These can be obtained by
profiling components individually and counting the number of times output and internal actions
have been executed. To this end, we have extended the source code of each component to log
its execution profile. We avoided using a generic profiling tool to ensure the collected execution
169
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION
traces reflect the mapping between Java code and P-FSP model defined in Section 6.1. Runtime
traces can be collected on each component independently as a separate model is used for the
representation of each component and these models are subsequently composed. When a sub-
component needs to be replaced, only its execution profile needs to be discarded. In contrast,
modelling the entire system using a DTMC would require re-profiling the entire system whenever
a sub-component needs to be replaced.
Furthermore, we have emulated the execution of the Application Client and the Web
Client to collect the traces of the calls on the other components. We then extracted the proba-
bilities of transitions between states from the execution traces and analysed reliability properties
based on the reachability of failure states. These properties can be used to verify if a system is
complying with Service Level Agreements (SLAs) based on different levels of granularity. For
example:
• reliability based the probability of the system failing;
• reliability experienced by a client component;
• probability of failure after requests of a client component;
• probability of failure of a specific component;
• probability of failure of a specific interface of a component.
Description PCTL Formula
R1 Probability of a system failure P=?[s = fail U ¬(s = finish) ]
R2 Probability of a system failure after a re-
quest from the Application Client
P=?[s = fail ∧ s = appRequest U ¬(s =
finish) ]
R3 Probability of a system failure after a re-
quest from the Web Client
P=?[s = fail ∧ s = webRequest U ¬(s =
finish) ]
R4 Probability of a system failure caused by
the Account Controller Bean
P=?[s = fail ∧ s = acbRequest U ¬(s =
finish) ]
R5 Probability of a system failure caused by
the createAccount of the Account Entity
P=?[s = fail ∧ s =
createAccount U ¬(s = finish) ]
O1 Percentage of requests that are fully
treated (without failure handling)
P=?[s = finish ∧ ¬(handled) U ¬(s =
failure) ]
Table 6.3.: Reliability Properties for the e-Banking System
In table 6.3 we describe some specific cases for these properties in the context of the e-Banking
system. For instance, the aggregated system’s reliability measured by property R1 is dependent
on the components’ reliability and their execution profile. Hence, each component may have
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a different impact on the overall reliability of the system. Properties R2 and R3 are used
to distinguish between the reliability experienced by each client, as the Application Client
may require a higher reliability. Property R4 determines the failures caused by the Account
Controller Bean and the ratio between the values of R4 and R1 determines the impact of
the Account Controller Bean in the overall system reliability. In general, this ratio can be
used to select the components that should be re-implemented or replaced to improve overall
reliability. Moreover, the source of the failures caused by a given component may not affect all
the functionality provided by the component. With property R5 we analyse the probability of
failure caused by the interface createAccount of the Account Controller Bean. We include in
table 6.3 an operational property O1 which requires more actions to be kept in the model for
analysis as all internal actions resulting from failure handling need to be kept.
We have analysed these properties in PRISM [KNP] for both the reduced and non-reduced
versions of the composite representation. We automatically translate these composite models
for the e-Banking system to DTMC models for analysis in PRISM. Note that such models need
to be closed, i.e. without any input actions so that all transition probabilities are known. The
resulting performance times for each of the properties considered are reported in table 6.4. The
reported time includes both the time to analyse the property as well as the time to construct
the composite model, and to reduce it in the case of the reduced model. We also include the
size of the reduced model as it is specific to the actions needed for analysing each property (e.g.
R5).
Analysis Time Reduced Model Size
Full Model Reduced Model #(States) #(Transitions)
R1 715 s 46.89 s (93.44 %) 2246 8430
R2 715 s 46.89 s (93.44 %) 2246 8430
R3 715 s 46.89 s (93.44 %) 2246 8430
R4 715 s 46.89 s (93.44 %) 2246 8430
R5 715 s 47.29 s (93.38 %) 2310 8626
O1 715 s 47.52 s (93.35 %) 2470 9116
Table 6.4.: Time to Analyse Reliability and Operational Properties for the e-Banking System
These results show large gains in the analysis times but their significance needs to be discussed
more carefully. First, the results indicate that the gains obtained by applying the hiding operator
before composing are much greater than the gains obtained by the state reduction techniques
performed in PRISM on the overall DTMC model. This is because the size of the model is
greatly reduced as shown in Table 6.2. Second, we note that the average time to analyse
both the full and the reduced models in PRISM is approximately the same for
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all properties as 99% of the reported time corresponds to the model building step.
Once the model is internally constructed, checking each property requires an almost
negligible time by comparison, i.e. approximately 100ms for the reduced model and
2s for the full model.
However, not all the properties can be analysed on the reduced model since some of the
behaviour has been hidden. Thus, whilst the same model can be used for properties R1−4
which only require information about the components causing the failure, a different, finer
granularity model is required to analyse R5. Hence, there is a tradeoff between the granularity
of the properties that need to be checked and the time required for the analysis. This tradeoff
is controlled by the user through the specification of the actions to be preserved/hidden by
the reduction algorithm. The significant gains in analysis time obtained suggest that
often the user is better off re-building the model for the specific cases where fine
granularity is required.
Finally, this flexibility given to the user when analysing the reliability of the system can be
achieved only when the models are composable, provide expressive failure representations and
can be reduced. This is not the case in monolithic, non-composable models such as DTMCs,
and not the case in many performance models that cannot be reduced through hiding.
6.2.1. Sensitivity Analysis
In this Section we perform sensitivity analysis on the e-Banking system to verify the impact of
changes in the probability of failures for specific components. Component failures have different
impacts on the system’s reliability according to how the components are used. For instance, an
unreliable component will not significantly affect the overall reliability if it is rarely used. On
this account, we analyse the impact with respect to the execution profile of different users of the
system, namely the Web Client, the Admin Client and both clients. The results obtained (Figure
6.8) show the impact on the system reliability for different probabilities of failure (1%, 2%, 5%
and 10%) for the Tx Entity, Account Controller and Customer Controller components.
The probability of failure for the other components was kept constant at 1% and we have specified
that the Web Client generates 70% of the requests whilst the Application Client generates the
rest 30%.
The sensitivity analysis for the Tx Entity shows that the Application Client is insensitive to
the probability of the Tx Entity failing as it does not access information about the clients’ trans-
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Figure 6.8.: Sensitivity Analysis on the e-Banking System
actions. Similarly, the Web Client is insensitive to the probability of the Customer Controller
failing. As both clients interact with the Account Controller EJB, they are affected by changes
in its failure probability.
Notwithstanding that the sensitivity analysis reported in Figure 6.8 is performed on the
probability of failure of a given component, PCA models allow a system engineer to con-
duct fine-grained sensitivity analysis on the probability of failure of an individual action in
a component. Although the Account Controller component is used by both the Web Client
and Application Client, some of its interface actions are only available to the Application
Client, e.g. createAccount. Figure 6.9(a) shows that the Web Client is insensitive to changes
in the probability of failure of actions associated with the createAccount interface. In con-
trast, if the probabilistic behaviour of the e-banking system is modelled as a DTMC following
Cheung’s approach [Che80], failure probabilities are associated only with specific components.
Consequently, the DTMC model does not include the behaviour associated with each provided
interface, and more specifically the paths that lead the AccountControllerBean to fail. The
results shown in Figure 6.9(b) illustrate the impact on the accuracy of reliability analysis.
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Figure 6.9.: Sensitivity Analysis on the AccountControllerBean Actions Using PCA and
DTMC
6.3. Summary
We illustrated in this Chapter how P-FSP expressions can be used to model the behaviour of
Java implementations of component-based applications. Invocation of methods is represented as
output actions, while a method signature is denoted by an input action. The execution of internal
instructions, such as if statements and loops are represented using internal actions. Failure
actions provide a close mapping with exception modelling and handling in Java. Although the
P-FSP expression for each component in the e-Banking system was manually defined and we
have abstracted from many details such as variables, these expressions illustrate the flexibility
and expressiveness of PCA models to model the probabilistic behaviour of component-based
systems. The probabilities associated with transitions that are labelled with internal, output,
internal and output failure actions can be automatically extracted from system profiling, thereby
reducing the specification burden.
After translating P-FSP expressions into PCA models, the supported operators provide the
means to adjust the generic representation of each component to one that is specific to a given
system configuration. The interface operator enables automatic removal of behaviour associated
with unbound provided interfaces. The re-labelling operator supports the representation of mul-
tiple bindings to a provided interface. The parallel composition allows automatic construction of
the composite system model based on the (modified) representations of individual components.
Therefore, a faithful composite representation of the system can only be obtained by establishing
a close integration between the architectural and behavioural aspects of the system.
As the composite system model does not contain behaviour associated with unbound provided
interfaces, it does not contain input actions and is automatically translated to a DTMC model.
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We have illustrated how such model can be used to verify different reliability and operational
properties. As the composite model includes the actions executed by the different components
in the e-Banking system, it enables the definition of both global and granular properties. We
have also shown the improvements in the accuracy of sensitivity analysis in comparison with
a DTMC representation of the e-Banking following the modelling approach of existing work
[Che80, FGT12], which abstracts from internal behaviour.
Furthermore, not all actions need to kept in the composite model in order for some properties
to be analysed. The PCA model of each component prior to composition by removing all internal
actions that are not needed for analysis. We have shown that significant reductions in model
size can be achieved. These, along with the gains obtained for the time to analyse each property,
confirm the improvements in complexity illustrated in Chapter 4. The hiding operator allows
the system designer to define the required actions to be preserved/hidden, thereby controlling
the granularity of the composite representation for analysis.
6.4. Qualitative Evaluation
In this Section we discuss how the requirements defined in Chapter 1 have been met by the work
described in this thesis.
Self-management systems need to be capable of changing autonomously, without user input
at run-time. In this thesis we have focused on how the system architecture can be adapted
to satisfy both functional and non-functional properties, with a focus on reliability. We have
presented how the models of the system architecture, functional and probabilistic behaviour need
to be closely integrated as considering such models in isolation leads to inconsistent analysis
or requires user input. The multi-view framework we propose in Chapter 5 also integrates
management elements for keeping models alive at run-time but also to determine the necessary
reconfiguration steps to fulfil reliability requirements. Given that all elements of the multi-view
framework are composable, the reconfiguration processes can consider any available configuration
even if it was not defined at design-time. From the point-of-view of system analysis, the multi-
view framework realises requirements R1 (Autonomy), R2 (Integrated System models) and R3
(Composability). Moreover, the compositional reachability algorithm proposed in Chapter 4
presents an important contribution towards the use of composable models for self-management
by improving the scalability of model construction and analysis (Requirement R4).
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The integration of models of functional behaviour and system architecture in the multi-view
framework enables accurate analysis of the compatibility of components based on the bindings
between provided and required interfaces, thereby ensuring adaptation safety before it is realised
(Requirement R5). We have also presented how the models in the multi-view framework can be
exchanged between components to enable autonomous reconfiguration in a decentralised fashion
(Requirement R6).
Although we have presented contributions for autonomous analysis for reconfiguration, we
have abstracted from lower-level details that need to be considered when fully integrating into
a running autonomous system underpinned by a management framework. For example, we do
not contemplate how components are allocated to nodes, as we assume that each component
is instantiated in a separate node. The reconfiguration process needs to take into account the
physical host where components are instantiated as it directly influences the non-functional
properties achieved by each configuration. Other management aspects, such as security and
resource usage, also have to be considered as they may prevent some configurations from being
instantiated. The reconfiguration processes presented in this thesis take into account a single
non-functional property: reliability. The addition of another non-functional property, such as
performance, requires not only integration with existing models to avoid inconsistencies in the
analysis but also requires modifying the reconfiguration process to a multi-objective framework.
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The dynamic nature and increasing scale of modern pervasive systems and service-oriented envi-
ronments demands the design of applications that are adaptive and autonomous. Consequently,
manual maintenance performed by a system administrator is impractical and slow. Autonomous
and self-managing systems require approaches that address non-functional properties, manage-
ment and adaptation as first-class concerns.
Traditional Software Engineering models do not fully cater for these aspects which are of-
ten left for subsequent design iterations. On the other hand, adaptation approaches based on
management services cater for the previous issues in isolation with the software model. We
have discussed how these aspects should be combined to support self-management as they are
clearly interdependent. We have also reviewed existing work on architectural modelling, be-
haviour analysis and model-based analysis of non-functional properties such as reliability and
performance. Although some approaches integrate software models with adaptation processes,
the lack of support for composability and compositionality prevents their systematic use. This
limitation is more pronounced in the case of non-functional properties, which are needed to
support adaptation choices.
We further reviewed in more detail different approaches to model probabilistic behaviour and
discussed their limitations in the context of component-based systems and architectural adap-
tation. We described thereafter Probabilistic Component Automata (PCA), our formalism to
model the probabilistic behaviour of those systems. By overcoming the main limitations of ex-
isting work, we proposed how the formalism can be closely integrated with architectural models.
This enables the automatic construction of the composite model corresponding to a particular
configuration of the system based on the individual representations of the system components.
To mitigate the state-explosion problem associated with composite models, we introduced an
algorithm that reduces the PCA representation of each component by removing its internal be-
haviour. We have then shown, both formally and empirically, that the reduced model preserves
the properties of the original representation. Furthermore, using an example e-Banking appli-
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cation from Java EE materials, we evaluate the expressiveness of PCA models to model the
behaviour of component-based systems and demonstrate the gains in size reduction produced
by reducing models before composition. Finally, we described how architectural, behavioural
and non-functional aspects of a system are integrated in a multi-view modelling framework for
self-management systems. This framework includes a management view which consists of man-
agement services that support architectural adaptation processes. We have defined a centralised
and a distributed version which enable automatic selection of architectural configurations driven
by global reliability requirements.
7.1. Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is a composable modelling formalism, Probabilistic Com-
ponent Automata, to represent the probabilistic behaviour of component-based systems. We
have introduced constructs for failure modelling, propagation and handling whose semantics
closely resemble the behaviour of exceptions in Object-Oriented languages. Building upon the
existing features of the LTSA model checker, we have implemented tool support for PCA models
by defining a probabilistic extension to FSP and extending the original operators to cater for
the semantics of PCA models. All the existing tools for constructing, visualising and analysing
composable models have also been extended to support PCA representations.
A close integration between PCA and architectural models of provided and required inter-
faces enables the definition of models that are independently from the context in which each
component is deployed. By combining the semantics of generative and reactive probabilistic
models, the representation of each component includes behaviour that a component controls
and actions whose execution is chosen by others. In contrast with existing approaches based on
DTMC models, the same PCA representation of each component can be used to construct the
composite model of different configurations, though it may have to be adjusted before compo-
sition to reflect the bindings defined by each configuration. To this end, we have also defined
interface and re-labelling operators which are used to remove behaviour associated with unbound
provided interfaces and adjust the interface actions of components involved in multiple bindings
to a provided interface, respectively. These operators allow us to adjust the PCA model of each
component to reflect the bindings defined by each configuration. For instance, the interface
operator removes the behaviour associated with unbound provided interfaces, thereby ensuring
that the model used for composition does not contain input actions that are not going to be
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synchronised with the corresponding output actions from other components. As a result, the
composite model of a given architectural configuration does not contain input actions and can
be translated to a DTMC model for reliability analysis. The reliability properties of each con-
figuration are then automatically analysed using existing model-checking tools such as PRISM
[KNP]. Our PCA formalism therefore provides the means to construct composite DTMC models
for reliability analysis, in a similar way as PEPA models are used to construct the composite
CTMC model of a system for performance analysis.
When analysing reliability properties of a system configuration, the same level of detail may
not be required, in particular for system reconfiguration where components are replaced as a
whole. The second main contribution of this thesis is the reduction algorithm presented in
Chapter 4 which provides an efficient method to reduce a component’s PCA representation to
its interface actions by removing transitions labelled with internal actions. As a result, smaller
composite models can be constructed by reducing the representations of sub-components w.r.t.
to the reliability and operational properties to be analysed, before composing them using parallel
composition. The reduction gains obtained can be significant, as demonstrated by the different
examples used in this thesis. These results are supported by the lower time complexity of the
algorithm (quasilinear), compared with existing methods for reducing generative probabilistic
systems whose time complexity is cubic in the number of states of the original model. While
existing methods are based on recursive processes that consider all the paths of the input model
at each step, our reduction algorithm performs two iterative navigations whereby only local
transitions to a single state are analysed at each step. Moreover, by formally showing the cor-
rectness of the algorithm using notions of behaviour equivalences, we have demonstrated that
reduced models preserve the properties of the original properties and can be used to replace the
original representation in any context (formula) defined by a combination of PCA operators. In
particular to parallel composition, we are able to obtain significantly smaller composite repre-
sentations by removing internal behaviour prior to composition, whilst preserving the reliability
properties of a composite model with non-reduced representations.
We have leveraged existing work on architecture models and behaviour analysis and combined
with PCA models to define a multi-view modelling framework for adaptive component-based
applications. A close integration between the architectural, behavioural and non-functional
aspects of a system underpins the definition of a centralised and a distributed algorithms for
architectural reconfiguration driven by reliability requirements. Firstly, alternative configura-
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tions are generated using the functional requirements established by the architectural model.
Secondly, the components’ PCA representations are used to determine which required func-
tionality is needed for each component, based on the bindings to its provided interfaces. An
underlying Interface Automata representation extracted from each PCA model is used to filter
the configurations that would lead the system to inconsistent states. Thirdly, the reliability
of each alternative configuration is calculated by composing the PCA representations of each
component, which are first modified according to the bindings configuration. These constitute
the mains steps performed by both algorithms. In the case of the distributed version, although
the choice between alternative configurations is performed on a local level by each component,
the exchanged representations allow to preserve the global reliability of the system. Further-
more, as composability is preserved across all views of the modelling framework, reconfiguration
processes do not require that all the architectural configurations considered at runtime to be
defined at design time.
The use of component models that require explicit specification of the provided and required
functionality of each component provides the means for third-party bindings determined by an
external management component. Consequently, a clear separation between the functional and
management behaviour can be established. Nonetheless, an autonomous component requires a
close link between management elements and the models of the managed system.
In the next Section we describe several aspects in which the work presented in this thesis
could be extended in the future.
7.2. Future Work
In the same way that probabilities of transitions labelled with internal, output, internal-failure
and output failure actions are automatically extracted from run-time traces, the behaviour
representation of a component should ideally be automatically derived from the source code.
Although the PCA representations components of the example e-Banking system were manu-
ally defined, we followed some systematic rules. The same rules may be used as the basis for
an extraction method that covers the main constructs of a particular language. Additionally,
transitions in PCA models can be augmented with rewards to improve the expressiveness of
properties that can be analysed using PCA representations, e.g. energy used. This extension
requires the redefinition of the parallel composition, re-labelling and hiding operators based on
the semantics of each reward structure.
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Notwithstanding that the PCA representation of each component can be kept live at runtime,
changes in the probabilities of transitions require the full reconstruction of the composite model
for analysis of reliability properties. PCA models can be further extended to support late
definition of the probability of some actions that are relevant for particular properties, e.g.
interface and failure actions. The analysis of properties based on parametric models produces
a formula that is dependent on the variables included in the composite model. As a result,
reliability properties can be calculated later by directly replacing the updated probability of those
actions. Similar to rewards, this extension requires the redefinition of the parallel composition,
re-labelling and hiding operators.
Although we have employed PCA for reliability analysis of component-based systems to drive
architectural reconfiguration processes, PCA is a formal and abstract probabilistic model whose
semantics can be generalised and be applied in other contexts. For instance, Mallios et al.
[MBK+13] extended PIOA for analysing the probabilistic cost of enforcing security policies.
Additionally, PCA can also be further extended with other action types to accommodate alter-
native synchronisation semantics for other types of analysis.
The multi-view framework currently supports analysis of reliability properties, but other non-
functional properties such as performance are equally important. Given the similarities between
PEPA and Interface Automata, the performance behaviour of each component could be mod-
elled using PEPA representations to support automated performance analysis. However, such
representations would have to be integrated with existing views to avoid considering them in
isolation. The similarities between single PEPA and Interface Automata models can provide a
basis for such integration. For instance, passive active actions in PEPA are mapped to input
actions in IA and PCA as the execution of these actions is determined by an external component.
Although PEPA models do not distinguish between internal and output actions, as parallel com-
position requires the specification of set of actions for synchronisation, extending PEPA with
output actions is straightforward. Finally, in order to support a full integration between software
models, adaptation processes, management services and software components, the multi-view
framework proposed in this thesis needs to be integrated with existing management frameworks
that implement the management services required for architectural adaptation.
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A. Notions of Equivalence for Probabilistic
Component Automata
While in Chapter 4 we have discussed the reduction algorithm that implements the hiding
operator, in this Chapter we show that the reduced model produced by the algorithm preserves
the reachability properties of an input model. This corresponds to showing that the behaviour of
the reduced model is equivalent to the one of the original model when abstracting from internal
behaviour, which the algorithm tries to remove. In the context of automata based models, strong
and weak bisimulation are the most used behaviour equivalences. These notions of behavioural
equivalence can be informally described as follows. Consider that models A and B represent
the interface behaviour of two components C1 and C2 where C1 is being used in a certain
system. If these models are strongly bisimilar, then component C2 can replace C1 as it can
perform exactly the same behaviour as C1, i.e. A simulates the behaviour of B and vice versa.
Weak bisimulation is similar to strong bisimulation but only considers the set of observable
actions, i.e. two models A and B are weakly bisimilar if they can perform the same observable
behaviour, excluding internal actions which are not externally observed. Consider that model
A denotes a specification of a protocol and that model B represents an implementation of that
protocol; if models A and B are weakly bisimilar, then the implementation is compliant with
the specification of the protocol.
Formally, behavioural equivalences are defined based on a bisimulation relationship R that es-
tablishes a mapping between states which are considered equivalent, according to some properties
[Hil96]. These properties are specific to both the behavioural equivalence and the model to which
they are applied. Milner [Mil89] defined strong and weak bisimulations for non-probabilistic
Labelled Transitions Systems, the corresponding bisimulation relationships R and associated
properties. Moreover, Milner established that these bisimulation relationships R need to hold
the following properties when applied to models A and/or B [Mil89]:
• reflexivity: ARA;
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• symmetry: ARB ⇐⇒ B RA;
• transitive: ARB ∧ B R C =⇒ AR C;
• congruence: ARB =⇒ C[A]R C[B], for any context C.
An equivalence relationship R is a congruence if it is valid in any context, i.e. its properties are
still valid after the application of any operator to models A and B.
In the next sections we will first review the notions of both strong and weak bisimulation
for non-probabilistic and probabilistic versions of Labelled Transitions Systems. We then ex-
tend these notions to define the conditions for strong and weak bisimulation for PCA models.
Thereafter, each case of the reduction algorithm described in the Chapter 4 is defined as a trans-
formation Ti which is applied to an arbitrary state of an original model A. We demonstrate
that each transformation Ti, when applied to a model A produces a weakly bisimilar model
based upon a bisimulation relationship RTi . We then show that a sequence of transformations
Ti applied to model A also produces a weakly bisimilar model. This effectively corresponds to
establishing that the bisimulation relationships RTi are transitive. Finally, we demonstrate that
the bisimulation relationships RTi associated with each transformation Ti are a congruence with
respect to the three operators supported by PCA: hiding, relabelling and parallel composition.
A.1. Behaviour Equivalences for Labelled Transition Systems
Consider a non-probabilistic LTS model A = 〈S, q, E ,∆〉, where:
• S is a set of states,
• q is the initial state,
• E is the set of labels and
• ∆ is the set of transitions.
Although we are interested in using notions of strong and weak bisimulation between two
LTS models, these notions are defined through a bisimulation R which defines an equivalence
relationship between states of a single model. Consequently, in order for a bisimulation to be
defined for two LTS models A1 = 〈S1, q1, E1,∆1〉 and A2 = 〈S2, q2, E2,∆2〉, a disjoint union
Aˆ = 〈Sˆ, qˆ, Eˆ , ∆ˆ〉 of automata A1 and A2 is defined as described by Lanotte et al. [LMST10]:
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• Sˆ = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ {qˆ} | S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ ∧ {qˆ} /∈ S1 ∪ S2;
• Eˆ = E1 ∪ E2;
• ∆ˆ = ∆1 ∪∆2 ∪ { (qˆ, τ, q1) ∪ (qˆ, τ, q2)} , where τ is a silent internal action.
In the following Sections we present the conditions for strong and weak bisimulations between
two Labelled Transition Systems A1 and A2 based upon their disjoint union Aˆ.
A.1.1. Strong Bisimulation
Milner [Mil89] defines a strong bisimulation between two LTS A1 and A2 through an equivalence
relationship R on Sˆ × Sˆ such that ∀(s, t) ∈ R, ∀a ∈ Eˆ ∪ {τ}:
if s
a−→ s′ =⇒ ∃ t′ ∈ Sˆ such that t a−→ t′ and (s′, t′) ∈ R; (A.1)
if t
a−→ t′ =⇒ ∃ s′ ∈ Sˆ such that s a−→ s′ and (s′, t′) ∈ R. (A.2)
Note that there are many equivalence relationships R which verify the above conditions. For
instance, consider the following two equivalence relationships:
• empty relationship R = ∅;
• reflexive relationship, ∀s ∈ S1, (s, s) ∈ R.
Although the above equivalence relationships are strong bisimulations as they verify the con-
ditions A.1 and A.2, they are not sufficient to determine that two LTS models are strongly
bisimilar. Two LTS A1 and A2 are strongly bisimilar, depicted by A1 ∼ A2, if every step per-
formed by A1 is simulated by A2, and vice versa, in the same order [Mil89]. The two conditions
for strong bisimulation ensure that if two states (s, t) are strongly bisimilar, then all destination
states (s′, t′) of outgoing transitions from states s and t are also strongly bisimilar. The two
conditions are also needed for R to be a symmetric relationship, i.e. it is not necessary to assume
that if (s, t) ∈ R then (t, s) ∈ R. However, the initial states (q1, q2) must also be mapped. It
is therefore necessary and sufficient for two LTS models A1 and A2 to be strongly bisimilar iff
there is an equivalence relationship R which is a strong bisimulation and (q1, q2) ∈ R.
A.1.2. Weak Bisimulation
Weak bisimulation relaxes the conditions for strong bisimulation by abstracting from internal
behaviour. In order to reflect this in the weak bisimulation definition, Milner introduced the
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concept of a weak transition s
a
=⇒ s′ [Mil89] which corresponds to a sequence of zero or more
non-observable transitions labelled with the internal action τ , followed by a transition labelled
with action a and succeed by zero or more non-observable transitions labelled with the internal
action τ : s(
τ−→)∗ a−→ ( τ−→)∗s′.
Weak bisimulation is defined through an equivalence relationship R on Sˆ × Sˆ such that
∀(s, t) ∈ R, ∀a ∈ Eˆ \ {τ}:
• if s a−→ s′ =⇒ ∃ t′ ∈ Sˆ such that t a=⇒ t′ and (s′, t′) ∈ R;
• if t a−→ t′ =⇒ ∃ s′ ∈ Sˆ such that s a=⇒ s′ and (s′, t′) ∈ R.
Two models are weakly bisimilar if their observable behaviour is indistinguishable to an external
observer, i.e. every visible step (
a−→) performed by an automaton A1 is executed by A2 ( a=⇒),
though this step can be preceded and/or succeed by internal/silent actions τ which are not
externally visible. Similarly to strong bisimulation, the existence of a weak bisimulation is not
sufficient to determine that two models are weakly bisimilar. Formally, A1 is weakly bisimilar
to A2, denoted by A1 ≈ A2, iff there is a weak bisimulation relationship R on Sˆ × Sˆ and
(q1, q2) ∈ R.
A.2. Behavioural Equivalences for Probabilistic Labelled
Transitions Systems
Consider now a probabilistic LTS model (PLTS) A = 〈S, q, E ,∆, µ〉, an LTS model to which
generative probabilities have been added to each transition. µ : ∆ → [0, 1] is a function that
assigns a probability to each transition in ∆ subject to ∀s ∈ S,∑(s,a,s′)∈∆ µ(s, a, s′) = 1, i.e.
the sum of probabilities of all outgoing states from a given state s is equal to 1. In the following
Sections we describe the notions of strong and weak bisimulation for PLTS models based on the
work of Baier and Hermanns [BH97] using an alternative equivalent notation introduced by Tini
[Tin07].
Let A1 = 〈S1, q1, E1,∆1, µ1〉 and A2 = 〈S2, q2, E2,∆2, µ2〉 be two PLTS models; similarly to
the non-probabilistic case, an equivalence relationship R is defined on a disjoint union of the
two automata Aˆ = 〈Sˆ, qˆ, Eˆ , ∆ˆ, µˆ〉 [BH97], where:
• Sˆ = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ {qˆ} | S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ ∧ qˆ /∈ S1 ∪ S2 ;
• Eˆ = E1 ∪ E2;
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• ∆ˆ = ∆1 ∪∆2 ∪ { (qˆ, τ, q1) ∪ (qˆ, τ, q2)} ;
• µˆ : ∆→ [0, 1],
µˆ(s, a, s′) =

0.5 if (s, a, s′) = (qˆ, τ, q1)
0.5 if (s, a, s′) = (qˆ, τ, q1)
µ(s, a, s′) if (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆1
µ′(s, a, s′) if (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆2
The disjoint union PLTS Aˆ is equal to the one constructed for non-probabilistic LTS models,
apart from the function µˆ. The first two cases of µˆ ensure that the model Aˆ is a valid generative
PLTS model, i.e. ∀s ∈ Sˆ,∑(s,a,s′)∈ ∆ˆ µˆ(s, a, s′) = 1. This condition is valid for state qˆ as well as
for all other states given that A1 and A2 are valid PLTS models and their states are disjoint.
A.2.1. Strong Bisimulation
Two PLTS A1 and A2 are strongly bisimilar, depicted by A1 ∼ A2, if every step performed by
A1 is simulated by A2, and vice versa, in the same order and with the same probability [BH97].
As a result, the strong bisimulation definition for PLTS models needs to consider not only the
transitions of the two models but also their probability as defined by µˆ, which includes both
µ1 and µ2. Before describing Baier and Hermanns’s strong bisimulation definition for PLTS
models [BH97], we present some intermediate formulations to explain the changes required to
the previous definitions of strong and weak bisimulation for LTS models, which arise from the
introduction of probabilities.
We first consider a simple extension of the conditions for strong bisimulation for non-probabilistic
LTS Models by adding µ to the previous rules. Given two PLTS Models A1, A2 and their disjoint
union Aˆ, we define a strong bisimulation R on Sˆ × Sˆ such that ∀(s, t) ∈ R, ∀a ∈ Eˆ ∪ {τ}:
if s
a−→ s′ =⇒ ∃ t′ ∈ Sˆ such that t a−→ t′, (s′, t′) ∈ R and µˆ(s, a, s′) = µˆ(t, a, t′); (A.3)
if t
a−→ t′ =⇒ ∃ s′ ∈ Sˆ such that s a−→ s′, (s′, t′) ∈ R and µˆ(s, a, s′) = µˆ(t, a, t′). (A.4)
If the previous conditions were applied to the models in Figure A.1, A1 and A2 would not be
considered strongly bisimilar. However, model A1 can perform a visible step with action a from
state 0 to state 1 with probability 0.5 + 0.5 = 1, while model A2 can perform the same step
with action a from state 0′ to 1′ with same probability 1. Consequently, strong bisimulation for
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0 1
〈0.5〉 a
〈0.5〉 a
(a) PLTS A1
0’ 1’
〈1.0〉 a
(b) PLTS A2
Figure A.1.: Examples of PLTS Models for Strong Bisimulation
PLTS models needs to be defined over sets of transitions between bisimilar states as opposed to
single transitions.
Baier and Hermanns defined strong bisimulation for PLTS models [BH97] using a cumulative
probability distribution function introduced by Vanglabbeek et al. [VSS95]. When applied to a
PLTS A = 〈S, q, E ,∆, µ〉, the cumulative probability distribution function µG1 determines the
total probability by which a state s′ ∈ S can be reached from state s ∈ S through transitions
labelled which the action a ∈ E :
µG(s, a, s
′) =
∑
(s,a,s′)∈∆
µ(s, a, s′) (A.5)
µG(s, a, s
′) = 0 iff 6 ∃(s, a, s′) ∈ ∆ (A.6)
Strong bisimulation for PLTS models is accordingly defined based on an equivalence relation-
ship strong bisimulation R ⊆ Sˆ × Sˆ such that ∀(s, t) ∈ R, ∀a ∈ Eˆ ∪ {τ} [BH97]:
• if s a−→ s′ =⇒ ∃ t′ ∈ Sˆ{s′} such that t a−→ t′, (s′, t′) ∈ R and µˆG(s, a, s′) = µˆG(t, a, t′);
• if t a−→ t′ =⇒ ∃ s′ ∈ Sˆ{t′} such that s a−→ s′, (s′, t′) ∈ R and µˆG(s, a, s′) = µˆG(t, a, t′).
Consequently, two states s and t are strongly bisimilar if the sum all outgoing transitions labelled
with action a from state s to state s′ is the sum as the sum all outgoing transitions labelled with
action a from state t to state t′.
As the function µG already includes the existence of transitions between two states labelled
with a certain action, Baier and Hermanns [BH97] defined the simplified conditions for strong
bisimulation of PLTS models based on the notion of equivalent classes of states in Sˆ. Formally,
the set of equivalence classes SˆC is determined by the binary relationship R as follows:
• SˆC = Sˆ/R,
1For convenience, we follow the notation used by Tini [Tin07], which is based on the definitions of Baier and
Hermanns.
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• SˆC = { [s]R | s ∈ Sˆ }, where
• [s]R = { t ∈ Sˆ | (s, t) ∈ R}
Moreover, before introducing the conditions for strong bisimulation [BH97], the function µG
for a PLTS A needs be extended to a set of target/destination states S1 ⊆ S as follows [Tin07]:
µG(s, a,S1) =
∑
s′ ∈S1
µG(s, a, s
′). (A.7)
A strong bisimulation for PLTS models is then defined by Baier and Hermanns [BH97] using
an equivalence relationship R ⊆ Sˆ × Sˆ such that ∀(s, t) ∈ R: ∀C ∈ SˆC and ∀a ∈ Eˆ ∪ {τ}:
µˆG(s, a, C) = µˆG(t, a, C). (A.8)
Analogously to the case of non-probabilistic LTS models, two PLTS models are strongly bisimilar
iff there is a strong bisimulation R on Aˆ such that (q1, q2) ∈ R. In the following paragraphs we
will illustrate the application of bisimulation rules to two example PLTS models.
0ˆ
0 1
0’ 1’
〈0.5〉 τ
〈0.5〉 τ
〈0.5〉 a
〈0.5〉 a
〈1.0〉 a
Figure A.2.: Disjoint Union PLTS Aˆ for Strong Bisimulation Between PLTS Models A1 and A2
Consider the PLTS Aˆ in Figure A.2 as the disjoint union of the PLTS models A1 and A2 from
Figure A.1. We specify the equivalence relationship R12 between A1 and A2 : {(0, 0′), (1, 1′)}.
The corresponding set of equivalence classes SˆC is defined as {{0, 0′}, {1, 1′}}2. Using the strong
bisimulation definition in equation A.8, we verify below the equivalence relationship R12 is a
strong bisimulation.
2Note that for a bisimulation R′12 = { {0, 0′}, {0, 1′} }, the set of equivalence classes SˆC is defined as {{0, 0′, 1′}},
i.e. there is only one equivalence class as states 0′ and 1′ are specified as being equivalent to state 0.
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We start with the case where (s, t) = (0, 0′) and C = {0, 0′} for the action label a:
µˆG(0, a, {0, 0′}) = µˆG(0′, a, {0, 0′}). (A.9)
By applying the expansion rule A.7 when µG is applied to a set of states, we obtain
µˆ(0, a, 0) + µˆ(0, a, 0′) = µˆ(0′, a, 0) + µˆ(0′, a, 0′). (A.10)
Given that the transitions (0, a, 0), (0, a, 0′), (0′, a, 0) and (0′, a, 0′) do not exist in ∆ˆ, we derive
µˆ(0, a, 0) = µˆ(0, a, 0′) = µˆ(0′, a, 0) = µˆ(0′, a, 0′) = 0, (A.11)
and we conclude that the condition for strong bisimulation is verified as follows for the current
case
µˆ(0, a, 0) + µˆ(0, a, 0′) = µˆ(0′, a, 0) + µˆ(0′, a, 0′) ⇐⇒ 0 + 0 = 0 + 0 (A.12)
We omit the cases where (s, t) = (1, 1′) and C = {1, 1′} as well as (s, t) = (1, 1′) and C = {0, 0′}
for the action label a as these are equivalent the previous case since there are no transitions
between the bisimilar states and the states in the equivalence classes.
Consider now the case where (s, t) = (0, 0′) and C = {1, 1′} for the action label a:
µˆG(0, a, {1, 1′}) = µˆG(0′, a, {1, 1′}). (A.13)
By applying the expansion rule A.7 when µG is applied to a set of states, we obtain
µˆG(0, a, 1) + µˆG(0, a, 1
′) = µˆG(0′, a, 1) + µˆG(0′, a, 1′). (A.14)
Given that the transitions µˆG(0, a, 1
′) and µˆG(0′, a, 1) do not exist in ∆ˆ, we derive
µˆG(0, a, 1) + 0 = 0 + µˆG(0
′, a, 1′). (A.15)
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By replacing µˆG(0, a, 1) by µ1G(0, a, 1) and µˆG(0
′, a, 1′) by µ2G(0′, a, 1′) we confirm that the
condition for strong bisimulation is also verified for this case:
0.5 + 0.5 = 1 (A.16)
As a result, the equivalence relationship R12 verifies the conditions for strong bisimulation
defined by equation A.8 and includes the initial states 0 and 0′ of A1 and A2, respectively. As
a consequence, the PLTS models A1 and A2 are strongly bisimilar.
A.2.2. Weak Bisimulation
When establishing the notion of weak bisimulation for PLTS models, Baier and Hermanns
[BH97] define the probability of weak transition s
a
=⇒ s′, i.e. the probability of paths from states
s and s′ which contain action a and may be preceded and/or followed by transitions labelled
with internal action τ . To this end, consider the extension of the function µG for a PLTS A to
sequences of actions in E∗ [Tin07], i.e. with zero or more actions in E . Let Λ be a sequence of
actions in E∗ and  the empty sequence of actions. The function µG is defined as follows ∀Λ ∈ E∗
and ∀s ∈ S and ∀S1 ⊂ S:
µG(s,Λ,S1) =

1 if Λ =  ∧ s ∈ S1 (A.17)
0 if Λ =  ∧ s /∈ S1 (A.18)∑
s′∈S
(
µG(s, a, s
′).µG(s′, λ,S1)
)
if Λ = aλ, a ∈ E ∧ λ ∈ E∗ (A.19)
Equation A.19 denotes an expansion law to calculate the probability over all the paths starting
from state s to states in S1 through a sequence of transitions as defined by the sequence Λ.
Consider the case where the function µG is applied to (s1, a, {s2}) and (s1, a, s2) ∈ ∆. As the
sequence of actions Λ in E∗ is the label a followed by an empty sequence of actions  (Λ = a)3,
we obtain:
µG(s1, a, {s2}) =
∑
s′∈S
(
µG(s1, a, s
′).µG(s′, , {s2})
)
. (A.20)
As the summation in equation A.19 is defined over all states s′ in S, equation A.18 removes from
the summation transitions labelled with action a from state s1 to states s
′ which do not belong
3The case where Λ = a is equivalent.
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to a path between state s1 and states in S1, where S1 = {s2} in this case. In addition, equation
A.17 denotes the identity case for µG(s
′, , {s2}), s′ = s2 and  denotes an empty sequence of
actions.
Based on the extension of the function µG for a PLTS A to sequences of actions in E∗, weak
bisimulation for PLTS models is then defined through an equivalence relationship R ⊆ Sˆ × Sˆ
such that ∀(s, t) ∈ R, ∀C ∈ SˆC and ∀a ∈ Eˆ [BH97]:
µˆG(s, τ
∗ a τ∗, C) = µˆG(t, τ∗ a τ∗, C). (A.21)
µˆG(s, τ
∗, C) = µˆG(t, τ∗, C). (A.22)
The first condition determines that two states s and t are weakly bisimilar if the sum of the
probability over all the paths over a sequence of zero or more internal actions followed by a
visible action a and a sequence of zero or more internal actions between them and states in the
equivalence class C is the same. Note that the paths between state s and states in C may not
have the same length as the corresponding paths between state t and C. On the other hand,
the second condition ensures that that two states s and t are weakly bisimilar if the sum of the
probability over all the paths over a sequence of zero or more internal actions between them and
states in the equivalence class C is the same. Formally, two PLTS models A1 and A2 are weakly
bisimilar iff there is a weak bisimulation R on Aˆ such that (q1, q2) ∈ R.
0 1 2 3
〈1.0〉 a
〈0.6〉 τ
〈0.4〉 τ
〈1.0〉 b
(a) PLTS A1
0’ 1’ 3’
〈1.0〉 a 〈1.0〉 b
(b) PLTS A2
Figure A.3.: Examples of PLTS Models for Weak Bisimulation
Consider the example PLTS models A1 and A2 in Figure A.3 and their disjoint union Aˆ in Fig-
ure A.4. We specify the equivalence relationshipR12 between A1 and A2 : {(0, 0′), (1, 1′), (3, 3′)}.
The corresponding set of equivalence classes SˆC is defined as { {0, 0′}, {1, 1′}, {3, 3′} }. Using
the weak bisimulation definition in equation A.21, we verify below the equivalence relationship
R12 is a weak bisimulation.
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0ˆ
0 1 2 3
0’ 1’ 3’
〈0.5〉 τ
〈0.5〉 τ
〈1.0〉 a
〈0.6〉 τ
〈0.4〉 τ
〈1.0〉 b
〈1.0〉 a 〈1.0〉 b
Figure A.4.: Disjoint Union PLTS Aˆ for Weak Bisimulation Between PLTS Models A1 and A2
We start by considering the case where (s, t) = (0, 0′) and C = {1, 1′} for the action label a:
µˆG(0, τ
∗ a τ∗, {1, 1′}) = µˆG(0′, τ∗ a τ∗, {1, 1′}). (A.23)
Given that there is a single path between states 0 and 1 as well as between states 0′ and 1′ we
derive the following from the expansion rule A.19:
µˆG(0, , 0) . µˆG(0, a, {1, 1′}) = µˆG(0′, , 0′) . µˆG(0′, τ∗ a τ∗, {1, 1′}). (A.24)
By applying rule A.17 to µˆG(0, , 0) and µˆG(0
′, , 0′) as well as the expansion rule A.7 when µG
is applied to a set of states, we obtain
1 .
(
µˆG(0, a, 1) + µˆG(0, a, 1
′)
)
= 1 .
(
µˆG(0
′, a, 1) + µˆG(0′, a, 1′)
)
. (A.25)
Given that the transitions µˆG(0, a, 1
′) and µˆG(0′, a, 1) do not exist in ∆ˆ, we derive
µˆG(0, a, 1) + 0 = 0 + µˆG(0
′, a, 1′). (A.26)
By replacing µˆG(0, a, 1) by µ1G(0, a, 1) and µˆG(0
′, a, 1′) by µ2G(0′, a, 1′) we confirm that the
condition for weak bisimulation is verified for this case:
1 = 1 (A.27)
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Consider now the case where (s, t) = (1, 1′) and C = {3, 3′} for the action label b:
µˆG(1, τ
∗ b τ∗, {3, 3′}) = µˆG(1′, τ∗ b τ∗, {3, 3′}). (A.28)
While there is only one transition in the path between states 1′ and 3′ in Aˆ, the paths between
states 1 and 3 include transitions through intermediate state 2. Therefore, the general condition
A.21 for weak bisimulation is mapped to:
µˆG(1, τ b, {3, 3′}) = µˆG(1′, b, {3, 3′}). (A.29)
Using the expansion rule A.19 on µˆG(1, τ b, {3, 3′}) we obtain:
∑
s∈Sˆ
µˆG(1, τ, s) . µˆG(s, b, {3, 3′}) = µˆG(1′, b, {3, 3′}). (A.30)
Given that all the transitions from state 1 only have state 2 as the destination state, then for
all states s ∈ Sˆ \ {2}, µˆG(1, τ, s) . µˆG(s, b, {3, 3′}) = 0 as µˆG(1, τ, s) = 0. As only the transition
between states 1 and 2 has a probability greater than 0, we obtain the following by also applying
the rule A.7 when µG is applied to a set of states:
µˆG(1, τ, 2) .
(
µˆG(2, b, 3) + µˆG(2, b, 3
′)
)
= µˆG(1
′, b, 3) + µˆG(1′, b, 3′). (A.31)
By replacing µˆG by the corresponding cumulative probability functions from A1 and A2 we
derive
µ1G(1, τ, 2) .
(
µ1G(2, b, 3) + 0
)
= 0 + µ2G(1
′, b, 3′). (A.32)
and confirm that the condition for weak bisimulation is also verified for this case:
(0.5 + 0.5) . 1 = 1 (A.33)
The equivalence relationshipR12 verifies the conditions for weak bisimulation defined by equa-
tion A.21 and includes the initial states 0 and 0′ of A1 and A2, respectively. As a consequence,
the PLTS models A1 and A2 are weakly bisimilar.
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A.3. Behaviour Equivalences for Probabilistic Component
Automata
After reviewing the definitions of strong and weak bisimulations for LTS [Mil89] and PLTS
[BH97] models, in this Section we extend these notions of behaviour equivalence to define the
conditions for strong and weak bisimulation for PCA models. We start by recalling the definition
of a PCA model. A PCA is a tuple 〈S, q, E ,∆, µ〉, where
• S is a set of states;
• q ∈ S is the initial state;
• E is a set of action labels;
– E = E in ∪ E loc ∪ Efail;
– E in is the set of input action labels;
– E loc = E int ∪ Eout is the set of locally controlled action labels, where
∗ Eout is the set the of output action labels;
∗ E int is the set of internal action labels;
– Efail = Efail−in ∪ Efail−out ∪ Efail−int, where
∗ Efail−in is the set of input failure actions;
∗ Efail−out is the set of output failure actions;
∗ Efail−int is the set of internal failure actions;
• ∆ ⊆ S × E × S is the set of transitions;
• µ : ∆→ [0, 1] is a function that assigns a probability to each transition in ∆.
While in a PLTS model there is no explicit type for action labels and internal (non-observable)
actions are denoted by a special label τ , in PCA internal actions are explicitly distinguished from
visible actions (input and output). Therefore, internal behaviour is characterised by internal
actions. Additionally, locally controlled actions (internal and output) follow the same proba-
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bilistic semantics as in PLTS, i.e. the sum of the probabilities of all locally controlled actions
from a given state s is 1:
∀s ∈ S,
( ∑
(s,a,s′) ∈ ∆
a ∈ Eloc
µ(s, a, s′)
)
= 1. (A.34)
On the other hand, input actions follow the semantics of reactive systems, i.e. the sum of
probabilities of transitions labelled with a given input action from a given state is one, since the
choice over input actions is performed by another PCA model:
∀s ∈ S,∀a ∈ E in,
( ∑
(s,a,s′) ∈ ∆
µ(s, a, s′)
)
= 1. (A.35)
Note that the previous definition of function µG for PLTS models can be used to calculate the
probability of paths in PCA models without having to resolve the choices over input actions, as
long as those paths do not include more than one input action. We describe how the choices
over input actions are resolved when discussing weak bisimulation in relation to composite
models. Although failure behaviour is modelled using separate failure actions, input failure
actions follow the semantics of normal input actions, while output and internal failure actions
follow the semantics of locally controlled actions. As a result, failure actions do not require
special cases.
Similarly to LTS and PLTS models, the notions of bisimulation for PCA models are defined
through an equivalence relationshipR on a disjoint union of two models. Given two PCA models
A1 = 〈S1, q1, E1,∆1, µ1〉 and A2 = 〈S2, q2, E2,∆2, µ2〉 we define their disjoint union PCA Model
Aˆ = 〈Sˆ, qˆ, Eˆ , ∆ˆ, µˆ〉, where:
• Sˆ = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ {qˆ}, such that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and qˆ /∈ S1 ∪ S2;
• Eˆ = E1 ∪ E2 ∪ {τ};
• ∆ˆ = ∆1 ∪∆2 ∪ {(qˆ, τ, q1), (qˆ, τ, q2)};
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• µˆ : ∆ˆ→ [0, 1]
∀(s, a, s′) ∈ ∆ˆ, µˆ(s, a, s′) =

0.5 if(s, a, s′) = (qˆ, τ, q1)
0.5 if(s, a, s′) = (qˆ, τ, q2)
µ1(s, a, s
′) if(s, a, s′) ∈ ∆1
µ2(s, a, s
′) if(s, a, s′) ∈ ∆2
A.3.1. Strong Bisimulation
Two PCA A1 and A2 are strongly bisimilar, depicted by A1 ∼ A2, if every step performed by A1
is simulated by A2, and vice versa, in the same order and with the same probability. Note that
a single step is associated with both externally visible and internal step, hence the conditions
for strong bisimulation for PLTS can also be applied to PCA as no distinction is needed due to
the introduction of action types. A strong bisimulation for PCA models is then defined using
an equivalence relationship R ⊆ Sˆ × Sˆ such that ∀(s, t) ∈ R: ∀C ∈ SˆC and ∀a ∈ Eˆ :
µˆG(s, a, C) = µˆG(t, a, C). (A.36)
Equivalently to the case of PLTS models, two PCA models are strongly bisimilar iff there is a
strong bisimulation R on Aˆ such that (q1, q2) ∈ R. In the following paragraphs we will illustrate
the application of bisimulation rules to two example PCA models.
0 1 2 3
〈0.7〉 ?a
〈0.3〉 ?a
〈1.0〉 x 〈1.0〉 !b
(a) PCA A1
0’ 1’ 2’ 3’
〈1.0〉 ?a 〈1.0〉 x
〈0.6〉 !b
〈0.5〉 !b
(b) PCA A2
Figure A.5.: Examples of PCA Models for Strong Bisimulation
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Consider the example PCA models A1 and A2 in Figure A.5 and their disjoint union Aˆ in Fig-
ure A.8. We specify the equivalence relationshipR12 betweenA1 andA2 : {(0, 0′), (1, 1′), (2, 2′), (3, 3′)}.
The corresponding set of equivalence classes SˆC is defined as {{0, 0′}, {1, 1′}, {2, 2′}, {3, 3′}}.
Using the strong bisimulation definition in equation A.36, we verify below the equivalence rela-
tionship R12 is a strong bisimulation.
0ˆ
0 1 2 3
0’ 1’ 2’ 3’
〈0.5〉 τ
〈0.5〉 τ
〈0.7〉 ?a
〈0.3〉 ?a
〈1.0〉 x 〈1.0〉 !b
〈1.0〉 ?a 〈1.0〉 x
〈0.6〉 !b
〈0.4〉 !b
Figure A.6.: Disjoint Union PCA Aˆ for Strong Bisimulation Between PCA Models A1 and A2
We start with the case where (s, t) = (0, 0′) and C = {0, 0′} for the action label a:
µˆG(0, a, {0, 0′}) = µˆG(0′, a, {0, 0′}). (A.37)
By applying the expansion rule A.7 when µG is applied to a set of states, we obtain
µˆ(0, a, 0) + µˆ(0, a, 0′) = µˆ(0′, a, 0) + µˆ(0′, a, 0′). (A.38)
Given that the transitions (0, a, 0), (0, a, 0′), (0′, a, 0) and (0′, a, 0′) do not exist in ∆ˆ, we derive
µˆ(0, a, 0) = µˆ(0, a, 0′) = µˆ(0′, a, 0) = µˆ(0′, a, 0′) = 0, (A.39)
and we conclude that the condition for strong bisimulation is verified as follows for the current
case
µˆ(0, a, 0) + µˆ(0, a, 0′) = µˆ(0′, a, 0) + µˆ(0′, a, 0′) ⇐⇒ 0 + 0 = 0 + 0 (A.40)
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We omit the cases where (s, t) = (1, 1′) and C = {1, 1′} as well as (s, t) = (1, 1′) and C = {0, 0′}
for the action label a as these are equivalent the previous case since there are no transitions
between the bisimilar states and the states in the equivalence classes.
Consider now the case where (s, t) = (0, 0′) and C = {1, 1′} for the action label a:
µˆG(0, a, {1, 1′}) = µˆG(0′, a, {1, 1′}). (A.41)
By applying the expansion rule A.7 when µG is applied to a set of states, we obtain
µˆG(0, a, 1) + µˆG(0, a, 1
′) = µˆG(0′, a, 1) + µˆG(0′, a, 1′). (A.42)
Given that the transitions µˆG(0, a, 1
′) and µˆG(0′, a, 1) do not exist in ∆ˆ, we derive
µˆG(0, a, 1) + 0 = 0 + µˆG(0
′, a, 1′). (A.43)
By replacing µˆG(0, a, 1) by µ1G(0, a, 1) and µˆG(0
′, a, 1′) by µ2G(0′, a, 1′) we confirm that the
condition for strong bisimulation is also verified for this case:
0.7 + 0.3 = 1 (A.44)
We omit the following cases as their verification is analogous to the previous case:
• (s, t) = (1, 1′) and C = {2, 2′} for the action label x;
• (s, t) = (2, 2′) and C = {3, 3′} for the action label b.
The equivalence relationship R12 verifies the conditions for strong bisimulation defined by
equation A.36, includes the initial states 0 and 0′ of A1 and A2, respectively. As a consequence,
the PCA models A1 and A2 are strongly bisimilar.
A.3.2. Weak Bisimulation
While weak bisimulation for PLTS models is defined based on the probability of paths from
bisimilar states s and s′ which contain action a and may be preceded and/or followed by transi-
tions labelled with internal action τ , in PCA internal steps are labelled with internal actions, as
opposed to τ . As a result, weak bisimulation for PCA models is defined based on the probability
of paths from bisimilar states s and s′ which contain action a visible a and may be preceded
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and/or followed by transitions labelled with internal actions. We define the set of visible actions
Evisible as the union of input, output and failure actions: Evisible = E in ∪ Eout ∪ Efail. Based on
the extension of the function µG for a PCA A to sequences of actions in E∗, we define the notion
of weak bisimulation for PCA models through an equivalence relationship R ⊆ Sˆ × Sˆ such that
∀(s, t) ∈ R, ∀C ∈ SˆC and ∀a ∈ Eˆvisible:
µˆG(s, τ
∗ a τ∗, C) = µˆG(t, τ∗ a τ∗, C), (A.45)
µˆG(s, τ
∗, C) = µˆG(t, τ∗, C),where τ ∈ Eˆ int. (A.46)
This condition determines that two states s and t are weakly bisimilar if the sum of the proba-
bility across all the paths over a sequence of zero or more internal actions followed by a visible
action a and a sequence of zero or more internal actions between them, and states in the equiv-
alence class C is the same. Note that the paths between state s and states in C may not have
the same length as the corresponding paths between state t and C. Formally, two PLTS models
A1 and A2 are weakly bisimilar iff there is a weak bisimulation R on Aˆ such that (q1, q2) ∈ R.
0 1 2 3
〈1.0〉 ?a 〈1.0〉 x
〈0.6〉 !b
〈0.4〉 !b
(a) PCA A1
0’ 2’ 3’
〈1.0〉 ?a
〈0.6〉 !b
〈0.4〉 !b
(b) PCA A2
Figure A.7.: Examples of PCA Models for Weak Bisimulation
Consider the example PCA models A1 and A2 in Figure A.7 and their disjoint union Aˆ in Fig-
ure A.8. We specify the equivalence relationshipR12 between A1 and A2 : {(0, 0′), (1, 1′), (3, 3′)}.
The corresponding set of equivalence classes SˆC is defined as { {0, 0′}, {1, 1′}, {3, 3′} }. Using
the weak bisimulation definition in equation A.45, we verify below the equivalence relationship
R12 is a weak bisimulation.
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0ˆ
0 1 2 3
0’ 1’ 3’
〈0.5〉 τ
〈0.5〉 τ
〈1.0〉 ?a 〈1.0〉 x
〈0.6〉 !b
〈0.4〉 !b
〈1.0〉 ?a
〈0.6〉 !b
〈0.4〉 !b
Figure A.8.: Disjoint Union PCA Aˆ for Weak Bisimulation Between PCA Models A1 and A2
We start by considering the case where (s, t) = (0, 0′) and C = {1, 1′} for the input action a:
µˆG(0, τ
∗ ?a τ∗, {1, 1′}) = µˆG(0′, τ∗ ?a τ∗, {1, 1′}). (A.47)
Given that there is a single path between states 0 and 1 as well as between states 0′ and 1′ we
derive the following from the expansion rule A.19:
µˆG(0, , 0) . µˆG(0, ?a, {1, 1′}) = µˆG(0′, , 0′) . µˆG(0′, τ∗ ?a τ∗, {1, 1′}). (A.48)
By applying rule A.17 to µˆG(0, , 0) and µˆG(0
′, , 0′) as well as the expansion rule A.7 when µG
is applied to a set of states, we obtain
1 .
(
µˆG(0, ?a, 1) + µˆG(0, ?a, 1
′)
)
= 1 .
(
µˆG(0
′, a, 1) + µˆG(0′, a, 1′)
)
. (A.49)
Given that the transitions µˆG(0, ?a, 1
′) and µˆG(0′, ?a, 1) do not exist in ∆ˆ, we derive
µˆG(0, ?a, 1) + 0 = 0 + µˆG(0
′, ?a, 1′). (A.50)
By replacing µˆG(0, ?a, 1) by µ1G(0, ?a, 1) and µˆG(0
′, ?a, 1′) by µ2G(0′, ?a, 1′) we confirm that the
condition for weak bisimulation is verified for this case:
1 = 1 (A.51)
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Consider now the case where (s, t) = (1, 1′) and C = {3, 3′} for the output action !b:
µˆG(1, τ
∗ !b τ∗, {3, 3′}) = µˆG(1′, τ∗ !b τ∗, {3, 3′}). (A.52)
While there is only one transition in the path between states 1′ and 3′ in Aˆ, the paths between
states 1 and 3 include transitions through intermediate state 2. Therefore, the general condition
A.21 for weak bisimulation is mapped to:
µˆG(1, τ !b, {3, 3′}) = µˆG(1′, !b, {3, 3′}). (A.53)
Using the expansion rule A.19 on µˆG(1, τ !b, {3, 3′}) we obtain:
∑
s∈Sˆ
µˆG(1, τ, s) . µˆG(s, !b, {3, 3′}) = µˆG(1′, !b, {3, 3′}). (A.54)
Given that there is only a single transition from state 1 to state 2, then for all states s ∈ Sˆ \{2},
µˆG(1, τ, s) . µˆG(s, !b, {3, 3′}) = 0 as µˆG(1, τ, s) = 0. As only the transition between states 1 and
2 has a probability greater than 0, we obtain the following by also applying the rule A.7 when
µG is applied to a set of states:
µˆG(1, τ, 2) .
(
µˆG(2, !b, 3) + µˆG(2, !b, 3
′)
)
= µˆG(1
′, !b, 3) + µˆG(1′, !b, 3′). (A.55)
By replacing µˆG by the corresponding cumulative probability functions from A1 and A2 we
derive
µ1G(1, τ, 2) .
(
µ1G(2, !b, 3) + 0
)
= 0 + µ2G(1
′, !b, 3′). (A.56)
and confirm that the condition for weak bisimulation is also verified for this case:
1 . (0.6 + 0.4) = (0.6 + 0.4) (A.57)
The equivalence relationshipR12 verifies the conditions for weak bisimulation defined by equa-
tion A.45 and includes the initial states 0 and 0′ of A1 and A2, respectively. As a consequence,
the PCA models A1 and A2 are weakly bisimilar.
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A.4. Hiding Operator
In the previous Section we defined notions of strong and weak bisimulation for PCA models,
given any two models A1 and A2. In this Section we show that the reduced model A2 produced
by the hiding operator when applied to an original model A1 is weakly bisimilar to A1. We start
by reviewing the steps performed by the reduction algorithm when producing the model A2.
The hiding operator is implemented using the reduction algorithm presented in Chapter 4; the
input model A1 is traversed and the incoming/outgoing transitions of each state s are analysed
according to the two main cases considered by the algorithm to determine which ones can be
deleted and whether probabilities can be propagated to subsequent or prior transitions. We
formalise each case as a transformation Ti that is applied to any state of an input PCA A1 and
produces a reduced PCA A2 along with an equivalence relationship RTi . We then show that
the models A1 and A2 are weakly bisimilar by showing that the equivalence relationship RTi
is a weak bisimulation that contains the initial states of A1 and A2. Moreover, the reduction
algorithm can be seen as a sequence of transformations RTi applied to the original model A1.
Therefore, we show that the model A2 produced of the reduction algorithm is weakly bisimilar
to the original model A1 by showing that the relationships RTi are transitive, i.e. any sequence
of transformations produces a weakly bisimilar model.
A.4.1. Preliminaries
The different cases considered by the reduction algorithm take as input a PCA A1 = 〈S1, q1, E1,
∆1, µ1〉, a sub-set of internal actions ER1 ⊆ E int1 and a state ssrc ∈ S1. Each case is modelled
as a transformation Ti which takes as input the tuple 〈A1, ER1 , ssrc〉 and produces a (reduced)
PCA A2 = 〈S2, q2, E2,∆2, µ2〉 and a bisimulation that establishes and equivalence relationship
RTi between states in S1 and S2. In the next Sections we discuss how each transformation
constructs the PCA A2 from an input PCA A1 and the corresponding equivalence relationship
RTi . We then show that RTi is a weak bisimulation.
A.4.2. Transformation T1
Transformation T1 represents the first case of the reduction algorithm which analyses a single
transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) ∈ ∆1 labelled with action ar ∈ ER1 and determines if the transition is
removed when constructing A2 from A1. The transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) is removed if the following
conditions hold:
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• the transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) is the only incoming transition to state sdst and the outgoing
transitions of state sdst are not labelled with input/output actions: #( ρ(s
′) ) = 1 ∧
∆e1(sdst) ∩ E in1 = ∅ ∧ ∆e1(sdst) ∩ Eout1 = ∅;
• the transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) is both the only incoming transition to state sdst and the only
outgoing transition of state ssrc which implies µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst) = 1;
When the transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) is deleted, the PCA A2 and the equivalence relationshipRT1
are defined as follows. For all transitions (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆1, except the transition {(ssrc, ar, sdst)},
if the source state s is not the destination state sdst of the deleted transition, the following steps
as performed:
• state s is mapped to a state t and (s, t) is added to RT1 ;
• state s′ is mapped to a state t′ and (s′, t′) is added to RT1 ;
• transition (t, a, t′) is added to ∆2 and its probability is defined as
µ2(t, a, t
′) = µ1(s, a, s′). (A.58)
When the transition source state s is the destination state sdst, the probability of the deleted
transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) is propagated to the outgoing transitions of sdst
(
(sdst, a, s
′)
)
as follows:
• state ssrc is mapped to a state t and (ssrc, t) is added to RT1 ;
• state s′ is mapped to a state t′ and (s′, t′) is added to RT1 ;
• transition (t, a, t′) is added to ∆2 and its probability is defined as
µ2(t, a, t
′) = µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst) . µ1(sdst, a, s′). (A.59)
The state sdst is not mapped to any other state in S2 as this state is merged with state ssrc
when constructing the PCA model A2. As a result, for each state s ∈ S1 \ {sdst} there exists
one and only one state t ∈ S2 such that (s, t) ∈ RT1 :
[s]RT1 = {t} ∧ [t]RT1 = {s}. (A.60)
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Consequently, all equivalence classes C ∈ Sˆ /RT1 have two states {s, t}, where s ∈ S1 and t ∈ S2.
Finally, the set of action labels E2 is equal to E1 \ {ar} if (ssrc, ar, sdst) is the only transition in
A1 labelled with ar; and equal to E1 otherwise.
In order for RT1 to be a weak bisimulation on the disjoint union Aˆ of A1 and A2, the following
conditions have to hold (q1, q2) ∈ RT1 ∧ ∀(s, t) ∈ RT1 , ∀C ∈ SˆC , ∀a ∈ Eˆvisible:
µˆG(s, (a
int)∗ a (aint)∗, C) = µˆG(t, (aint)∗ a (aint)∗, C), (A.61)
µˆG(s, (a
int)∗, C) = µˆG(t, (aint)∗, C),where aint ∈ Eˆ int. (A.62)
If the transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) is not deleted, then A2 is strongly bisimilar to A1 and is therefore
also weakly bisimilar. When the transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) is deleted we consider the following two
cases to show that RT1 is a weak bisimulation. Although for simplicity we assume that for each
(s, t) ∈ RT1 , state s belongs to A1 and state t belongs to A2, the demonstration for the reciprocal
case is equivalent. Consequently, we will demonstrate that (q1, q2) ∈ RT1 ∧ ∀(s, t) ∈ RT1 ,
∀C ∈ SˆC , ∀a ∈ Eˆvisible:
µ1G(s, (a
int)∗ a (aint)∗, C) = µ2G(t, (aint)∗ a (aint)∗, C), (A.63)
µ1G(s, (a
int)∗ a (aint)∗, C) = µ2G(t, (aint)∗, C). (A.64)
Given that the equivalences C ∈ SˆC are of the form {s′, t′}, we further assume state s′ belongs
to A1 and state t
′ belongs to A2. The following condition is then derived from equations A.63
and A.64:
µ1G(s, (a
int)∗ a (aint)∗, {s′, t′}) = µ2G(t, (aint)∗ a (aint)∗, {s′, t′}), (A.65)
µ1G(s, (a
int)∗, {s′, t′}) = µ2G(t, (aint)∗, {s′, t′}) (A.66)
Using rule A.7, we expand the first equation as follows:
µ1G(s, (a
int)∗ a (aint)∗, s′) + µ1G(s, (aint)∗ a (aint)∗, s′), t′) (A.67)
= µ2G(t, (a
int)∗ a (aint)∗, s′) + µ2G(t, (aint)∗ a (aint)∗, t′). (A.68)
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As there are no transitions from state s to state t′ as well as from state t to state s′ in A1 and
A2, respectively, we obtain:
µ1G(s, (a
int)∗ a (aint)∗, s′) = µ2G(t, (aint)∗ a (aint)∗, t′), (A.69)
µ1G(s, (a
int)∗, s′) = µ2G(t, (aint)∗, t′). (A.70)
While the above conditions cover all possible sequences of internal actions as a prefix and
suffix of a visible action a, as well as sequences of internal actions, we consider the application
of condition A.69 to a particular sequence λ = aint1 . . . a
int
l1
a bint1 . . . b
int
l2
, where ∀l1i=1ai ∈ Eˆ int and
∀l2i=1bi ∈ Eˆ int. In order to verify the condition A.69, it needs to be validated for the following
cases:
• the transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) is not present in any path based on sequence λ between states
s and s′;
• the transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) is the first transition in the path based on sequence λ between
states s and s′, hence s = ssrc and ar = aint1 ;
• the transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) is present in the path based on sequence λ between states s
and s′, but it is not the last transition of the first and last part, thus ar 6= al1 and ar 6= bl2 ;
• the transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) is the last transition in the first part of the path based on
sequence λ between states s and s′, hence sl1 = ssrc and ar = aintl1 .
Case 1:
We first consider the case where the transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) is not included in any path between
states s and s′. As a result, the sequence λ is applied to both µ1G and µ2G:
µ1G(s, λ, s
′) = µ2G(t, λ, t′). (A.71)
Following rule A.19, we expand µ1G(s, λ, s
′) as follows:
µ1G(s, λ, s
′) =
∑
s1∈S1
µ1G(s, a
int
1 , s1) . µ1G(s1, λ
′, s′),where λ = aint1 λ
′. (A.72)
We derive the general expansion as follows. Consider l1 as the length of prefix sequence of
internal actions aint1 . . . a
int
l1
that precedes the visible action label a and l2 as the length of the
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sequence of internal actions bint1 . . . b
int
l2
that succeeds the visible action label a, the full expansion
of µ1G(s, λ, s
′) is given as follows:
µ1G(s, λ, s
′) =
∑
s1∈S1
(
µ1G(s, a
int
1 , s1) .
l1∏
i=2
( ∑
si∈S1
µ1G(si−1, ainti , si)
)
. (A.73)
( ∑
s′1∈S1
µ1G(sl1 , a, s
′
1) .
l2∏
i=2
( ∑
s′i∈S1
µ1G(s
′
i−1, b
int
i−1, s
′
i)
)
. µ1G(s
′
l2 , b
int
l2 , s
′)
))
As the transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) is not included in any path between states s and s
′, µ2G(t, λ, t′)
is similarly expanded as follows:
µ2G(t, λ, t
′) =
∑
t1∈S2
(
µ2G(t, a
int
1 , t1) .
l1∏
i=2
( ∑
ti∈S2
µ2G(ti−1, ainti , ti)
)
. (A.74)
( ∑
t′1∈S2
µ2G(tl1 , a, t
′
1) .
l2∏
i=2
( ∑
t′i∈S2
µ2G(ti−1, binti−1, t
′
i)
)
. µ2G(t
′
l2 , b
int
l2 , t
′)
))
Given rule A.58, for each state si ∈ S1 in the paths with the sequence λ, there is a correspond-
ing state ti ∈ S2 such that (si, ti) ∈ RTi . Therefore, ∀l1−1i=1 µ1G(si, ainti , si+1) = µ2G(ti, ainti , ti+1).
Similarly, for each state s′i ∈ S1 in the paths with the sequence λ, there is a corresponding
state t′i ∈ S2 such that (s′i, t′i) ∈ RTi . Consequently, ∀l2i=2µ1G(s′i−1, binti−1, s′i) = µ2G(t′i−1, binti−1, t′i.
The sample principle applies to the transitions (s′l2 , b
int
l2
, s′) and (t′l2 , b
int
l2
, t′) as both (s′l2 , t
′
l2
) and
(s′, t′) belong to the equivalence relationship RT1 , thus µ1G(s, λ, s′) = µ2G(t, λ, t′) in this case.
Case 2:
We now consider the case where the deleted transition is the first in the sequence λ = aint1 . . . a
int
l1
a bint1′ . . . b
int
l2
,
hence s = ssrc and a
int
1 = ar. Therefore, we verify the following conditions
µ1G(s, λ, s
′) = µ2G(t, λ′, t′), where λ = ar λ′, (A.75)
as transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) has not been mapped to A2. We start by following rule A.19 to
expand µ1G(s, λ, s
′). Note that in order for transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) to be deleted it needs to
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be the only incoming transition to state sdst. As a result, state sdst is only reachable through
transition (ssrc, ar, sdst):
µ1G(s, λ, s
′) = µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst) . µ1G(sdst, λ′, s′). (A.76)
We further expand the above expression to
µ1G(s, λ, s
′) = µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst) .
( ∑
s2∈S1
µ1G(sdst, a
int
2 , s2) . µ1G(s2, λ
′′, s′)
)
,where λ = ar a
int
2 λ
′′,
(A.77)
which is equivalent to
µ1G(s, λ, s
′) =
( ∑
s2∈S1
µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst) . µ1G(sdst, a
int
2 , s2) . µ1G(s2, λ
′′, s′)
)
. (A.78)
On the other hand, µ2G(t, λ
′, t′) is expanded as follows:
µ2G(t, λ
′, t′) =
∑
t2∈S2
µ2G(t, a
int
2 , t2) . µ2G(t2, λ
′′, s′). (A.79)
Given rule A.59 for constructing the PCA A2 from A1 by applying transformation T1, ∀s2 ∈ S1
and ∀t2 ∈ S2 such that (s2, t2) ∈ RT1 , then
µ2G(t, a
int
2 , t2) = µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst) . µ1G(sdst, a
int
2 , s2). (A.80)
We have shown in the previous case that ∀s2 ∈ S1 and ∀t2 ∈ S2 such that (s2, t2) ∈ RT1 , then
µ1G(s2, λ
′′, s′) = µ2G(t2, λ′′, s′). (A.81)
Therefore, µ1G(s, λ, s
′) = µ2G(t, λ′, t′) when the deleted transition is the first in the sequence
λ = aint1 . . . a
int
l1
a aint1′ . . . a
int
l2
.
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Case 3:
We now consider the general case where the deleted transition is between states s and s′ but is
not the last transition in the sequence λ = aint1 . . . a
int
i−1 a
int
i a
int
i+1 . . . a
int
l1
a bint1′ . . . b
int
l2
. Therefore,
we verify the following conditions
µ1G(s, λ, s
′) = µ2G(t, λ′, t′), where λ′ = aint1 . . . a
int
i−1 a
int
i+1 . . . a
int
l1 a b
int
1′ . . . b
int
l2 . (A.82)
We first apply the expansion rule A.19 to µ1G(s, λ, s
′) and obtain
µ1G(s, λ, s
′) = µ1G(s, aint1 . . . a
int
i−1, si−1) . µ1G(si−1, a
int
i , si) . (A.83)
µ1G(si, a
int
i+1 . . . a
int
l1 a b
int
1′ . . . b
int
l2 , s
′),
where the deleted transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) = (si−1, ainti , si). Note that as we are only considering
paths that include the deleted transition, we do not need to consider paths through all possible
states si−1 ∈ S1 when applying the expansion rule to µ1G(s, λ, s′) as state si can only be reached
through the deleted transition, according the rules of transformation T1. We further expand
µ1G(s, λ, s
′) into
µ1G(s, λ, s
′) = µ1G(s, aint1 . . . a
int
i−1, si−1) . µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst) . (A.84)( ∑
si+1∈S1
µ1G(si, ai+1, si+1) . µ1G(si+1, a
int
i+2 . . . a
int
l1 a b
int
1′ . . . b
int
l2 , s
′)
)
,
which is equivalent to
µ1G(s, a
int
1 . . . a
int
i−1, si−1) .
( ∑
si+1∈S1
µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst) . (A.85)
µ1G(si, a
int
i+1, si+1) . µ1G(si+1, a
int
i+2 . . . a
int
l1 a b
int
1′ . . . b
int
l2 , s
′)
)
.
By applying the same steps to µ2G(t, λ
′, t′) we obtain:
µ2G(t, a
int
1 . . . a
int
i−1, ti−1) .
( ∑
ti+1∈S1
µ2G(ti−1, ainti+1, ti+1) . µ2G(ti+1, a
int
i+2 . . . a
int
l1 a b
int
1′ . . . b
int
l2 , t
′)
)
.
(A.86)
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We have shown in the previous cases that µ1G(s, a
int
1 . . . a
int
i−1, si−1) = µ2G(t, a
int
1 . . . a
int
i−1, ti−1)
and µ1G(si+1, a
int
i+2 . . . a
int
l1
a bint1′ . . . b
int
l2
, s′) = µ2G(ti+1, ainti+2 . . . a
int
l1
a bint1′ . . . b
int
l2
, t′). Based on the
rules of transformation T1, we can derive that (si−1, ti−1) ∈ RT1 ∧ (si+1, ti+1) ∈ RT1 and
µ2G(ti−1, ainti+1, ti+1) = µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst) . µ1G(si, a
int
i+1, si+1) . (A.87)
Case 4:
The case where the deleted transition is in the second part of the sequence λ after visible action
a is equivalent to the case we just discussed. Similarly, the case where the deleted transition
(ssrc, ar, sdst) is the last transition in the first path that precedes the visible action a in the
sequence λ = aint1 . . . a
int
l1−1 a
int
l1
a bint1′ . . . b
int
l2
is also equivalent to the previous case as the visible
action needs to be an output action for the transition ssrc, ar, sdst and its probability to be
propagated.
Furthermore, the verification of condition A.70 (µ1G(s, (a
int)∗, s′) = µ2G(t, (aint)∗, t′)) is simi-
lar to the verification steps applied in the previous paragraphs to the prefix sequence aintl1−1 a
int
l1
.
We have therefore shown that transformation T1 produces a weakly bisimilar model as defined
by the equivalence relationship RT1 .
Example
We illustrate in the next paragraphs the application of the above steps to the example PCA mod-
els A1 and A2 in Figure A.9 and their disjoint union Aˆ in Figure A.10. We specify the equivalence
relationship R12 between A1 and A2 : {(0, 0′), (1, 1′), (3, 3′), (4, 4′), (E,E′)}. The corresponding
set of equivalence classes SˆC is defined as { {0, 0′}, {1, 1′}, {3, 3′}, {4, 4′}, {E,E′} }. Using the
weak bisimulation definition in equation A.45, we verify below the equivalence relationship R12
is a weak bisimulation.
We start by considering the case where (s, t) = (0, 0′) and C = {1, 1′} for the input action a:
µˆG(0, τ
∗ ?a τ∗, {1, 1′}) = µˆG(0′, τ∗ ?a τ∗, {1, 1′}). (A.88)
By applying the expansion rules A.7, A.17 and A.19 we obtain
µˆG(0, ?a, 1) = µˆG(0
′, ?a, 1′). (A.89)
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0 1
2
3 4
E
〈1.0〉 ?a
〈0.7〉 x
〈0.3〉 y
〈1.0〉 z
〈0.95〉 !b
〈0.05〉 ∼!b
(a) PCA A1
0’ 1’ 3’ 4’
E’
〈1.0〉 ?a
〈0.7〉 z
〈0.3〉 y
〈0.95〉 !b
〈0.05〉 ∼!b
(b) PCA A2
Figure A.9.: Examples of PCA Models for Weak Bisimulation - Transformation T1
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By replacing µˆG(0, ?a, 1) by µ1G(0, ?a, 1) and µˆG(0
′, ?a, 1′) by µ2G(0′, ?a, 1′) we confirm that the
condition for weak bisimulation is verified for this case:
1 = 1 (A.90)
The case where(s, t) = (0, 0′) and C = {3, 3′} for the input action ?a can be verified as follows
by applying the expansion rules A.7, A.17 and A.19 to the condition A.45:
µ1G(0, ?a, 1) . µ1G(1, τ
∗, 3) = µ2G(0′, ?a, 1′) . µ2G(1′, τ∗, 3′). (A.91)
We further expand the above expressions and obtain
µ1G(0, ?a, 1) .
(
µ1G(1, τ, 2) . µ1G(2, τ, 3) + µ1G(1, τ, 3)
)
= µ2G(0
′, ?a, 1′) . µ2G(1′, τ, 3′). (A.92)
By replacing µ1G and µ2G by the probabilities of the corresponding transitions we verify the
condition A.91:
1 . (0.7 . 1 + 0.3) = 1 . (0.7 + 0.3) . (A.93)
We omit the illustration for the case where (s, t) = (1, 1′) and C = {4, 4′} for the output action
!b as it is can be verified using the same steps as for the case where (s, t) = (0, 0′) and C = {1, 1′}
for the input action a. We analyse instead the case where (s, t) = (1, 1′) and C = {4, 4′} for the
output action !b:
µˆG(1, τ
∗ !b τ∗, {4, 4′}) = µˆG(1′, τ∗ !b τ∗, {4, 4′}). (A.94)
Given that the paths from state 1 to 4 and from state 1′ to 4′ do not include an internal transition
after transitions labelled with output action !b, we simplify the previous conditions to
µˆG(1, τ
∗ !b, {4, 4′}) = µˆG(1′, τ∗ !b, {4, 4′}). (A.95)
Using the expansion rule A.19 on µˆG(1, τ !b, {3, 3′}) we obtain:
µˆG(1, τ
∗, 3) . µˆG(3, !b, {4, 4′}) = µˆG(1′, τ∗, 3′) . µˆG(3′, !b, {4, 4′}). (A.96)
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By replacing µˆG by the corresponding cumulative probability functions from A1 and A2 and
further expanding the sequences prefix τ∗ we derive
(
µ1G(1, τ, 2) . µ1G(2, τ, 3) + µ1G(1, τ, 3)
)
. µ1G(3, !b, {4, 4′}) = µ2G(1′, τ, 3′) . µ2G(3′, !b, {4, 4′}).
(A.97)
and confirm that the condition A.103 for weak bisimulation is also verified for this case:
(0.7 . 1 + 0.3) . 0.95 = (0.7 + 0.3) . 0.95 . (A.98)
The verification of paths involving output action ∼! b are verified in the same way as the
paths for output b. Therefore, the equivalence relationship R12 verifies the conditions for weak
bisimulation defined by equation A.45 and includes the initial states 0 and 0′ of A1 and A2,
respectively. As a consequence, the PCA models A1 and A2 are weakly bisimilar.
0ˆ
0 1
2
3 4
E
0’ 1’ 3’ 4’
E’
〈0.5〉 τ
〈0.5〉 τ
〈1.0〉 ?a
〈0.7〉 x
〈0.3〉 y
〈1.0〉 z
〈0.95〉 !b
〈0.05〉 ∼!b
〈1.0〉 ?a
〈0.7〉 z
〈0.3〉 y
〈0.95〉 !b
〈0.05〉 ∼!b
Figure A.10.: Disjoint Union PCA Aˆ for Weak Bisimulation Between PCA Models A1 and A2 -
Transformation T1
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A.4.3. Transformation T2
In this Section we show that the reduced models produced by transformation T2 and the original
model are also weakly bisimilar. While transformation T1 is applied to a single outgoing transi-
tion of a given state, transformation T2 denotes the second main case of the reduction algorithm
and considers multiple incoming transitions (ssrc, ar, sdst) ∈ ∆1 to a given state sdst labelled
with actions ar ∈ ER1 . When determining if these transitions are removed when constructing A2
from A1, transformation T2 considers the following two sub-cases:
• all the incoming transitions to state sdst originate from the same source state ssrc: ρs1(sdst) =
{ssrc};
• the incoming transitions to state sdst originate from different source states ssrc.
In the latter case, the incoming transitions to state sdst are grouped based on their source state
and transformation T2 is applied separately to each group of transitions.
Same source state ssrc
The set of transitions (ssrc, ar, sdst) from the same source state ssrc are removed iff all the
following conditions hold:
• the outgoing transitions of state sdst are not labelled with input actions: ∆e1(sdst) ∩ E in1 =
∅;
• either state ssrc has outgoing transitions labelled with output actions or state sdst, not
both: ∆e(s) ∩ Eout = ∅ ∨ ∆e(s′) ∩ Eout = ∅.
The first condition ensures that the aggregated probability
∑
(ssrc,ar,sdst)∈∆1 µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst) is
only propagated forward to the successors transitions of state sdst if these are not labeled with
input actions in order to preserve their reactive semantics. The second condition guarantees
that the set of outgoing transitions labelled with output actions is kept for each state. Note that
this condition is necessary for preserving the compositional properties of the reduced model, as
we show later in Section A.5. We describe in the next paragraphs how the PCA A2 and the
equivalence relationship RT2 are defined by the transformation T2.
For all transitions (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆1, except the transitions {(ssrc, ar, sdst)}, if the source state s
is not the destination state sdst of the deleted transition, the following steps are performed:
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• state s is mapped to a state t and (s, t) is added to RT2 ;
• state s′ is mapped to a state t′ and (s′, t′) is added to RT2 ;
• transition (t, a, t′) is added to ∆2 and its probability is defined as
µ2(t, a, t
′) = µ1(s, a, s′) (A.99)
When case the transition source state s is the destination state sdst the probability of the deleted
transitions (ssrc, ar, sdst) is propagated to the outgoing transitions of sdst as follows:
• state ssrc is mapped to a state t and (ssrc, t) is added to RT2 ;
• state s′ is mapped to a state t′ and (s′, t′) is added to RT2 ;
• transition (t, a, t′) is added to ∆2 and its probability is defined as
µ2(t, a, t
′) =
( ∑
(ssrc,ar,sdst)∈∆1
µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst)
)
. µ1(sdst, a, s
′). (A.100)
Note that rule A.100 is similar to the rule A.59 applied for forward propagation of a single
transition, namely:
µ2(t, a, t
′) = µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst) . µ1(sdst, a, s′) .
Moreover, the expression
∑
(ssrc,ar,sdst)∈∆1 µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst) can be replaced by µ1G(ssrc, ar, sdst)
using rule A.5 over a set of transitions labelled with internal actions in the set ER1 ⊆ E int1 .
This case for transformation T2 is analogous to the ones described for transformation T1. As
a result, the same steps used for showing that the equivalence relationship RT1 produced by
transformation T1 is a weak bisimulation can be applied to show that the equivalence relationship
RT2 produced by transformation T2 is a weak bisimulation for the case where deleted transitions
all come from the same source state ssrc. For example, in rule A.80 and A.87 defined for T1, we
substitute µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst) by µ1G(ssrc, ar, sdst) as follows:
µ2G(t, a
int
2 , t2) = µ1G(ssrc, ar, sdst) . µ1G(sdst, a
int
2 , s2), (A.101)
µ2G(ti−1, ainti+1, ti+1) = µ1G(ssrc, ar, sdst) . µ1G(si, a
int
i+1, si+1) . (A.102)
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For paths that do not include the delete transition(s), the equations A.74 and A.75 defined for
the general expansion of µ1G(s, λ, s
′) and µ2G(t, λ, t′) also apply to the case of transformation
T2 as rule A.58 is the same as A.99.
0’ 1’ 3’ 4’
E’
〈1.0〉 ?a
〈0.7〉 z
〈0.3〉 y
〈0.95〉 !b
〈0.05〉 ∼ !b
(a) PCA A1
0” 1” 4”
E”
〈1.0〉 ?a 〈0.95〉 !b
〈0.05〉 ∼!b
(b) PCA A2
Figure A.11.: Examples of PCA Models for Weak Bisimulation - Transformation T2 : Same
Source State
We illustrate in the next paragraphs the application of transformation T2 to the example PCA
models A1 and A2 in Figure A.11 and their disjoint union Aˆ in Figure A.12. We specify the
equivalence relationshipR12 between A1 and A2 : {(0′, 0′′), (1′, 1′′), (4′, 4′′), (E′, E′′)}. The corre-
sponding set of equivalence classes SˆC is defined as { {0′, 0′′}, {1′, 1′′}, {4′, 4′′}, {E′, E′′} }. Using
the weak bisimulation definition in equation A.45, we verify below the equivalence relationship
R12 is a weak bisimulation.
We omit the illustration for the case where (s, t) = (0′, 0′′) and C = {1′, 1′′} for the input
action ?a as it has been verified in the previous example. We analyse instead the case where
(s, t) = (1′, 1′′) and C = {4′, 4′′} for the output action !b:
µˆG(1
′, τ∗ !b τ∗, {4′, 4′′}) = µˆG(1′′, τ∗ !b τ∗, {4′, 4′′}). (A.103)
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0ˆ
0’ 1’ 3’ 4’
E’
0” 1” 4”
E”
〈0.5〉 τ
〈0.5〉 τ
〈1.0〉 ?a
〈0.7〉 z
〈0.3〉 y
〈0.95〉 !b
〈0.05〉 ∼ !b
〈1.0〉 ?a 〈0.95〉 !b
〈0.05〉 ∼!b
Figure A.12.: Disjoint Union PCA Aˆ for Weak Bisimulation Between PCA Models A1 and A2 -
Transformation T2: Same Source State
Given that the paths from state 1′ to 4′ and from state 1′′ to 4′′ do not include an internal
transition after transitions labelled with output action !b, we simplify the previous conditions to
µˆG(1
′, τ∗ !b, {4′, 4′′}) = µˆG(1′′, τ∗ !b, {4′, 4′′}). (A.104)
Using the expansion rule A.19 on µˆG(1
′, τ !b, {4′, 4′′}) we obtain:
µˆG(1
′, τ∗, 3′) . µˆG(3′, !b, {4′, 4′′}) = µˆG(1′′, τ∗, 1′′) . µˆG(1′′, !b, {4′, 4′′}). (A.105)
By replacing µˆG by the corresponding cumulative probability functions from A1 and A2 and
further expanding the sequences prefix τ∗ we derive
µ1G(1
′, τ, 3′) . µ1G(3′, !b, {4′, 4′′}) = µ2G(1′′, !b, {4′, 4′′}). (A.106)
and confirm that the condition A.103 for weak bisimulation is also verified for this case:
(0.7 + 0.3) . 0.95 = 0.95 . (A.107)
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The verification of paths involving output action ∼! b are verified in the same way as the
paths for output b. Therefore, the equivalence relationship R12 verifies the conditions for weak
bisimulation defined by equation A.45 and includes the initial states 0 and 0′ of A1 and A2,
respectively. As a consequence, the PCA models A1 and A2 are weakly bisimilar.
Multiple source states ssrc
We now consider the case where the set of incoming transitions to state sdst originate from differ-
ent states. We describe the application of transformation T2 to a set of transitions (ssrc, ar, sdst)
from a particular source state ssrc, which is equivalently applied to the other group of transitions.
The transitions (ssrc, ar, sdst) are removed if one of the following conditions hold:
• the predecessor transitions of state ssrc are not labelled with input actions and state ssrc
does not have other outgoing transitions to other states: ρe1(ssrc) ∩ E in1 = ∅ ∧ ∆s1(ssrc) =
{sdst};
• the sum of the probability of all the transitions (ssrc, ar, sdst) is equal to 1:∑
(ssrc,ar,sdst)∈∆1 µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst).
The first part of first condition ensures that the aggregated probability
∑
(ssrc,ar,sdst)∈∆1 µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst)
is only propagated backward to the predecessor transitions of state ssrc if these are not labeled
with input actions in order to preserve their reactive semantics. If there are other transitions
that can be chosen from state ssrc, the second part guarantees the choice between those and the
group of transitions (ssrc, ar, sdst) is not broken. We describe in the next paragraphs how the
PCA2 and the equivalence relationship RT2 are defined by the transformation T2.
For all transitions (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆1, except the transitions {(ssrc, ar, sdst)}, if the source state s
is not the destination state sdst of the deleted transition, the following steps as performed:
• state s is mapped to a state t and (s, t) is added to RT2 ;
• state s′ is mapped to a state t′ and (s′, t′) is added to RT2 ;
• transition (t, a, t′) is added to ∆2 and its probability is defined as
µ2(t, a, t
′) = µ1(s, a, s′) (A.108)
When the transition destination state s′ is the destination state ssrc, the probability of the
deleted transitions (ssrc, ar, sdst) is propagated to the predecessor transitions of ssrc as follows:
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• state s is mapped to a state t and (s, t) is added to RT2 ;
• state sdst is mapped to a state t′ and (sdst, t′) is added to RT2 ;
• transition (t, a, t′) is added to ∆2 and its probability is defined as
µ2(t, a, t
′) = µ1(s, a, ssrc) .
( ∑
(ssrc,ar,sdst)∈∆1
µ1(ssrc, ar, sdst)
)
. (A.109)
Similarly to the first case of transformation T2, the steps performed for paths that do not
include the delete transitions are also applied to the second case of transformation T2 as A.58
is the same as A.108.
We now consider the general case where the deleted transitions are between states s and s′
and verify the following conditions
µ1G(s, λ, s
′) = µ2G(t, λ′, t′), where λ′ = aint1 . . . a
int
i−1 a
int
i+1 . . . a
int
l1 a b
int
1′ . . . b
int
l2 . (A.110)
We first apply the expansion rule A.19 to µ1G(s, λ, s
′) and obtain
µ1G(s, λ, s
′) =
∑
si−1∈S1
µ1G(s, a
int
1 . . . a
int
i−1, si−1) . µ1G(si−1, a
int
i , si) . (A.111)
µ1G(si, a
int
i+1, si+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
deleted transitions
. µ1G(si+1, a
int
i+2 . . . a
int
l1 a b
int
1′ . . . b
int
l2 , s
′),
where the deleted transitions (ssrc, ar, sdst) = (si, a
int
i+1, si+1). Note that above equation only
includes the summation
∑
si−1∈S1 as we are considering all sub-paths that finish at the source
state ssrc. We do not consider a summation over all incoming states si as the transformation
T2 is applied separately to the incoming transitions of state si+1 based on their source state si.
Additionally, in order for transitions (si, a
int
i+1, si+1) to be deleted, all the transitions from state
si have si+1 as the destination state, i.e. the state si does not contain other outgoing transitions
apart from the deleted transitions. As as a result, according to rule A.109, the aggregated
probability of deleted transitions µ1G(si, a
int
i+1, si+1) is propagated backwards to transitions the
last transition (si−1, ainti , si) of all the incoming sub-paths to the source state si of deleted
transitions.
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Furthermore, by applying the same expansion to µ2G(t, λ
′, t′) we obtain
µ2G(t, λ, t
′) =
∑
ti−1∈S2
µ2G(t, a
int
1 . . . a
int
i−1, ti−1) . µ2G(ti−1, a
int
i , ti+1) . (A.112)
µ2G(ti+1, a
int
i+2 . . . a
int
l1 a b
int
1′ . . . b
int
l2 , t
′).
According to rule A.109 the probability of µ2G(ti−1, ainti , ti+1) is defined as
µ2G(ti−1, ainti , ti+1) = µ1G(si−1, a
int
i , si) . µ1G(si, a
int
i+1, si+1) . (A.113)
The same steps can be directly applied to the incoming transitions to state si+1 of other
source states si. Similarly, the case where the deleted transition (ssrc, ar, sdst) = (si, a
int
i+1, si+1)
are the last transitions in the first path that precedes the visible action a in the sequence
λ = aint1 . . . a
int
l1−1 a
int
l1
a bint1′ . . . b
int
l2
is also equivalent to the previous case as the visible action
needs to be an output action for the transition ssrc, ar, sdst and its probability to be propagated.
We have covered the two cases of transformation T2 and therefore shown that it produces a
weakly bisimilar model as defined by the equivalence relationship RT2 .
Example
0
1
2
〈0.7〉 !b
〈0.3〉 c
〈0.6〉 x
〈0.4〉 y
(a) PCA A1
0’ 2’
〈0.7〉 !b
〈0.3〉 c
(b) PCA A2
Figure A.13.: Examples of PCA Models for Weak Bisimulation - Transformation T2 : Multiple
Source States
We illustrate in the next paragraphs the application of the above steps to the example PCA
models A1 and A2 in Figure A.7 and their disjoint union Aˆ in Figure A.14. We specify the
equivalence relationship R12 between A1 and A2 : {(0, 0′), (2, 2′)}. The corresponding set of
equivalence classes SˆC is defined as { {0, 0′}, {2, 2′} }. Using the weak bisimulation definition in
equation A.45, we verify below the equivalence relationship R12 is a weak bisimulation.
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We start by considering the case where (s, t) = (0, 0′) and C = {2, 2′} for the output action
!b:
µˆG(0, τ
∗ !b τ∗, {2, 2′}) = µˆG(0′, τ∗ !b τ∗, {2, 2′}). (A.114)
By applying the expansion rules A.7, A.17 and A.19 we obtain
µ1G(0, !b, 1) . µ1G(1, τ, 2) = µ2G(0
′, !b, 2′). (A.115)
By replacing µ1G and µ2G by the probabilities of the corresponding transitions we verify the
condition A.115:
0.7 . (0.6 + 0.4) = 0.7 . (A.116)
We now consider the case where (s, t) = (0, 0′) and C = {2, 2′} for paths that only include
internal actions:
µˆG(0, τ
∗, {2, 2′}) = µˆG(0′, τ∗, {2, 2′}). (A.117)
By applying the expansion rules A.7, A.17 and A.19 we obtain
µ1G(0, τ, 2) = µ2G(0
′, τ, 2′). (A.118)
By replacing µ1G and µ2G by the probabilities of the corresponding transitions we verify the
condition A.118:
0.3 = 0.3 . (A.119)
Therefore, the equivalence relationship R12 verifies the conditions for weak bisimulation de-
fined by equation A.45 and includes the initial states 0 and 0′ of A1 and A2, respectively. As a
consequence, the PCA models A1 and A2 are weakly bisimilar.
Remarks
Note that the probabilities of other paths is not changed by the transformations T1 and T2 when
applied to transitions (ssrc, ar, sdst) as forward propagation is only performed only when there
233
APPENDIX A. NOTIONS OF EQUIVALENCE FOR PROBABILISTIC COMPONENT
AUTOMATA
0ˆ
0
1
2
0’ 2’
〈0.5〉 τ
〈0.5〉 τ
〈0.7〉 !b
〈0.3〉 c
〈0.6〉 x
〈0.4〉 y
〈0.7〉 !b
〈0.3〉 c
Figure A.14.: Disjoint Union PCA Aˆ for Weak Bisimulation Between PCA Models A1 and A2 -
Transformation T1
are no other incoming paths to state ssrc and backward propagation is applied only when the
state ssrc does not have other outgoing transitions.
A.4.4. Transitivity
In the previous Section we have shown that the automaton produced by the two transformations
used by the reduction algorithm is weakly bisimilar to the original automaton. In this Section we
show that the equivalence relationships RT1 and RT2 corresponding to the two transformations
are transitive.
Given A1 = 〈S1, q1, E1,∆1, µ1〉, A2 = 〈S2, q2, E2,∆2, µ2〉 and A3 = 〈S3, q3, E3,∆3, µ3〉, consider
A1 ≈ A2 and A2 ≈ A3 as defined by the equivalence relationships R12 and R23, respectively.
We want to show that A1 ≈ A2 ∧ A2 ≈ A3 =⇒ A1 ≈ A3 through an equivalence relationship
R13.
According to the weak bisimulation condition for PCA, A1 is weakly bisimilar to A2 through
the equivalence relationship R12 on the disjoint union Aˆ12 of A1 and A2 iff (q1, q2) ∈ R12 and
∀(s12, t12) ∈ R12, ∀a ∈ Eˆ12, ∀C12 ∈ SˆC12 :
µˆG12(s12, τ
∗ a τ∗, C12) = µˆG12(t12, τ∗ a τ∗, C12) (A.120)
µˆG12(s12, τ
∗ a τ∗, {s′12, t′12}) = µˆG12(t12, τ∗ a τ∗, {s′12, t′12}) (A.121)
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Similarly for A2 and A3, the equivalence relationshipR23 needs to hold the following properties
on the disjoint union Aˆ23 of A2 and A3, (q2, q3) ∈ R23 and ∀(s23, t23) ∈ R23, ∀a ∈ Eˆ23, ∀C23 ∈
SˆC23 :
µˆG23(s23, τ
∗ a τ∗, C23) = µˆG23(t23, τ∗ a τ∗, C23) (A.122)
µˆG23(s23, τ
∗ a τ∗, {s′23, t′23}) = µˆG23(t23, τ∗ a τ∗, {s′23, t′23}) (A.123)
In order for A1 to be weakly bisimilar to A3, an equivalence relationship R13 on the disjoint
union Aˆ13 of A1 and A3 needs to hold the following properties (q1, q3) ∈ R13 and ∀(s23, t23) ∈
R23,∀a ∈ Eˆ13,∀C13 ∈ SˆC13 :
µˆG13(s13, τ
∗ a τ∗, C13) = µˆG13(t13, τ∗ a τ∗, C13) (A.124)
µˆG13(s13, τ
∗ a τ∗, {s′13, t′13}) = µˆG13(t13, τ∗ a τ∗, {s′13, t′13}) (A.125)
Consider that the equivalence relationshipR13 is defined as follows based upon the equivalence
relationships R12 and R23:
∀(s12, t12) ∈ R12 ∧ (s23, t23) ∈ R23
Assuming s12 ∈ S1 =⇒ t12 ∈ S2
Assuming s23 ∈ S2 =⇒ t23 ∈ S3
If t12 = s23 (A.126)
(s12, t23) ∈ R13 ∧ [s12]R13 = {t13} ∧ [t23]R13 = {s12} (A.127)
We demonstrate that A1 is weakly bisimilar to A3 as defined by the equivalence relationship
R13.
Consider s12 = s1 ∈ S1 and s′12 = s′1 ∈ S1 =⇒ t12 = s2 ∈ S2 and t′12 = s′2 ∈ S2, then
µˆG13(s13, τ
∗ a τ∗, {s′13, t′13}) = µG1(s1, τ∗ a τ∗, s′1) (A.128)
and
µˆG13(t13, τ
∗ a τ∗, {s′13, t′13}) = µG2(s2, τ∗ a τ∗, s′2) (A.129)
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Equivalently for A2 and A3, consider s23 = s2 ∈ S2 and s′23 = s′2 ∈ S2 =⇒ t23 = s3 ∈ S3 and
t′23 = s′3 ∈ S3, then
µˆG23(s23, τ
∗ a τ∗, {s′23, t′23}) = µG2(s2, τ∗ a τ∗, s′2) (A.130)
and
µˆG23(t23, τ
∗ a τ∗, {s′23, t′23}) = µF3G3(s3, τ∗ a τ∗, s′3) (A.131)
From A1 ≈ A2 it holds that
µG1(s1, τ
∗ a τ∗, s′1) = µG2(s2, τ
∗ a τ∗, s′2),
and from A2 ≈ A3 it holds that
µG2(s2, τ
∗ a τ∗, s′2) = µ
F3
G3(s3, τ
∗ a τ∗, s′3).
According to rule A.127 for defining the equivalence relationship (s1, s3) ∈ R13 if (s1, s2) ∈ R12
and (s2, s3) ∈ R23. Consequently it holds that
µG1(s1, τ
∗ a τ∗, s′1) = µG2(s2, τ
∗ a τ∗, s′2) = µ
F3
G3(s3, τ
∗ a τ∗, s′3) =⇒
µˆG13(s13, τ
∗ a τ∗, s′13) = µˆG13(t13, τ
∗ a τ∗, t′13).
The same steps can be applied to the condition for weak bisimulation for paths that only include
internal actions.
Example
Using PCA models A1, A2 and A3 in Figure A.15 we now describe the application of the
previous rules to define a transitive relationship between equivalence relationships. Consider the
model A2 (Figure A.15(b)) has been obtained by applying the transformation T1 to A1 (Figure
A.15(a)) w.r.t. transition 1
x,0.7−−−→ 2. The corresponding equivalence relationship R12 is defined
as R12 = { (0, 0′), (1, 1′), (3, 3′), (4, 4′), (E,E′) }. On the other hand, the model A3 (Figure
A.15(c)) has been obtained by applying transformation T2 to model A2 w.r.t. to transitions
1′ z,0.7−−−→ 3′ and 1′ y,0.3−−−→ 3′ and the corresponding equivalence relationship R23 is defined as
R23 = { (0′, 0′′), (1′, 1′′), (4′, 4′′), (E′, E′′) }. We now describe how an equivalence relationship
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R13 is defined from R12 and R23 and show that models A1 and A3 are weakly bisimilar given
that A1 ≈ A2 and A2 ≈ A3.
From rules A.126 and A.126 we obtain the following equivalence relationshipR13 = { (0, 0′′), (1, 1′′),
(4, 4′′), (E,E′′) }. The corresponding set of equivalence classes SˆC is defined as { {0, 0′′}, {1, 1′′},{4, 4′′},
{E,E′′} }. Using the weak bisimulation definition in equation A.45, we verify below the equiv-
alence relationship R13 is a weak bisimulation.
We start by considering the case where (s, t) = (0, 0′′) and C = {1, 1′′} for the input action a:
µˆG(0, τ
∗ ?a τ∗, {1, 1′′}) = µˆG(0′′, τ∗ ?a τ∗, {1, 1′′}). (A.132)
Given that there is a single path between states 0 and 1 as well as between states 0′′ and 1′′ we
derive the following from the expansion rule A.19:
µˆG(0, , 0) . µˆG(0, ?a, {1, 1′′}) = µˆG(0′′, , 0′′) . µˆG(0′′, τ∗ ?a τ∗, {1, 1′′}). (A.133)
By applying rule A.17 to µˆG(0, , 0) and µˆG(0
′′, , 0′′) as well as the expansion rule A.7 when µG
is applied to a set of states, we obtain
1 .
(
µˆG(0, ?a, 1) + µˆG(0, ?a, 1
′′)
)
= 1 .
(
µˆG(0
′′, a, 1) + µˆG(0′′, a, 1′′)
)
. (A.134)
Given that the transitions µˆG(0, ?a, 1
′′) and µˆG(0′′, ?a, 1) do not exist in ∆ˆ, we derive
µˆG(0, ?a, 1) + 0 = 0 + µˆG(0
′′, ?a, 1′′). (A.135)
By replacing µˆG(0, a, 1) by µ1G(0, ?a, 1) and µˆG(0
′′, ?a, 1′′) by µ3G(0′′, ?a, 1′′) we confirm that
the condition for weak bisimulation is verified for this case:
1 = 1 (A.136)
Consider now the case where (s, t) = (1, 1′′) and C = {3, 3′′} for the output action !b:
µˆG(1, τ
∗ !b τ∗, {3, 3′′}) = µˆG(1′′, τ∗ !b τ∗, {3, 3′′}). (A.137)
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While there is only one transition in the path between states 1′′ and 3′′ in Aˆ, the paths between
states 1 and 3 include transitions through intermediate state 2. Therefore, the general condition
A.21 for weak bisimulation is mapped to:
µˆG(1, τ !b, {3, 3′′}) = µˆG(1′′, !b, {3, 3′′}). (A.138)
Using the expansion rule A.19 on µˆG(1, τ !b, {3, 3′′}) we obtain:
∑
s∈Sˆ
µˆG(1, τ, s) . µˆG(s, !b, {3, 3′′}) = µˆG(1′′, !b, {3, 3′′}). (A.139)
We obtain the following by also applying the rule A.7 when µG is applied to a set of states:
µˆG(1, τ, 2) .
(
µˆG(2, !b, 3) + µˆG(2, !b, 3
′′)
)
= µˆG(1
′′, !b, 3) + µˆG(1′′, !b, 3′′). (A.140)
By replacing µˆG by the corresponding cumulative probability functions from A1 and A3 we
derive
µ1G(1, τ, 2) .
(
µ1G(2, !b, 3) + 0
)
= 0 + µ3G(1
′′, !b, 3′′). (A.141)
and confirm that the condition for weak bisimulation is also verified for this case:
(0.7 + 0.3) . 0.95 = 0.95 (A.142)
Finally, consider the case where (s, t) = (1, 1′′) and C = {E,E′′} for the output failure action
∼!b:
µˆG(1, τ
∗ ∼!b τ∗, {E,E′′}) = µˆG(1′′, τ∗ ∼!b τ∗, {E,E′′}). (A.143)
By applying the same steps as for the previous case, we obtain
µ1G(1, τ, 2) .
(
µ1G(2, ∼!b, E) + 0
)
= 0 + µ3G(1
′′,∼!b, E′′). (A.144)
and confirm that the condition for weak bisimulation is also verified for this case:
(0.7 + 0.3) . 0.05 = 0.05 (A.145)
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The equivalence relationshipR13 verifies the conditions for weak bisimulation defined by equa-
tion A.45 and includes the initial states 0 and 0′′ of A1 and A3, respectively. As a consequence,
the PCA models A1 and A3 are weakly bisimilar.
We have shown that the equivalence relationships associated with each transformation are
weakly bisimilar and transitive. In the general case, a sequence of n transformations produces a
weakly bisimilar model An from an original model A1 as defined by the equivalence relationship
R1n. Therefore, the reduced model produced the hiding operator is a weakly bisimilar model
as the reduction algorithm applies a single transformation to the incoming transitions of each
state.
A.5. Congruence
In the previous sections we demonstrated that the reduced models produced by the reduction
algorithm preserve the reachability properties of the original model by showing that the equiva-
lence relationships produced by each reduction case are weakly bisimilar, and the application of
a sequence of transitions also produces a weakly bisimilar model. In this Section we show that
these relationships are also a congruence on PCA. In other words, if two PCA models A1 and
A2 are weakly bisimilar as defined by an equivalence relationship RTi (A1 RTiA2), the models
resulting from the application of any operator on PCA models to A1 and/or A2 are also weakly
bisimilar. Formally, if A1 ≈ A2 then:
A1 \ Enobs ≈ A2 \ Enobs (hiding) (A.146)
A1 @ Eunused ≈ A2 @ Eunused (interface) (A.147)
A1 /L ≈ A2 /L (re-labelling) (A.148)
A1 ‖B ≈ A2 ‖B (parallel composition) (A.149)
Consequently, given an original model A1 and an expression involving any operator supported
by PCA, the model A1 can be replaced by a weakly bisimilar model A2 whilst preserving weak
bisimulation. In the next Sections we show this result for each of the listed operators.
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0 1
2
3 4
E
〈1.0〉 ?a
〈0.7〉 x
〈0.3〉 y
〈1.0〉 z
〈0.95〉 !b
〈0.05〉 ∼!b
(a) PCA A1
0’ 1’ 3’ 4’
E’
〈1.0〉 ?a
〈0.7〉 z
〈0.3〉 y
〈0.95〉 !b
〈0.05〉 ∼ !b
(b) PCA A2
0” 1” 4”
E”
〈1.0〉 ?a 〈0.95〉 !b
〈0.05〉 ∼!b
(c) PCA A3
Figure A.15.: Examples of PCA Models for Transitivity Property
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0ˆ 0 1
2
3 4
E
0” 1” 4”
E”
〈0.5〉 τ
〈0.5〉 τ
〈1.0〉 ?a
〈0.7〉 x
〈0.3〉 y
〈1.0〉 z
〈0.95〉 !b
〈0.05〉 ∼!b〈1.0〉 ?a 〈0.95〉 !b
〈0.05〉 ∼!b
Figure A.16.: Disjoint Union PCA Aˆ for Transitivity Property
A.5.1. Hiding
Given A1 ≈ A1 \ Enobs (A.150)
and A2 ≈ A2 \ Enobs (A.151)
then A1 \ Enobs ≈ A2 =⇒ A1 \ Enobs ≈ A2 \ Enobs (A.152)
The conditions A.150, A.151 and A.152 are verified using the transitivity property associated
with the transformations Ti.
A.5.2. Interface
Given two models A1 ≈ A2 and the corresponding equivalence relationship R that verifies the
conditions for weak bisimulation on their disjoint union Aˆ. We show in the next paragraphs how
the same equivalence relationship holds when applying the interface operator @ w.r.t. set of
input actions E inunbound to both A1 and A2. Consider A′1 = A1 @ E inunbound and A′2 = A2 @ E inunbound
and their disjoint union Aˆ′.
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In the following paragraphs we show that R is also a weak bisimulation on Aˆ′, such that
∀(s, t) ∈ R, ∀C ∈ SˆC and ∀a ∈ Evisible the following conditions hold:
µˆG(s, τ
∗ a τ∗, C) = µˆG(t, τ∗ a τ∗, C), (A.153)
µˆG(s, τ
∗, C) = µˆG(t, τ∗, C) where τ ∈ E int1 . (A.154)
If in equation A.153 the visible action a corresponds to an output action or an input action
not in E inunbound, then the condition is verified given that A1 ≈ A2. In the case that action a is
an input action in E inunbound and assuming s, s′ ∈ S1 and t, t′ ∈ S2, we expand the equation A.153
as follows:
∑
s′′∈S1
µ1G(s, τ
∗, s′′) . µ1G(s′′, a τ∗, s′) =
∑
t′′∈S2
µ2G(t, τ
∗, t′′) . µ2G(t′′, a τ∗, t′) (A.155)
From the constraints of transformations T1 and T2 where transitions labelled with internal
actions cannot be propagated to transitions labelled with input actions, we obtain that states
s′′ and t′′ are weakly bisimilar
(
(s′′, t′′) ∈ R ) thus ∑s′′∈S1 µ1G(s, τ∗, s′′) = ∑t′′∈S2 µ2G(t, τ∗, t′′)
which verifies condition A.154.
A.5.3. Relabelling
Given two models A1 ≈ A2 and the corresponding equivalence relationship R that verifies the
conditions for weak bisimulation on their disjoint union Aˆ. We show in the next paragraphs how
the same equivalence relationship holds when applying the relabelling operator w.r.t. relation
L to both A1 and A2. Consider A
′
1 = A1 L and A
′
2 = A2 / L and their disjoint union Aˆ
′.
When the relation is {a}×L, a ∈ E1, each transition (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆1 is replaced by #(L) transi-
tions labelled with the action labels in L and the probability associated with those transitions is
re-defined to µ′1(s, a, s′) =
µ1(s,a,s′)
#(L) . Note that the original probability µ1(s, a, s
′) can be defined
as
µ1(s, a, s
′) =
∑
(s,a,s′)∈∆1
µ′1(s, a, s
′)
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which is the same as definition µG in equation A.5. The same steps can be applied to A2 to derive
the new probabilities of re-labelled transitions. Therefore, the R is also a weak bisimulation on
Aˆ′, such that ∀(s, t) ∈ R, ∀C ∈ SˆC and ∀a ∈ Evisible the following conditions hold:
µˆG(s, τ
∗ a τ∗, C) = µˆG(t, τ∗ a τ∗, C), (A.156)
µˆG(s, τ
∗, C) = µˆG(t, τ∗, C) where τ ∈ E int1 . (A.157)
A.5.4. Parallel Composition
Consider two models A1 ≈ A2 and the corresponding equivalence relationship R which verifies
the conditions for weak bisimulation on their disjoint union Aˆ. Given another B, we define
the composite models A1B = A1 ‖B = 〈SA1B, qA1B, EA1B, ∆A1B, µA1B〉 and A2B = A2 ‖B =
〈SA2B, qA2B, EA2B, ∆A2B, µA2B〉. We define an equivalence relationship R′ on Aˆ‖ the disjoint
union of A1B and A2B as follows:
∀〈sA2 , sB〉 ∈ SA2B ∧ (sA1 , sA2) ∈ R, (〈sA1 , sB〉, 〈sA2 , sB〉) ∈ R′ iff (A.158)
∆A2B(〈sA2B, sB〉) = ∅ ∨
(ρeA2(sA2) ∩ ρeB(sB)) 6= ∅ (A2 and B make a synchronous move )
The equivalence relationship R′ defines as bisimilar the states where both A2 and B make a
synchronous move as well as deadlock states. If A2 synchronises with B by executing an output
action a that leads to a state sA2 ∈ SA2 , then A1 also makes a synchronous move with B through
action a. When constructing A2 by reducing A1, if no transition is deleted immediately prior or
after to the transition labelled with output action a leading to state sA1 ∈ SA1 , then the pair of
bisimilar states (sA1 , sA2) is added to R′. The other states represent intermediate states where
the models execute independently their non-synchronisable actions.
In the following paragraphs we show that R′ is a weak bisimulation on Aˆ‖, such that ∀(s, t) ∈
R′, ∀C ∈ SˆC and ∀a ∈ shared(A1, B) = EA1 ∩ EB the following conditions hold:
µˆG(s, τ
∗ a τ∗, C) = µˆG(t, τ∗ a τ∗, C), (A.159)
µˆG(s, τ
∗, C) = µˆG(t, τ∗, C) where τ ∈ (EA1 ∪ EB) \ shared(A1, B) . (A.160)
Note that shared(A1, B) only contains synchronisable interface actions as we assume the models
A1 and B are compatible for parallel composition. The special action label τ refers in this case
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to all actions on which the models do not synchronise, which include by definition their internal
actions but also input and output actions which are not shared between the two models.
Given how the equivalence relationship R′ is constructed, and assuming s = 〈sA1 , sB〉, s′ =
〈s′A1 , s′B〉, t = 〈sA2 , sB〉 and t′ = 〈s′A2 , s′B〉, we redefine the condition A.159 as follows:
µA1B−G(〈sA1 , sB〉, τ∗ a τ∗, 〈s′A1 , s′B〉) = µA2B−G(〈sA2 , sB〉, τ∗ a τ∗, 〈s′A2 , s′B〉) . (A.161)
By applying the expansion rule A.19 for a sequence of actions to µA1B−G(〈sA1 , sB〉, τ∗ a τ∗, 〈s′A1 , s′B〉)
we obtain:
∑
〈s′′A1 ,s
′′
B〉∈SA1B
µA1B−G(〈sA1 , sB〉, τ∗, 〈s′′A1 , s′′B〉) . (A.162)
( ∑
〈s′′′A1 ,s
′′′
B 〉∈SA1B
µA1B−G(〈s′′A1 , s′′B〉, a, 〈s′′′A1 , s′′′B〉) . µA1B−G(〈s′′′A1 , s′′′B〉, τ∗, 〈s′A1 , s′B〉)
)
.
In equation A.162, µA1B−G(〈sA1 , sB〉, τ∗, 〈s′′A1 , s′′B〉) and µA1B−G(〈s′′′A1 , s′′′B〉, τ∗, 〈s′A1 , s′B〉) denote
paths of interleaved transitions labelled with non-synchronisable actions in A1 and B, while
µA1B−G(〈s′′A1 , s′′B〉, a, 〈s′′′A1 , s′′′B〉) represents a synchronous move by A1 and B. As a result, we
further expand µA1B−G(〈sA1 , sB〉, τ∗ a τ∗, 〈s′A1 , s′B〉) to
∑
〈s′′A1 ,sB〉∈SA1B
µA1−G(sA1 , τ
∗, s′′A1) . µB−G(sB, τ
∗, s′′B) . (A.163)
( ∑
〈s′′′A1 ,s
′′′
B 〉∈SA1B
µ′A1−G(s
′′
A1
, a, s′′′A1) . µB−G(s
′′
B, a, s
′′′
B)
ηA1B(s
′′
A1
, s′′B)
.
µA1−G(s
′′′
A1 , τ
∗, s′A1) . µB−G(s
′′′
B , τ
∗, s′B)
)
.
By applying the same steps to µA2B−G(〈sA2 , sB〉, τ∗ a τ∗, 〈s′A2 , s′B〉) we derive:
∑
〈s′′A2 ,sB〉∈SA2B
µA2−G(sA2 , τ
∗, s′′A2) . µB−G(sB, τ
∗, s′′B) . (A.164)
( ∑
〈s′′′A2 ,s
′′′
B 〉∈SA2B
µ′A2−G(s
′′
A2
, a, s′′′A2) . µB−G(s
′′
B, a, s
′′′
B)
ηA2B(s
′′
A2
, s′′B)
.
µA2−G(s
′′′
A2 , τ
∗, s′A2) . µB−G(s
′′′
B , τ
∗, s′B)
)
.
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We now consider the case when the sequence τ∗ a τ∗ does not contain deleted transitions.
Given the rules A.158 for constructing R′, we obtain that 〈s′′′A1 , s′′′B〉 = 〈s′A1 , s′B〉 and the suffix
sequence τ∗ is an empty sequence . Therefore, we simplify the previous equations A.163 and
A.164 into:
∑
〈s′′A1 ,sB〉∈SA1B
µA1−G(sA1 , τ
∗, s′′A1) . µB−G(sB, τ
∗, s′′B) . (A.165)
µ′A1−G(s
′′
A1
, a, s′A1) . µB−G(s
′′
B, a, s
′
B)
ηA1B(s
′′
A1
, s′′B)
, and
∑
〈s′′A2 ,sB〉∈SA2B
µA2−G(sA2 , τ
∗, s′′A2) . µB−G(sB, τ
∗, s′′B) . (A.166)
µ′A2−G(s
′′
A2
, a, s′A2) . µB−G(s
′′
B, a, s
′
B)
ηA2B(s
′′
A2
, s′′B)
.
Given that A1 ≈ A2, then µA1−G(sA1 , τ∗, s′′A1) = µA2−G(sA2 , τ∗, s′′A2), then we verify the condi-
tion A.160 as
µA1−G(sA1 , τ
∗, s′′A1) . µB−G(sB, τ
∗, s′′B) = µA2−G(sA2 , τ
∗, s′′A2) . µB−G(sB, τ
∗, s′′B).
Consequently, to verify the condition for weak bisimulation define by equation A.159 we need
to show that
µ′A1−G(s
′′
A1
, a, s′A1)
ηA1B(s
′′
A1
, s′′B)
=
µ′A2−G(s
′′
A2
, a, s′A2)
ηA2B(s
′′
A2
, s′′B)
. (A.167)
We recall the normalisation rules associated with the parallel composition operator defined in
Chapter 3, where the adjusted transition is defined as follows:
µ′A1−G(s
′′
A1 , a, s
′
A1) =

µA1−G(s′′A1 , a, s
′
A1
) if a ∈ E intA1
µA1−G(s
′′
A1
,a,s′A1 )
ηenabledA1B
if a ∈ EoutA1
where
ηenabledA1B (s
′′
A1 , sB) =
µenabledA1 (s
′′
A1
, sB)∑
(s′′A1 ,a
out,s′A1 )
µA1(s
′′
A1
, aout, s′A1)
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Given that there are no deleted transition in the sequence τ∗ a in A1, we have that (s′′A1 , s
′′
A2
) ∈
R), (s′A1 , s′A2) ∈ R) and the transitions of s′′A1 are all preserved in A2 from state s′′A2 . Therefore,
the equation A.167 is verified in this case.
In the case that the prefix sequence τ∗ in A1 contains deleted transitions, if the deleted
transitions are not incoming transitions to (s′′A1 , a, s
′
A1
) the previous steps can be applied to
verify the the condition for weak bisimulation define by equation A.159 as A1 ≈ A2, implies that
µA1−G(sA1 , τ∗, s′′A1) = µA2−G(sA2 , τ
∗, s′′A2).
On the other hand, two additional cases need to be considered if the delete transitions are
the last of prefix sequence τ∗ in A1. In the first case we consider that all output actions from
state s′′A1 can be synchronised. As a result, η
enabled
A1B
(s′′A1 , sB) = 1 and µ
′
A1−G(s
′′
A1
, a, s′A1) =
µA1−G(s′′A1 , a, s
′
A1
). In this case,
ηA1B(s
′′
A1 , s
′′
B) =
∑
(s′′A1 ,a,s
′
A1
)∈∆A(s′′A1 )
a∈ElocA1
µA1(s
′′
A1 , a, s
′
A1) +
∑
(s′′B ,b,s
′
B)∈∆B(s′′B)
b∈ElocB
µB(s
′′
B, b, s
′
B)
and
ηA2B(s
′′
A2 , s
′′
B) =
∑
(s′′A2 ,a,s
′
A2
)∈∆A(s′′A2 )
a∈ElocA2
µA2(s
′′
A2 , a, s
′
A2) +
∑
(s′′B ,b,s
′
B)∈∆B(s′′B)
b∈ElocB
µB(s
′′
B, b, s
′
B) .
Given that there are no blocked transitions from both states s′′A1 and s
′′
A2
, then we have
∑
(s′′A1 ,a,s
′
A1
)∈∆A(s′′A1 )
a∈ElocA1
µA1(s
′′
A1 , a, s
′
A1) =
∑
(s′′A2 ,a,s
′
A2
)∈∆A(s′′A2 )
a∈ElocA2
µA2(s
′′
A2 , a, s
′
A2).
Therefore, in order to verify the equations A.165 and A.166 result in the same value, we have
to show that
∑
〈s′′A1 , s
′′
B〉∈SA1B
µA1−G(sA1 , τ
∗, s′′A1) . µA1−G(s
′′
A1 , a, s
′
A1) = (A.168)
∑
〈s′′A2 , s
′′
B〉∈SA2B
µA2−G(sA2 , τ
∗, s′′A2) . µA2−G(s
′′
A2 , a, s
′
A2)
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We start by expanding the left side as
∑
〈s′′′A1 , s
′′′
B 〉∈SA1B
µA1−G(sA1 , τ
∗, s′′′A1) .
( ∑
〈s′′A1 , s
′′
B〉∈SA1B
µA1−G(s
′′′
A1 , τ, s
′′
A1) . µA1−G(s
′′
A1 , a, s
′
A1)
)
.
(A.169)
In order for
∑
〈s′′A1 , sB〉∈SA1B
µA1−G(s′′′A1 , τ, s
′′
A1
) to be propagated forward to µA1−G(s′′A1 , a, s
′
A1
),
we are either in the case of transformation T1 and transformation T2 when all the incoming
transitions to state s′′A1 come from state s
′′′
Ai
. In both cases we have that (s′′′A1 , s
′′
A2
) ∈ R and
µA2−G(s
′′
A2 , a, s
′
A2) = µA1−G(s
′′′
A1 , τ, s
′′
A1) . µA1−G(s
′′
A1 , a, s
′
A1),
which verifies the equality A.168.
We now consider the case where some transitions labelled with output actions in A1 and A2
may be blocked as B is not ready to synchronise with all of them, therefore ηenabledA1B (s
′′
A1
, sB) < 1,
ηenabledA2B (s
′′
A2
, sB) < 1 and η
enabled
A1B
(s′′A1 , sB) 6= ηenabledA2B (s′′A2 , sB). We start by simplifying the
equations A.165 and A.166 by removing the probabilities of transitions in B as these are not
changed:
∑
〈s′′A1 ,s
′′
B〉∈SA1B
µA1−G(sA1 , τ
∗, s′′A1) .
µ′A1−G(s
′′
A1
, a, s′A1)
ηA1B(s
′′
A1
, s′′B)
, and (A.170)
∑
〈s′′A2 ,s
′′
B〉∈SA2B
µA2−G(sA2 , τ
∗, s′′A2) .
µ′A2−G(s
′′
A2
, a, s′A2)
ηA2B(s
′′
A2
, s′′B)
. (A.171)
By applying the expansion rule to the sequence τ∗ in equation A.170 we obtain
∑
〈s′′′A1 ,s
′′′
B 〉∈SA1B
µA1−G(sA1 , τ
∗, s′′′A1) .
( ∑
〈s′′A1 ,s
′′
B〉∈SA1B
µA1−G(s
′′′
A1 , τ, s
′′
A1) .
µ′A1−G(s
′′
A1
, a, s′A1)
ηA1B(s
′′
A1
, s′′B)
)
,
(A.172)
where
µ′A1−G(s
′′
A1 , a, s
′
A1) =
µA1−G(s′′A1 , a, s
′
A1
)
ηenabledA1B (s
′′
A1
, sB)
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Given that the transitions s′′′A1 , τ, s
′′
A1
have been propagated forward when constructing A2 from
A1, we derive the following from equation A.171:
µA1−G(sA1 , τ
∗, s′′′A1) = µA2−G(sA2 , τ
∗, s′′A2) , (A.173)
as A1 ≈ A2. Therefore, we need to show the following condition holds in order to show that the
expressions in equations A.170 and A.171 result in the same value.
µ′A2−G(s
′′
A2 , a, s
′
A2) =
∑
〈s′′A1 ,s
′′
B〉∈SA1B
µA1−G(s
′′′
A1 , τ, s
′′
A1) . µ
′
A1−G(s
′′′
A1 , a, s
′
A1). (A.174)
We start by expanding µ′A2−G(s
′′
A2
, a, s′A2) into
µ′A2−G(s
′′
A2 , a, s
′
A2) =
µA2−G(s′′A2 , a, s
′
A2
)
ηenabledA2B (s
′′
A2
, sB)
(A.175)
In order for
∑
〈s′′A1 , sB〉∈SA1B
µA1−G(s′′′A1 , τ, s
′′
A1
) to be propagated forward to µA1−G(s′′A1 , a, s
′
A1
),
we are either in the case of transformation T1 and transformation T2 when all the incoming
transitions to state s′′A1 come from state s
′′′
Ai
. In both cases we have that (s′′′A1 , s
′′
A2
) ∈ R and
µA2−G(s
′′
A2 , a, s
′
A2) = µA1−G(s
′′′
A1 , τ, s
′′
A1) . µA1−G(s
′′
A1 , a, s
′
A1). (A.176)
We then use this equality to replace derive the following from equation A.175:
µ′A2−G(s
′′
A2 , a, s
′
A2) =
µA1−G(s′′′A1 , τ, s
′′
A1
) . µA1−G(s′′A1 , a, s
′
A1
)
ηenabledA2B (s
′′
A2
, sB)
, (A.177)
where
ηenabledA2B =
µenabledA2 (s
′′
A2
, sB)∑
(s′′A2 ,a
out,s′A2 )
µA2(s
′′
A2
, aout, s′A2)
.
Based on the equality A.183 we further expand ηenabledA2B as follows
ηenabledA2B =
µenabledA2 (s
′′
A2
, sB)∑
(s′′A1 ,a
out,s′A1 )
µA1−G(s′′′A1 , τ, s
′′
A1
) . µA1−G(s′′A1 , a
out, s′A1)
. (A.178)
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From the condition for propagation rules defined by the reduction algorithm, the set of out-
put actions that are enabled at state s′′A2 are the same as the actions enabled at state s
′′
A1
.
Consequently we redefine ηenabledA2B as follows
ηenabledA2B (s
′′
A2 , s
′′
B) =
µA1−G(s′′′A1 , τ, s
′′
A1
) . µenabledA1 (s
′′
A1
, sB)
µA1−G(s′′′A1 , τ, s
′′
A1
) .
(∑
(s′′A1 ,a
out,s′A1 )
µA1−G(s′′A1 , a
out, s′A1)
) , (A.179)
which is the same as ηenabledA1B (s
′′
A1
, s′′B).
Therefore, we can conclude that
µ′A2−G(s
′′
A2 , a, s
′
A2) =
µA1−G(s′′′A1 , τ, s
′′
A1
) . µA1−G(s′′A1 , a, s
′
A1
)
ηenabledA1B (s
′′
A1
, s′′B)
, (A.180)
We now consider the last case where the deleted transitions are the outgoing transitions from
state s′′′A1 in equation A.163 defined earlier.
∑
〈s′′A1 ,sB〉∈SA1B
µA1−G(sA1 , τ
∗, s′′A1) . µB−G(sB, τ
∗, s′′B) .
( ∑
〈s′′′A1 ,s
′′′
B 〉∈SA1B
µ′A1−G(s
′′
A1
, a, s′′′A1) . µB−G(s
′′
B, a, s
′′′
B)
ηA1B(s
′′
A1
, s′′B)
.
µA1−G(s
′′′
A1 , τ
∗, s′A1) . µB−G(s
′′′
B , τ
∗, s′B)
)
.
From the propagation rule A.100 defined for transformation T2 and the rules for constructing
R′, we derive that the suffix sequence τ∗ for B is an empty sequence , as s′′′B = s′B, and a
sequence of a single non-synchronisable action τ for A1. We simplify the previous equation as
follows:
∑
〈s′′A1 ,sB〉∈SA1B
µA1−G(sA1 , τ
∗, s′′A1) . µB−G(sB, τ
∗, s′′B) . (A.181)
( ∑
〈s′′′A1 ,s
′′′
B 〉∈SA1B
µ′A1−G(s
′′
A1
, a, s′′′A1) . µB−G(s
′′
B, a, s
′′′
B)
ηA1B(s
′′
A1
, s′′B)
. µA1−G(s
′′′
A1 , τ, s
′
A1)
)
..
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By applying the same principles to equation A.164 we obtain the following
∑
〈s′′A2 ,sB〉∈SA2B
µA2−G(sA2 , τ
∗, s′′A2) . µB−G(sB, τ
∗, s′′B) . (A.182)
µ′A2−G(s
′′
A2
, a, s′A2) . µB−G(s
′′
B, a, s
′
B)
ηA2B(s
′′
A2
, s′′B)
.
In order for µA1−G(s′′′A1 , τ, s
′
A1
) to be propagated backwards to
∑
〈s′′′A1 ,s
′′′
B 〉∈SA1B
µ′A1−G(s
′′
A1 , a, s
′′′
A1)
using transformation T2, all the incoming transitions to state s
′′
A1
originate from state s′′′Ai , which
reduces the summation to only one state s′′′Ai .
From the propagation rule A.109 defined for transformation T2 and the rules for constructing
R′, we obtain that (s′A2 , s′A1) ∈ R′ and
µA2−G(s
′′
A2 , a, s
′
A2) = µA1−G(s
′′
A1 , a, s
′′′
A1) . µA1−G(s
′′′
A1 , τ, s
′
A1) . (A.183)
We have therefore shown thatR′ is a weak bisimulation on Aˆ‖, such that ∀(s, t) ∈ R′, ∀C ∈ SˆC
and ∀a ∈ shared(A1, B) = EA1 ∩ EB the following condition holds the condition A.159:
µˆG(s, τ
∗ a τ∗, C) = µˆG(t, τ∗ a τ∗, C),
µˆG(s, τ
∗, C) = µˆG(t, τ∗, C) where τ ∈ (EA1 ∪ EB) \ shared(A1, B) .
A.6. Summary
In this Chapter we have defined notions of equivalence between PCA models by extending the
definitions for strong and weak bisimulations that have been applied to PLTS models. We then
used the definition of weak bisimulation for PCA models to show that the models produced
by the reduction algorithm described in the Chapter 4 preserve the reachability properties
of the original representations. In order to allow compositional system verification, we show
that weak bisimulation is a congruence for the parallel composition operator. This means that
composite representations constructed using the original models or their reduced representations
are equivalence w.r.t. their reachability probabilistic properties. We have also shown that
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weak bisimulation is a congruence for all the other operators supported by PCA. As a result,
given an expression involving PCA models an any combination of the supported operators, the
models involved can be substituted by reduced representations whilst preserving the reachability
probabilistic properties of the original result.
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B. Tool Support - LTSA-PCA
We present in this Chapter our extension of the LTSA model checker [MK06]. It supports
the specification, visualisation and failure analysis of composable, probabilistic behaviour of
component-based systems, modelled as Probabilistic Component Automata (PCA). To evaluate
aspects such as the probability of system failure, a DTMC model can be automatically con-
structed from the composition of the PCA representations of each component and analysed in
tools such as PRISM [KNP]. Existing behavioural analysis techniques in LTSA can be applied
to PCA representations to verify, for instance, the compatibility of interface behaviour between
components with matching provided-required interfaces.
Figure B.1.: Architecture of e-commerce System [FGT12]
We use the e-commerce system described by Filieri et. al [FGT12] to illustrate the LTSA-PCA
tool. This system consists of a web-service that sells merchandise and integrates three external
web-services: authentication, shipping and payment. The original DTMC model [FGT12] is a
closed representation of the entire system and has not been constructed from the models of its
components. To illustrate our approach, we assume that the system is constructed from the
components shown in Figure B.1. Based on the original DTMC model (Figure B.2) we specify
the behaviour of each component in P-FSP. We then construct the composite model of the e-
commerce system and show it is equivalent to the original DTMC model, thereby producing the
same reliability analysis.
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Figure B.2.: Original DTMC Model of e-commerce System [FGT12]
In the same way that LTS models are defined based on FSP expressions, PCA models are
constructed using our probabilistic extension of FSP (P-FSP). The specification of LTS or PCA
models is done using the Editor panel shown in Figure B.3.
Figure B.3.: Editor Panel - LTSA-PCA
The P-FSP expression for the Authentication Service is shown in Figure B.4. Note that the
user has to specify the key-word pca before specifying any P-FSP expression. This allows us to
support both the specification of PCA models and LTS models, though only one type of model
can be specified when modelling a particular system.
254
Figure B.4.: Editor Panel - Authentication Service P-FSP
Figure B.5.: Editor Panel - Authentication Service PCA
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The corresponding PCA model for the Authentication Service is constructed by clicking on
the C button on top of the Edit panel to compile the P-FSP expression. The PCA graphical
representation of the Authentication Service can be seen using the Draw panel, as depicted by
Figure B.5.
The behaviour of the Authentication Service denotes three provided interfaces with no shared
(internal) behaviour, which is specified using a single simple process. In order to avoid duplicate
specification of shared behaviour, the system designer can define a local process which can be
re-used in different parts of the main model. These local processes can be used to model private
functions of a class as their scope is local to the main process. While a simple single process
ends with a dot, a comma separates the behaviour of the main process specification from its
local processes.
Consider now the behaviour of the Shipping Service where its two provided interfaces send back
the same message after processing each request (shippingConfirmation). The local process
CONFIRMATION represents the shared behaviour, thereby avoiding duplicating the specification
of the behaviour after actions processNormalRequest and processExpressRequest.
Figure B.6.: Editor Panel - Shipping Service P-FSP
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We now focus on how the composite model for the e-commerce system is built. The behaviour
of the E-Commerce component has to be adjusted to support interaction with the two clients,
as shown in Listing B.3.
Listing B.1: E Commerce component adjusted for two clients
| |E COMMERCE TWO CLIENTS = (E COMMERCE / {
{new . signUp}/ signUp ,
{ r e t . l o g i n }/ log in ,
{new . conf i rmat ion , r e t . con f i rmat ion }/ conf i rmat ion ,
{new . searchProduct , r e t . searchProduct }/ searchProduct ,
{new . buy , r e t . buy}/buy ,
{new . cont inueSearch , r e t . cont inueSearch }/ cont inueSearch ,
{new . normalShipping , r e t . normalShipping }/ normalShipping ,
{new . expressShipping , r e t . expres sSh ipp ing }/ expressShipping ,
{new . productsShipped , r e t . productsShipped }/ productsShipped ,
{new . checkout , r e t . checkout }/ checkout ,
{new . logout , r e t . l ogout }/ logout ,
{new . logoutConf i rmat ion , r e t . logoutConf i rmat ion }/ logoutConf i rmat ion } ) .
Similarly, all the actions of the two clients need to be prefixed to ensure that the behaviour of
the two clients is fully distinguished (Listing B.2). Note that the processes E COMMERCE TWO CLIENTS,
RET CLIENT and N CLIENT are defined based on processes that had been previously defined, e.g.
E COMMERCE. Consequently, their name needs to be preceded by the symbol ||.
Listing B.2: Relabelling of New-Client and Returning-Client components
| |RET CLIENT = r e t :RETURNING CLIENT.
| |N CLIENT = new :NEW CLIENT.
The final composite model of the e-Commerce system (E COMMERCE SYS) is constructed by
composing the adjusted models models E COMMERCE TWO CLIENTS, RET CLIENT and N CLIENT
with the models for the Authentication, Shipping and Payment services. This is done by clicking
on the parallel composition button ‖ below the main menu bar. Note that only one composite
model is constructed when clicking on the parallel composition button. If the current file being
edited had multiple composite models, the dropdown bar below above the Edit, Output and
Draw buttons can be used to select the active composite model.
When defining the expression for constructing the composite model of the e-Commerce system,
a special version of the parallel composition operator is used to determine the proportion of re-
quests from each client: ([(RET CLIENT, 0.65);(N CLIENT, 0.35) || E COMMERCE TWO CLIENTS])
. The last step for building the composite model involves using the hiding operator \ to remove
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the internal actions related to interactions with the different service components which were not
present in the original DTMC model.
Listing B.3: E Commerce component adjusted for two clients
| |E COMMERCE SYS =
( ( [ ( RET CLIENT, 0 . 6 5 ) ; ( N CLIENT, 0 . 3 5 ) | | E COMMERCE TWO CLIENTS] )
| | AUTH SERVICE | | SHIPPING SERVICE | | PAYMENT SERVICE)
\ { authent icatedUser , checkCredent ia l s , confirmPayment , createUser ,
createdUser , expressShippingRequest , f i n i s h S e s s i o n , log inUser ,
logoutUser , logoutUserConf i rmation , normalShippingRequest ,
processExpressRequest , processNormalRequest , registerPayment ,
r eg i s t e rProduc t , sh ippingConf i rmat ion , signUpUser} ) .
The composite model before removing those transitions has 47 states and 60 transitions.
Although it is still possible to view its graphical representation in the Draw panel, a textual rep-
resentation can be analysed in the Transitions panel as show in Figure B.7, which is activated
via the Window option in the main menu bar.
Figure B.7.: Transitions Panel - LTSA-PCA
Furthermore, the Alphabet panel shows the alphabet of each model used in the currently
active composite model. This panel can be used to analyse if all actions have been synchronised
in the composite model.
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Figure B.8.: Alphabet Panel - LTSA-PCA
After the composite model of the e-commerce system has been constructed, it can be converted
to a DTMC model for analysis of reliability properties in PRISM model checker as it does not
have input actions. This is done by clicking on the Prism button next to the parallel composition
‖ button. The converted DTMC model is shown in the PRISM panel, as depicted in Figure B.9,
and can then be copied to PRISM model checker for analysis. The tool currently supports
automatic generation of state variables for reliability analysis: one for each failure action and
a general failure variable that denotes the execution of any failure. The user is required to
manually edit the model in PRISM for analysis of operational properties that do not involve
failure actions.
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Figure B.9.: PRISM Panel - LTSA-PCA
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